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(Breat Commanbera 

EDITED BY JAMES GRANT WILSON 



GENERAL THOMAS 



Ube (Breat Commanders Series, 


Edited by General James Grant Wilson. 


Admiral Farragut. 

By Captain A. T. Mahan, U. S. N. 


Zachary Taylor. 

By General O. O. Howard, U. S. A. 


General Jackson. By James Parton. 


General Greene. 

By Captain Francis V. Greene, U. S. A. 


General J. E. Johnston. 

By Robert M. Hughes, of Virginia. 


General Thomas. 

By Henry Coppee, LL. D. 


IN PREPARATION. 


General Washington. 

By General Bradley T. Johnson. 


General Sherman. 

By General Manning F. Force. 


General Grant. 

By General James Grant Wilson, 


General Scott. 

By General Marcus J. Wright, 


Admiral Porter. 

By James R. Soley, late Assist. Sec. of Navy. 


General Lee. 

By General Fitzhugh Lee. 


General Hancock. 

By General Francis A, Walker. 


General Sheridan. 

By General Henry E. Davies. 


New York : D. Appleton & Co., i, 3, & 5 Bond St. 





^^J-^/9^ .-^O'^-^^^^^^^c 



D, APPLETON 5c C 9 



GREAT COMMANDERS 

• * * * 



GENERAL THOMAS 



1/ 



BY 



HENRY COPPEE, LL D. 

PROFESSOR IN THE LEHIGH UNIVERSITY, AND FORMERLY AN OFFICER 
OF ARTILLERY IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY 





NEW YORK 
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY 

1893 



nt^yf^Vj 






Copyright, 1893, 
By D. APPLETON AND COMPANY. 



All rights reserved. 



TO THE 
MEMORY OF THE OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF THE 

ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND 

WHO FELL WHILE FIGHTING WITH THOMAS, 

AND TO THE NOBLE SURVIVORS WHO CONTRIBUTED TO 

HIS RENOWN AND CHERISH HIS MEMORY 



PREFACE. 



When I undertook, at the request of the editor, 
to write a biographical sketch of General George 
H. Thomas, as one of the series of Great American 
Commanders, I soon found that my chief difficulty 
would be to condense within the small compass of a 
work like this the different portions of the great 
history in which he played a distinguished part. It 
was manifest that the battles in which he com- 
manded in person, and those in which under other 
commanders he held a very prominent place, must, 
of course, be more elaborately described. Those in 
which he had only a subordinate position need only 
such partial notice as will show what he individu- 
ally did. These latter are fully portrayed in the 
other volumes of the series, containing the lives of 
those generals who commanded in them. And yet 
even in such cases enough must be shown of the 
general field to enable the reader to see the relation 
sustained by the subject of our sketch to the other 
participants in the action. 

To illustrate : Mill Springs and Nashville must 



viii GENERAL THOMAS. 

be written out in full — they belong to Thomas. 
Chickamauga requires a great deal of attention, be- 
cause there, although another was in command, he 
stemmed the rushing tide and saved the day. At 
Chattanooga also, although Grant was in command, 
Thomas played so prominent a part that the whole 
field must be kept before the reader in order to 
appreciate his great achievements there. Thus it 
may happen, unavoidably, that the same field will 
be described in several works of the series, but as 
far as possible this will be avoided. Without enter- 
ing into further details, thus much has been said on 
this point in order that the reader may not look here 
for what is to be found elsewhere, well done by com- 
petent hands. I would mention also as a bar in 
judgment of the work that the name of the critics 
is legion ; every intelligent man who was in a battle 
has a word to say with regard to at least that por- 
tion of the field in which he served. 

Many vital authorities are not yet within the his- 
torian's reach ; such as are, are extremely volumi- 
nous, and impose a severe task of examination. Nor 
can there be left out of the account the prejudiced 
and contradictory claims of rival commanders, with 
their trains of followers, more persistent than the 
chiefs themselves. 

It is more than probable, therefore, that I have 
fallen into errors and made mistakes in spite of the 
strongest desire to avoid them. Wherever this is 



I PREFACE. ix 

shown, I stand ready and anxious to correct them 
and make the amend. My chief object has been to 
show what General Thomas was and what he did, 
not by odious comparisons with other generals, but 
in the light of a shining record, unrivaled in the 
history of the war. 

To General John M. Schofield, Commander in 
Chief of the Army, I am indebted for a copy of that 
famous work, The War of the Rebellion, Official 
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. It 
is a monument of industry and painstaking, with no 
rival in war records. With it alone the book might 
have been written. Without it, it could not have 
been. 

General William F. Smith, U. S. A., kindly fur- 
, nished me some papers and information, especially 
, concerning the campaign of Chattanooga, in which 
j he bore so distinguished a part. 

i General Thomas J. Wood has given me valuable 
i information concerning Chickamauga and Chatta- 
1 nooga, in both which he commanded a division with 
I great skill and gallantry. 

To Colonel Sanford C. Kellogg, U. S. A., I owe 
some important suggestions and the correction of 
certain errors into which I had fallen. 

My thanks are due to General James H. Wilson 
for corrections and suggestions, mainly with refer- 
ence to the campaign of Nashville, in which he 
played so splendid a part, and to Major William H. 



X GENERAL THOMAS. 

Lambert for the loan of letters and material. The 
latter has the finest and most complete collection of 
relics, letters, and authorities written and published 
with reference to General Thomas which exists. 

Many other friends have given me counsel and 
aid, but they are none of them responsible for the 
use I have made of such assistance. 

I have appended to the account of each battle 
extracts from the reports of both Union and Con- 
federate commanders. 

H. C. 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER PAGE 

I. — Early Life and Mexican War . . . . i 

II. — The Campaign with Patterson . . . .20 

III. — Appointed a Brigadier General . . .37 

IV. — Mill Springs 51 

v.— Corinth and Perryville 74 

VI. — The Battle of Stone's River . . . .94 

VII. — Forward to Chattanooga 118 

nil. — The Battle of Chickamauga . . . .135 

IX. — Thomas at Chattanooga 160 

X. — The Atlanta Campaign 199 

XI. — On to Nashville. — Franklin .... 233 
XII.— The Battle of Nashville and Results . . 264 

CIII.— Last Services and Death 298 

Index 321 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 



FACING PAGE 

ortrait of George Henry Thomas . . . Frontispiece 
he Battlefield of Logan's Cross Roads, or Mill Springs . 56 

'he Battlefield of Stone's River 98 

'he Battlefield of Chickamauga , . .... 144 
'he Battlefield of Nashville 268 



LIST OF AUTHORITIES CONSULTED. 



War of the Rebellion, Official Records of the Union and Con- 
federate Armies. 

The Rebellion Record, edited by Frank Moore. 

History of the Army of the Cumberland, by Chaplain Thomas 
B. Van Home. 

General Turchin's History of the Battle of Chickamauga. 

Steedman at Chickamauga. 

Memoirs of General William T, Sherman, by himself. 

Memoirs of General Ulysses S. Grant, by himself. 

Sherman's Historical Raid, by H. P. Boynton. 

Life of Thomas, by Thomas B. Van Home. 

Life of Thomas, by General R. W. Johnson. 

Notes on Chattanooga, by General William F. Smith. 

Memoirs of General Joseph E. Johnston, by himself. 

Pollard's First, Second, and Third Years of the War. 

Cullom's, General George W., Biographical Register of the 
Officers and Graduates of the Military Academy. 

Shank's Characteristics of our Generals. 

General J. W. De Peyster's Memorial Paper before the New- 
York Historical Society. 

Address by General O. O. Howard before the Loyal Legion, 
New York, 1891. 

The Life of Grant, by Dana and Wilson. 

Chickamauga, by General Henry M. Cist. 

General Emerson Opdycke's article entitled The Tennessee 
Campaign, New York Times, September 10, 1882. 

Franklin and Nashville, by General J. D. Cox. 

Letter of General Schofield to General Henry M. Cist, Sep- 
tember 15, 1880. 

Answer to the same, by Colonel S. D. Kellogg. 

Oration on General Thomas, delivered at Rochester by Major 
William H. Lambert. 

Life and Character of General Thomas, by General James A. 
Garfield. 

And many minor works. 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



CHAPTER I. 

EARLY LIFE AND MEXICAN WAR. 

Parentage and birthplace — Huguenot and cavalier — Mechanical 
taste — Enters a law office — Offered an appointment as cadet 
by the Hon. Mr. Mason — Life at West Point — Graduated in 
1840 — Florida War — Brevet first lieutenant — Stationed at 
Charleston, Baltimore, and other posts — Mexican War — With 
General Taylor — At Fort Brown — Monterey — Brevet captain 
— Buena Vista — Brevet major — Sword presented by citizens 
of Southampton County, Va. 

The following pages have been written to set 
forth the principal events in the life of a man who, 
in the words of his classmate and comrade, General 
Sherman (in the General Order announcing his death 
to the army), "never wavered in battle; who was 
firm and full of faith in his cause; who never sought 
advancement of rank or honor at the expense of any- 
one ; who was the very impersonation of honesty, 
integrity, and honor ; and who stands as the beau 
ideal of the soldier and gentleman." 

This eulogium, written immediately after his death, 
strikes with a ringing tone the keynote for the bi- 



2 GENERAL THOMAS. 

ographer. Let it be added, if any further praise be 
needed, that he was modest and retiring ; that he 
sought nothing for himself by politic and pedantic 
means ; that he never lost a battle, but won several 
splendid victories ; that he did not receive the full 
meed of advancement and praise due to his merits 
during his life ; and that, feeling this, he declared J 
that "time and history would do him justice." Such 
is the character which it is sought to present to the 
world in this sketch of his life, with the claim for 
him of that justice at least from history to which he 
confided his reputation. 

George Henry Thomas was born in Southamp- 
ton County, Virginia, on July 31, 1816. This county 
is in the southeastern part of the State, bordering on 
North Carolina, and separated from the Atlantic by 
only three intervening counties. It was thus a more 
secluded region than northern Virginia. His father, 
John Thomas, lived in one of the few settlements, 
and was of English lineage, or rather of Welsh an- 
cestry, that came to this country after some residence 
in England. John Thomas is remembered as a man 
strong in body and mind, of perfect honesty of pur- 
pose and decision of character. His mother, Eliza- 
beth Rochelle, was descended from one of those 
Huguenot families which were driven out of France 
by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 by 
Louis XIV, and some of whom were very glad to 
find an asylum in America, Not much is known 



EARLY LIFE AND MEXICAN WAR. 3 

of the Thomas family, but the little that has come 
to our notice informs us that they had inherited the 
traditions and the prestige of both the Cavaliers 
and the Huguenots; that they were well-to-do and 
eminently respectable, ranking among the best 
people in that part of Virginia. 

His father died (so it is recorded in General 
Thomas's policy of insurance) at forty-five years, 
as the result of an accident, and his mother at 
sixty, curiously enough also by an accident. He 
had three sisters and two brothers, of whose his- 
tory little is known but that they were the general's 
relatives ; they were a quiet, retired family, and he 
was an uncommonly reticent man, who did not 
speak much of his domestic affairs. 

After the opening of the civil war, and upon his 
deciding to remain in the United States service, 
there seems to have been an entire separation be- 
tween him and his family, with the probable excep- 
tion of his brother Benjamin, with whom he was on 
good terms after the war, in Tennessee, and who was 
the only one he saw after the year i860. The family 
were in possession of a goodly home property, on 
which the surviving members still reside ; these are 
two sisters. 

Such attempts as have been made to collect inci- 
dents of his boyhood have not been very successful. 
General Howard, when he was writing the sketch of 
his life for the Loyal Legion, wrote to his sisters on 
2 



4 GENERAL THOMAS. 

April 12, 1890, for reminiscences of his early life, but 
failed to elicit the desired information. One of his 
schoolmates pithily describes him as a boy of few 
words and of an excellent spirit. An old negro 
named Artise remembered him as secretly trying to 
teach the little negroes to read, contrary to the judg- 
ment of his father. He is represented to have been 
of a mechanical turn ; to have made a saddle and 
several pieces of house furniture. A quiet and 
thoughtful boy, there is doubtless little more to say 
about him. He lived a secluded life, with very few 
companions. The educational advantages of that 
region were not great, but such as they were young 
Thomas availed himself of them to the utmost. He 
went through his preliminary studies at a private in- 
stitution called the Southampton Academy, and in 
his nineteenth year he became a student of the law. 
His taste for mechanics, which increased in his later 
life, was constantly exercised, and was to be very 
useful to him in his military career. His mother's 
brother, James Rochelle, was at this time clerk of 
the court of Southampton County ; he appointed his 
nephew, George Thomas, to be his deputy, and the 
young man performed the duties of this office while 
he was continuing his legal studies. 

It is thus probable that young Thomas would 
have become a country lawyer and have spent his 
life at his paternal home ; but an event now occurred 
which changed his destiny. In the spring of 1836 



EARLY LIFE AND MEXICAN WAR. c 

John Y. Mason, a member of Congress from Vir- 
ginia, was empowered to appoint a cadet at West 
Point for his district. His attention was called to 
this well-grown and clever youth, the nephew and the 
deputy of the County Clerk of Southampton ; and 
he spoke of the appointment to his uncle, Mr. Ro- 
chelle. The boy was sent for and offered the war- 
rant ; it was left to his own judgment ; he accepted 
it at once and began his preparations to go to West 
Point. On his way to the Military Academy he 
stopped at Washington to thank Mr. Mason again. 
That gentleman expressed himself very curtly : " No 
cadet from my district," he said, "has ever graduated 
at the Military Academy. If you do not, I never 
want to see your face again." 

He entered West Point on June i, 1836. There 
is but little diversity in the life of a cadet. He lives 
an almost conventual life, shut out from the world 
and subjected to rigorous order and discipline, the 
like of which no young men in this country encoun- 
ter elsewhere. The days are filled up with drills, 
lessons, and parades. With the exception of two 
months' furlough at the end of the second year, 
there are absolutely no vacations. Soldiering there 
is not play, but business, and the consequence is, 
great transformations take place in the four years' 
course. Untutored boys become military men and 
courtly gentlemen, and West Point vindicates herself 
with every annual class that she graduates. 



6 GENERAL THOMAS. 

There is little to relate of his cadet life. He fell 
easily and obediently into the routine of duty. He 
is remembered as a steady student, not learning very 
rapidly, but never losing what he learned ; develop- 
ing slowly and strongly. On June 20, 1840, he was 
graduated twelfth in a class of forty-five. Among 
his classmates were Paul O. Hebert, later Governor 
of Louisiana, William T. Sherman, Stewart Van 
Vliet, and others whose names are well known in 
the military history of the country. From these 
gentlemen we learn that while at the academy he 
was reticent and introspective, dignified and seri- 
ous, a solid man, never hasty in judgment or ex- 
pression, but always just and considerate of others. 
To his special friends he was " Old Thom," easy- 
going and reliable. 

After his graduation in June, 1840, he received 
the usual furlough until the autumn. His first com- 
mission was that of second lieutenant in the Third 
Artillery. He joined his regiment at Fort Columbus, 
Governor's Island, New York Harbor, but he did 
not remain there long. The Florida War, caused by 
the attempted removal of the Indians from that ter- 
ritory, was still dragging along its fitful existence ; 
sometimes it burst forth into spasmodic flame, and 
anon its embers were smoldering and smoking. In 
October of that same year Thomas was sent to join 
that portion of his regiment which was already there 
in the Everglades of Florida, a swampy land of water 



EARLY LIFE AND MEXICAN WAR. 7 

and hummocks, given over to alligators, miasma, 
moccasins, ticks, and mosquitoes. It was hard sol- 
diering and little glory. Troops in civilized coun- 
tries march on roads ; in this Indian warfare they 
were obliged to fight in pathless swamps, where 
only the Indian can make his way from tree to 
tree. 

The following letter, now first published, written 
by Thomas to his friend and classmate Kingsbury, 
gives a very vivid glimpse of the man and his activi- 
ty during the Florida War. It is curious to find him 
saying, " This will be the only opportunity I shall 
have of distinguishing myself, and not to be able to 
avail myself of it is too bad." We who were then 
at West Point as cadets were also very fearful that 
the Florida War would end without giving us a 
chance . 

[copy.] 

"Fort Lauderdale, E. Y ., Juty 2^, 1841. 

" Dear Kingsbury : Owing to the quantity of 
business on my hands at this time, I have not been 
able to answer yours of the 22d May before. 

"What do you ordnance officers do for quarter- 
masters and commissaries ? Do you do the duty 
yourselves, or have you staff officers at your ar- 
senals to perform those duties ? 

" My duties at this post are so many that my 
whole time is taken up. I have to do the duty of 
commissary, quartermaster, ordnance officer, and 



8 GENERAL THOMAS. 

adjutant ; and if I find time to eat my meals, I 
think myself most infernal fortunate. 

" So the Democrat was not dismissed after all ; 
you have, however, got him away from Watervliet, 
which must be some consolation at least. Old Van 
has become so much pleased with line duty that I 
hardly think he could be bribed to accept an ap- 
pointment in a staff corps. I saw him yesterday ; 
he came down in the boat with Major Childs, who 
has gone to Fort Dallas, below this place, with sixty 
men from his post and sixty from here, for the pur- 
pose of making an expedition into the Everglades to 
oust Sam Jones from his cornfields. I think it highly 
probable that they may do something if they will go 
to work properly, for the Indians are there, I know, 
as we have frequently seen their fires at night, and 
they do not expect to see any of our men there at 
this season of the year ; therefore, if the major will 
only manage the affair well, he may add fresh laurels 
to those he has already won. I have been left be- 
hind to take care of this infernal place in conse- 
quence of being commissary, etc. 

" This will be the only opportunity I shall have 
of distinguishing myself, and not to be able to avail 
myself of it is too bad. They say at St. Augustine 
that the Third will be ordered to Old Point this fall, 
but there have been so many sayings of the kind this 
summer that I begin to have no faith in them. 

" Colonel Worth has been on a grand scout, but 



EARLY LIFE AND MEXICAN WAR. q 

did not succeed in discovering any fields or Indians. 
Major Childs thinks that some regiment of infantry 
will come to these lower posts this fall, and we will 
be concentrated at Fort Pierce preparatory to a 
grand expedition to the Okechobee, where they 
think the whole Indian force has retired as the last 
point of safety. 

"I am glad you exposed the doings of those 
people of the Academic Board ; they deserve some- 
thing worse than exposition to the Engineer De- 
partment. 

" I have not heard from Gardiner or Martin yet ; 
what they are doing I can not learn. Hebert has 
written only once since my arrival in Florida ; he 
had just then returned from furlough. From his ac- 
counts I should say that he had been enjoying him- 
self in fine style. 

" I have just heard that poor Job Lancaster has 
been killed by lightning. I have heard no news 
lately which has distressed me more, for he was one 
of the very best of men. Wardwell is also dead ; he 
had the fever which has been prevailing in the west- 
ern part of the territory. You must write again 
soon. Yours truly, 

" (Signed) George H. Thomas. 
''Lieutenant C. P. Kingsbury, U. S. A., Watervliet Arsenal, 
Watervliet, N. K."* 

* I am indebted to the courtesy of Major William H, Lam- 
bert, of Philadelphia, for the use of this letter. 



lO 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



Thomas joined Major Richard D. A. Wade's com- 
mand in his campaign against the Seminoles in time 
to take an active part in the capture of seventy In- 
dians on November 6, 1841. This was his first bat- 
tle service, and so well was it performed that he 
received the warm thanks of Major Wade, who com- 
manded in the action, and of Colonel (afterw^ard 
General) Worth, who was in command of all the 
troops in Florida at that time. 

The mention that he received in the dispatches of 
these officers gained for him the brevet rank of first 
lieutenant in the army " for gallantry and good con- 
duct against the Florida Indians." Few persons real- 
ize the dangers and hardships of Indian warfare. It 
is indeed an inglorious service. Death by an arrow 
is ignoble in comparison of that in " the imminent 
deadly breach " amid ** the pomp and circumstance of 
glorious war." The savages are treacherous and 
cruel. They lie in ambush, they tear off the scalp, 
they torture the prisoners ; add to this the character 
of the Indian country in Florida, the reeking mias- 
mas of the Everglades, and we shall see that few men 
have received adequate rewards for such service. 
Fortunately for Thomas, he did not remain long in 
that region. First he was ordered on temporary duty 
to New Orleans Barracks in 1842, and very soon after 
to Fort Moultrie, South Carolina, opposite Fort 
Sumter, a locality before long to be famous. 

So small was our army at that time, and so wide 



EARLY LIFE AND MEXICAN WAR. n 

the range of country, that the young officer was your 
true peripatetic philosopher, traveling for the most 
time in high-pressure steamboats or on bad roads in 
broken-down stage coaches. He was also a social 
personage wherever he went, invited everywhere, 
and considered, by virtue of his commission, a gen- 
tleman of the first rank. Thomas shared in the 
gayeties of Charleston for a short time, performing 
his routine duties at Fort Moultrie, but in 1843 he 
was ordered to Fort McHenry, near Baltimore, and 
there the handsome and accomplished young soldier 
was a very acceptable person in the gay and delight- 
ful society of Baltimore, always renowned for its 
charming hospitality. He is still remembered there 
as a dignified and courteous gentleman and a very 
handsome officer. The story of his service and his 
honors in Florida gave him additional social dis- 
tinction. But he w^as not permitted to linger long in 
that pleasant place ; after less than two years' stay 
he was detailed on recruiting service, in 1845, to 
New York city. 

Such a " detail " is considered choice duty, and is 
sought for by most officers; but an event was now to 
occur in our history which required the more active 
services of the whole army and a considerable force 
of volunteers — militia mustered into the service of 
the United States. The army itself was increased 
from nine regiments of infantry to sixteen ; a third 
regiment of dragoons was created, and also a regi- 



12 GENERAL THOMAS. 

ment of mounted riflemen. The young soldier was 
now to have a new and better opportunity to exer- 
cise his powers and display his prowess. What was 
this new and portentous cloud which so suddenly 
arose ? 

It had become manifest, for many reasons, some 
of them purely political, and some of them the issue 
of the inexorable logic of events, that a conflict with 
our Southern neighbor Mexico was in the immedi- 
ate future. This is not the place to consider the 
causes and the justice of that war. A strong party 
opposed it. The poet James Russell Lowell lam- 
pooned it in the "Biglow Papers"; but the people 
favored it because it gave a new expansion to our 
territory and a new glory to our annals. Wild and 
adventurous Americans, aided by traitorous Mexi- 
cans, had claimed that Texas was independent ; the 
United States had favored their claims, had recog- 
nized the asserted independence, and had then an- 
nexed Texas to the Union. Mexico refused to ac- 
cept this action, and insisted upon retaining her 
territory intact. An American army of observa- 
tion and occupation was encamped under General 
Taylor at Corpus Christi. This officer, well and 
fortunately chosen to command our forces, was a 
man of revolutionary lineage and a young hero 
in the War of 1812. When the troubles with Mexi- 
co began he was colonel of the First Infantry, 
and, although sixty-one years of age, a man in the 



EARLY LIFE AND MEXICAN WAR. 13 

full vigor of life. With little early education, he 
was a soldier by instinct and practice, and was to 
earn a large fame by his good generalship and splen- 
did valor in Mexico. The force under his command 
being transformed into an army of invasion^ it marched 
to the Rio Grande to meet a Mexican army which 
had been sent thither to resist the movements of 
General Taylor. There was a show of justice on 
either side ; but what did not appear in any mani- 
festo was the hope of the Southern leaders to extend 
the territory in which the system of slavery might be 
continued, and to maintain that supremacy in the 
Government which the South felt it was gradually 
and surely losing. 

But to the young soldier of that time the ques- 
tions of the justice and morality of that war did not 
present itself. He was a sworn defender of the 
nation, and it was the nation's quarrel. He cared 
nothing for causes of war and knew little of political 
schemes and sectional disputes. Besides, he saw in 
that war an opportunity which had been rare, and 
promised to be rarer, to display his heroism and be 
crowned with military honor. He seized it with 
avidity and entered upon this new career of hope 
and promise. 

There had been no declaration of war; the actual 
war began with the first bloodshed. Immediately 
thereafter General Taylor, having marched up the 
river, left a force consisting of eight companies of 



14 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



infantry and artillery and several guns on the left 
bank of the Rio Grande to take post and intrench 
itself opposite the city of Matamoros. The earth- 
works thrown up there were called Fort Brown, in 
honor of the commanding officer, Major Jacob 
Brown. Returning to Point Isabel he made his 
preparations for advance. With his main body, con- 
sisting of about thirty-five hundred men, the general 
marched from Point Isabel to meet the Mexican force 
which was coming down the left bank slowly from 
Matamoros. The armies encountered each other 
midway between Fort Brown and Pomt Isabel, at 
Palo Alto, on the 6th of May, 1846. There a cau- 
tious and experimental battle was fought, with no 
decided results, except that the Mexicans had fallen 
back a little to a place called Resaca de la Palma, 
and the troops of both armies rested upon their arms 
during the night. On the 7th, beginning with the 
early dawn, a furious battle was fought which result- 
ed in the entire defeat of the Mexicans. 

Meantime the garrison at Fort Brown, opposite 
Matamoros, was in great straits. Should the Mexi- 
cans be successful, there is little doubt that they 
would all be massacred, and they were in this 
critical condition from the 3d to the 9th of May. 
They were furiously cannonaded from Matamoros; 
they heard the cannon of Palo Alto, and when it 
ceased and there was no Mexican retreat their hopes 
sank. The early guns of Resaca greeted their ears, 



EARLY LIFE AND MEXICAN WAR. jc 

and as the day passed fugitives from the Mexican 
force began to appear. At last they saw the com- 
plete rout ; every gun in Fort Brown was then 
trained upon them and hastened their flight. 

Fort Brown was relieved, Matamoros was evacu- 
ated, and occupied at once by our conquering army. 
Major Brown was killed during the siege, and Lieu- 
tenant Thomas, who was serving with that contin- 
gent under the immediate command of Bragg, 
shared the extreme dangers and the great honor of 
that siege. Fort Brown in time became a large 
town, and is now known as Brownsville, robbing 
Matamoros of its prestige and progress. 

Thomas moved with the army of General Taylor 
up the river, commanding a section of light artillery 
in the van. Diverging from the Rio Grande at Ca- 
margo, the force marched inland to Monterey, where 
he found and joined his company of the Third Artil- 
lery. He was again distinguished in the attack on 
that stronghold. It is related that he was ordered to 
withdraw his guns from a particularly exposed spot. 
With characteristic coolness he ordered them to be 
loaded, and in the midst of the heavy fire gave the 
enemy a farewell shot and retired slowly. He was 
complimented in orders by his immediate commander. 
General Henderson, and by the division commander. 
General Twiggs. - For his gallantry and good con- 
duct at Monterey he received a second brevet as 
captain. The next step in his career is in connection 



l6 GENERAL THOMAS. 

with the story of Buena Vista, a rare and glorious 
event in our military annals. 

General Taylor had advanced to a spot near Sal- 
tillo in expectation of meeting a large army under 
Santa Anna intended to crush him and the American 
occupancy from that region. Most unfortunately, 
Taylor's army was greatly decreased just when it 
seemed essential to retain every man in order to 
stem the Mexican torrent. It happened in this wise : 
General Scott was completing an armament with 
which to proceed on a new line from Vera Cruz to 
the city of Mexico. In order to do this he with- 
drew, by permission of the War Department, nearly 
all the regular troops from General Taylor, thus 
leaving him with a force of only five thousand men, 
mostly volunteers. The situation was grave in the 
extreme. Santa Anna was in array before him with 
an army of twenty thousand of the best Mexican 
troops. He sent a letter to Taylor demanding sur- 
render, which the latter very curtly refused. Then 
came shock upon shock ; masses were hurled against 
him; with his flank imperiled and a part of his 
forces driven back, but with a grim tenacity Taylor 
refused to be beaten. Then Santa Anna weakly sent 
another flag to ask him what he wanted. This was 
simply amusing, and was the prelude to the sudden 
withdrawal of the Mexican army in full march to- 
ward the capital. There are few fields of battle 
more glorious in history than that of Buena Vista. 



EARLY LIFE AND MEXICAN WAR. 



17 



It reminds one of Poitiers and Agincourt, where a 
few English soldiers confronted three times their 
numbers of French. It was there that originated 
General Taylor's sobriquet of "Rough and Ready." 
There was also given, or we like to think was given, 
the epigrammatic order, " A little more grape. Cap- 
tain Bragg." These words became watch words, 
and Buena Vista made General Taylor president. 

But to come back to Thomas. There were two 
batteries of light artillery on that field, commanded 
respectively by Braxton Bragg and T. W. Sherman. 
Thomas had been in command of one of them from 
November 21, 1846, to February 14, 1847, because 
Bragg had been promoted to a captaincy and had 
taken another battery. At the latter date Captain 
T. W. Sherman came and relieved him in command. 
During the battle he was thus acting as first lieu- 
tenant of the battery, and he received the plaudits 
of his captain, T. W. Sherman, who reported that he 
had more than sustained his reputation as an ac- 
curate and scientific artillerist. 

General Wool, second in command under Taylor, 
said : " We are mainly indebted for the great vic- 
tory to the service of the artillery officers. Without 
our artillery," he said, "we could not have main- 
tained our position." And it may be added that 
General Taylor's sententious and magnificent notice 
of Bragg in the report of the battle sheds some lus- 
ter also upon Bragg's comrades of the artillery. In 



l8 GENERAL THOMAS. 

speaking of his invaluable services he uses these 
words, conceived in the enthusiastic spirit of Napier 
in the Peninsular War : " Without infantry to sup- 
port him and at the imminent risk of losing his guns 
[Bragg] came rapidly into action, the Mexican lines 
being but a few yards from the muzzles of his pieces. 
The first discharge of canister caused the enemy to 
hesitate; the second and third drove him back in dis- 
order and saved the day." * 

For thus assisting to save the day at Buena Vista, 
Thomas was brevetted a major in the army, and a 
man with three brevets for service in front of the 
enemy was at that time a marked man. 

He honored the army, and was honored in turn by 
the citizens in his own county in Virginia, who met 
at Jerusalem Court House, July 19, 1847, in a pub- 
lic gathering, and in an enthusiastic meeting drew 
up a series of complimentary resolutions speaking 

* The reviewer of General Howard's Life of Taylor, of this 
series, in the journal of the Military Service Institution for 
March, 1893, makes a decided discount upon the claims of the 
United States army on this field. He says Santa Anna's forces 
were very much worn out on their arrival ; that probably he had 
not more than twelve thousand men in action ; and although he 
had a great preponderance of cavalry, there was a decided dis- 
parity between their weaker men and horses and our splendid dra- 
goons. Taylor had the choice of ground ; but, considering the 
known inequality between the two armies, the questions are per- 
tinent. Why did he fight there in the open field? and Why not in 
fortifications in Saltillo? Wool, his second in command, declared 
that they were whipped and must retreat. Notwithstanding all 
this, however, Taylor refused to consider himself beaten, and held 
the field while his discomfited enemy retired with great rapidity. 



EARLY LIFE AND MEXICAN WAR. iq 

of the military skill, bravery, and noble deportment 
of Major Thomas, and presented him with a hand- 
some sword, engrossed on the scabbard with the 
names of the victories in which he had participated. 
He had given such large promise that it was mani- 
fest he was only in reserve for greater things when- 
ever the Government should need military skill, 
valor, and power to command. Should the emer- 
gency come he would be sought for. 

It must be said, however, that there did not seem 
to be then the slightest prospect of a call for such 
services. From the beginning of our history the 
Government has taken a very just and proper view 
of the military situation in time of peace. It has al- 
ways reduced our army to a minimum. And so after 
the Mexican War the volunteers were disbanded and 
the extra regular regiments dropped. An opening 
for adventure was made by the acquisition of Cali- 
fornia, and all the world was awakened by the new 
cry, "Westward, ho ! " For the officers then in serv- 
ice there seemed to be, however, no military future. 
And yet in the womb of Time that very future was 
in embryo. The victories in Mexico ; the acquisi- 
tion of California, New Mexico, and Arizona were 
the potent factors in bringing about this issue. 
The entrance of California as a free State in 1850 
further disturbed the political equilibrium, and was 
a remote and faint usher of the great war which 
was to break out ten years later. 
3 



CHAPTER II. 

THE CAMPAIGN WITH PATTERSON. 

A loyal Virginian — His features and appearance — His men trust 
him — Florida, Newport, Boston, West Point — Instructor of 
artillery and cavalry — His captaincy a Ciiristmas gift — His 
marriage in 1855 — Second Cavalry — The Kiowa Expedition, 
i860 — Secession — Temptations — Per contra — Decides to re- 
main loyal — Accident at Norfolk — Defection of his seniors — 
At Carlisle — Joins Patterson — Bull Run — His view of Patter- 
son's campaign. 

Perhaps this is the place, and while waiting for 
such an emergency, to describe the appearance of 
this man. He was cast in a strong and large mould, 
and had many of the personal traits of Washington, 
whom, in his intellectual and moral character, he 
greatly resembled. He was just six feet high and 
very well proportioned, without too much flesh;* he 
was very erect. He had a walk which was at once 
military and easy; it was that of a man who marched 
straight to his purpose. Bright blue eyes, later in 
life somewhat sunken, changeable in expression from 

* He weighed at this time about one hundred and seventy-five 
pounds, but he had reached, in August, 1867, the weight of two 
hundred and forty-six pounds. 



THE CAMPAIGN WITH PATTERSON. 2 1 

mildness to strong purpose; a heavy overhanging 
brow, with a horizontal furrow at the base. His nose 
was well shaped and proportioned ; he had firm-set 
lips falling a little at the extremities ; a strong chin ; 
light-brown waving hair and full but short beard. 
His head gave altogether the suggestion of a self- 
reliant man ; dignified and courteous, asking lit- 
tle from others, but ready to impart much. When 
men first knew him they respected and feared him ; 
on longer acquaintance, especially such as exists be- 
tween a commander and his soldiers, they trusted 
and loved him. They learned to associate his ap- 
pearance with sure victory and constant care for 
their comfort and safety. 

The emergency spoken of was soon to occur. 
Until then he was leading the routine life of an of- 
ficer in garrison and camp. To an active and studi- 
ous mind such a life becomes irksome. How to pass 
the time is the question of the hour. Many officers 
seek amusement. On the frontier those who are 
sportsmen can pass their days with gun and rod and 
long excursions on horseback ; others play billiards 
and talk ; a few, like Thomas, spend their time in 
study of the profession, literally in time of peace 
preparing for war. Much of his time at frontier 
posts was also spent in the study of botany, miner- 
alogy, and other branches of natural history. He 
sent many valuable specimens to the Smithsonian 
Institution at Washington. 



22 GENERAL THOMAS. 

After a short stay in camp at Brazos Santiago he 
was ordered again to Florida, where the embers of 
the Indian War were slowly dying out. Nothing of 
importance occurred to affect his record. Very soon 
we find him at Fort Independence, in Boston Harbor^ 
whence he was ordered to Fort Adams, Newport, in 
December, 1848. In April, 185 1, he was detailed for 
duty as Instructor of Artillery and Cavalry at the 
Military Academy, a position of great importance, 
at the head of a department, corresponding to a pro- 
fessorship. This officer commands the detachments 
of artillery and cavalry troops, besides instructing 
the cadets. The position is usually given to a cap- 
tain, but, notwithstanding his numerous brevets. Ma- 
jor Thomas was still a first lieutenant, and as the 
army had again settled down to a peace establish- 
ment, promotion was very slow. Thus it happened 
that it was thirteen years after his graduation, and 
while he was stationed at West Point, that he re- 
ceived his promotion to a captaincy, a welcome 
Christmas gift on December 24, 1853. 

Those who, like the writer of this sketch, served 
with him during his tour of duty at West Point, will 
readily recall his serious, practical, almost stern face ; 
his stately form ; his firm, martial tread ; his cool and 
equable temper ; his impartial justice ; and withal 
his courteous bearing and kindly spirit toward the 
cadets, which they fully recognized and appreciated. 
He certainly taught them by example as well as by 



THE CAMPAIGN WITH PATTERSON. 23 

precept ; with entire recognition of military law and 
regulations, he treated them as gentlemen of honor 
as well as soldiers. 

We come now to another important event in his 
life. It was during his residence at West Point, on 
November 17, 1852, that he married a lady whom all 
army people had already learned to hold in great 
admiration and respect, Miss Frances L. Kellogg, of 
Troy, New York. Mrs. Kellogg, a widow and some- 
thing of an invalid, had been for some time in the 
habit of spending a portion of every year at the 
West Point Hotel with her two daughters. The 
fascination of the elder, in appearance, culture, and 
an exceeding charm of conversation, won. the affec- 
tions of Major Thomas. Seldom is such a congenial 
union to be recorded. She was, like him, large and 
of stately presence ; she made for him a charming 
home, when he could be at home; she entered into 
all his interests and made them her own ; treasured 
every incident of his famous career, and although 
separated for long periods by the war, she kept pace 
with his actions and was in perfect accord with his 
views and purposes. 

After being made a captain in December, 1853, 
he proceeded to join his company on May i, 1854, 
and while doing so to conduct a battalion cf the 
Third Artillery to Benicia Barracl'.s, California, 
which he reached via the Isthmus of Panama on the 
ist of June: after a short stay he marched them 



24 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



forward to Fort Yuma, where he remained until July 
21, 1855. Dr. Murray, afterward surgeon general, 
accompanied him. Always studious and of an in- 
quiring mind, he spent that year in learning to speak 
the Indian language of the tribes of that region. 
From Fort Yuma we find him transferred from duty 
to duty with a rapidity that required great activity 
on his part, and displayed that promptness of move- 
ment which is so excellent a quality in a commander. 
In the early spring of 1855 he was in garrison at 
Jefferson Barracks. It was while there that he re- 
ceived another promotion. In the reorganization of 
the cavalry service on May 12th of that year the fol- 
lowing field officers were appointed for the Second 
Cavalry, all of them graduates of West Point, and 
Southern men : Albert Sidney Johnston, of Texas, 
Colonel ; Robert E. Lee, of Virginia, Lieutenant 
Colonel ; William J. Hardee, of Georgia, and George 
H. Thomas, of Virginia, Majors. 

" General Thomas," says Mr. Van Horn, " always 
believed that Mr. Davis had regard to a probable 
war between the Northern and Southern States in 
organizing that regiment." Although his commis- 
sion reached him at Jefferson Barracks, he had in 
fact been appointed while at Fort Yuma to fill an 
original vacancy in the Second Cavalry. He was 
then a junior captain of artillery. The reason of 
this promotion was as follows : It was Jefferson 
Davis's regiment of the Mississippi Rifles that had 



THE CAMPAIGN WITH PATTERSON. 25 

supported the batteries at Buena Vista; thus Davis 
knew and admired Thomas personally. It was due 
to this that when he was Secretary of War he gave 
him this promotion. 

From 1855 to 1859 he had short tours of frontier 
duty at Fort Mason, Texas, San Antonio, and Fort 
Belknap. Being employed in the latter year to ac- 
company the Texas Reserve Indians to the Indian 
Territory, he made such studies of natural science 
as were possible. In i860 he took part in the Kiowa 
Expedition to the sources of the Concho and Colo- 
rado Rivers. It was during this expedition that the 
troops had a skirmish with the Indians on the 
Brazos River, near the junction of the Concho and 
Colorado Rivers — a predatory band not engaged in 
regular warfare but looking for plunder. In this 
skirmish on August 26, i860. Major Thomas received 
a singular wound ; an arrow passed through his chin 
and into his breast. It is more notable because, ex- 
posed as he was in after days and in so many fights, 
it was the only wound he ever received. It was not, 
however, sufficiently serious in itself to cause him to 
apply for a leave of absence. He wanted rest and 
deserved it, and on those grounds applied for leave 
for a year. It was granted, and he left his com- 
mand on November i, i860. This was just before 
Lincoln's election, and was a time of serious de- 
liberation to all thinking men in the country. 
Thomas was not a politician, but he might well 



26 GENERAL THOMAS. 

employ his leave in careful survey of the state of 
the nation. 

Rapidly coming events had cast their portentous 
shadows before them. It was manifest that dissatis- 
faction at the South would lead to secession ; and 
would not secession lead to war ? Southern officers 
of the army, honest but perplexed in the extreme, 
were beginning to leave the service ; some of them 
to take active part for their section, others limiting 
their allegiance to their State, others still hoping to 
remain neutral in the struggle. Vain hope ! 

The excitement increased in a rapid ratio. Men's 
consciences became deafened; men's reason was 
carried away in the whirlwind of political passion. 
The hatred of the sections became bitter and intense. 
The whole country was a mighty field of war, with 
two hostile encampments. The old cry was heard, 

" Under which king, Bezonian ? Speak or die." 
No wonder that many a good man was shaken. 

Professor Smyth, of Cambridge, in speaking of 
an analogous instance, illustrating the cool and fear- 
less judgment of General Washington when the 
country was in danger of being embroiled in a for- 
eign war by assisting France against the allies, uses 
these striking words : " The foundations of the moral 
world were shaken, but not the understanding of 
Washington." 

Surely it is not going too far to apply them to 
the conduct of those Southern officers who remained 



THE CAMPAIGN WITH PATTERSON. 2J 

true to the Union in this struggle in spite of tempta- 
tions and strong inducements to the contrary. 

The time has come when we may calmly consider 
and analyze this question. It is easy for men after 
the act, and in view of the momentous results, to 
reason back calmly to that day of stormy conditions 
and doubting judgments. It is easy to condemn, but 
to the Southern men of that time it was indeed a 
portentous question. Let us take all things into 
consideration : The prestige of birth, the claims of 
family, the long-time conflict between State and Na- 
tional supremacy, the doubts and hopes that a peace- 
ful solution might be reached, the fact that the best 
minds in Virginia were not in favor of the precipitate 
secession inaugurated by South Carolina, and that 
the State did not secede until April 17th. We may 
be sure that all these things, and many others, were 
carefully considered by Thomas. 

In the reminiscences of General E. D. Keyes he 
expresses the conviction that the influence of Mrs. 
Thomas was potent to keep her husband in the 
Union ranks. With reference to this, Mrs. Thomas, 
in a letter to a friend dated November 9, 1884, says: 
" General Keyes's private opinion that I was the 
cause of General Thomas remaining in the service 
is decidedly a mistake. I do not think they met 
from the time General Thomas went to Kentucky to 
join that army until they met in San Francisco years 
after. There was never a word passed between 



28 GENERAL THOMAS. 

General Thomas and myself, or any one of the 
family, upon the subject of his remaining loyal to the 
United States Government. We felt that whatever 
his course, it would be from a conscientious sense of 
duty; that no one could persuade him to do what 
he felt was not right." 

General Lee, who had been in favor of gradual 
emancipation, sadly resigned and received an ap- 
pointment in Virginia. It is not known that any 
special offers were made by the Southern authorities 
to General Thomas, but Governor Letcher, of Vir- 
ginia, had issued a general and urgent request to all 
officers of the army from Virginia to resign and take 
service for their State. After a careful and cautious 
review of the situation, Thomas determined to re- 
main in the service of his country, and this conclu- 
sion was the more honorable, if possible, because it 
would cost him so much. He knew that he would 
receive bitter reproaches from all his Southern rela- 
tions and friends on the one hand, and suspicions of 
his loyalty from the authorities at Washington on 
the other. 

After receiving his wound on the Brazos River, 
and while on his way home, he met with another 
severe accident which seemed at first as if it would 
disable him for all further duty as a soldier. Near 
Lynchburg he jumped from a railway train and 
twisted his spine He was six weeks confined to 
his bed in Norfolk, nursed by his faithful wife, who 



THE CAMPAIGN WITH PATTERSON. 



29 



joined him there. He recovered, but always felt 
the effects of that accident. 

It was at this time that he took a step which has 
been greatly misconstrued. If for any reason he 
should resign, he felt that he must do something for 
a livelihood, as he would be without adequate means 
of support. There had appeared in the newspapers 
an advertisement informing the world that the posi- 
tion of commandant of cadets at the Virginia Mili- 
tary Institute was vacant ; this was a school pro- 
vided for by the State and ranking next to West 
Point in the excellence of its military instruction. 
Thomas wrote for information concerning it. This 
has been construed by his maligners as an evidence 
of his intention to desert the Union cause. Nothing 
could be more mistaken ; he considered himself as 
an invalid; he still believed that secession, which 
had gone up like a rocket, would come down like 
a stick ; that it would not be espoused by a majority 
of the Southern States, his own being among the 
number that would repudiate it, and that in his re- 
tirement he would be able to take care of his health 
and cultivate the art of war by studious perusal of 
the campaigns of great generals. It may be said 
that his wish was father to his thought ; but there 
were many good men who had similar hopes. 

He found himself measurably recovering from 
his wound and his accident. He saw that the animus 
of the South was from day to day more warlike. 



30 GENERAL THOMAS. 

Secession had made a clean sweep. Virginia, who 
had disapproved and discountenanced the secession 
of South Carolina, had now joined the Confederate 
ranks. His decision was made and it was final. The 
bombardment of Fort Sumter clinched it. He was 
thenceforth a Union man, ready and anxious to fight 
in the Union quarrel, to give all that he had, even 
his life, to the service of the nation. The day before 
Fort Sumter fell Thomas started from New York for 
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, where he was ordered 
to reorganize and equip his regiment, the second 
cavalry, for immediate service in the field. His 
leave of absence had not more than half expired, 
and it was the only leave he had had for twelve 
long years. 

The great question of allegiance which Thomas 
had settled for himself had proved a stumbling-block 
to all the other field officers of his regiment. Colonel 
A. S. Johnston, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert E. Lee, 
and the senior major, W. J. Hardee, had resigned 
their commissions to enter the Confederate service, 
and by their resignation Major Thomas was placed 
in command of the regiment as colonel on May 3, 
1861.* His promotion was thus regular and rapid. 

* It has been said that he then took the new and strengthened 
oath of allegiance twice on the same day. As it was required that 
an officer on being promoted to a higher grade should again take 
the oath, it may well be that the commissions of lieutenant colonel 
and colonel followed each other so rapidly that he took the oath 
twice in quick succession and possibly on the same day. 



THE CAMPAIGN WITH PATTERSON. 31 

He was a full colonel at the age of forty-four, and so 
he was unexpectedly but richly rewarded for his ad- 
herence to the Union. 

In November, i860, General Twiggs, then in com- 
mand of the Department of the South, had dis- 
mounted this regiment and ordered it out of Texas; 
it needed, therefore, a thorough reorganization — re- 
cruits, rearrangement of companies and assignment 
to them ; the purchase of horses and preliminary 
drills, all of which taxed the activity and industry of 
Thomas to the utmost. It had been on April 10, 
1861 — two days before the bombardment of Fort 
Sumter — that all the companies of his regiment ex- 
cept two had been sent to Carlisle Barracks, and 
the remaining two to Army Headquarters at Wash- 
ington. The rapidity with which he put his regi- 
ment into condition for service is indicated by his 
readiness to take immediate part in the campaign. 

While at Carlisle he went out with four companies 
of his regiment to protect the Northern Central Rail- 
road, which was threatened from Maryland. Every 
day the war clouds lowered more portentously. 
Thomas was ordered, with these four companies, to 
join General Patterson in the Valley of Virginia, 
where the City Troop of Philadelphia* was added to 

* The first City Troop of Philadelphia was an organization 
which had existed since the Revolution (and still exists). It acted 
as escort to General Washington from Philadelphia to Cambridge 
in 1775. Its history was published in 1875. 



32 GENERAL THOMAS. 

his force, and very soon he was placed in command 
of a brigade. 

It is not within the scope of this work to review 
the brief campaign of Patterson except in so far as 
Thomas was concerned in it. It bore a relation to 
the general plan only vaguely discerned until after it 
was over. 

Had the Federal troops been successful at Bull 
Run, it would hardly have elicited a passing com- 
ment; it would have only been considered a cover 
of Harper's Ferry barring the entrance into Pennsyl- 
vania. The defeat at Bull Run caused the authori- 
ties to look for reasons, and, in search for a scape 
goat, the blame fell upon Patterson. The story is 
well known. General McDowell, an untried leader and 
a favorite of General Scott, moved out from Wash- 
ington with an undrilled and undisciplined force of 
thirty thousand men to meet Beauregard, who was 
marching northward from Richmond with an almost 
equal force, but of men more consolidated, and in- 
spired by the hopes which had fired the Southern 
heart. They encountered each other at and around 
Bull Run. These were the chief combatants, and at 
one time during the action the Federal advance had 
placed the Confederates in great straits, and the 
Union victory seemed certain. 

But besides these two armies, General Joseph E. 
Johnston, with Thomas J. Jackson under his com- 
mand, was on the Northern line, where he was con- 



THE CAMPAIGN WITH PATTERSON. 33 

fronted by General Patterson, as aforesaid, and in 
his emergency Beauregard awaited and hoped for 
this re-enforcement. 

The orders to General Patterson, it must be 
said, were not very explicit. He was to drive John- 
ston back to Virginia, and also by his menacing atti- 
tude to hold him in his front, and thus prevent his 
re-enforcing Beauregard at the critical moment so as 
to give him additional advantage over McDowell's 
army. The Confederate hopes were realized. The 
Union army was overpowered and defeated. 

Many penny-a-liners have tried their unskilled 
hands on this problem. To the military critic it ap- 
pears that the issue of the campaign ought not to 
have been unexpected. The movement on Bull Run 
was premature. The Union army was in no part 
organized or drilled. There were no generals worthy 
of the name; most brigades and some divisions were 
commanded by colonels newly appointed and inex- 
perienced ; the men did not know their officers. If 
it be said that the Southern force was in the same 
plight, that they were fairly matched, that the Fed- 
eral troops had a large advantage at first, it must be 
added that the first indication of real strategy and 
grand tactics came from the Confederate leaders. The 
final overwhelming blow was dealt by that very force 
of Johnston which it was vainly hoped that Patterson 
could hold in check. 

Let us look for the moment at the means which 



34 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



Patterson had of doing so. His army consisted 
principally in a small contingent of three months' 
volunteers, who were so entirely unused to military 
service as to be of very little use in the field ; but 
more than that, their time had almost expired and 
the men were eager to go home. He followed John- 
ston, crossing the Potomac at Williamsport ; had a 
slight skirmish with him on July 2d at Falling 
Waters, confronted him at Martinsburg, and finally 
drove him to Winchester. It is now manifest that 
the movements of Johnston were of a temporizing 
policy until he could fall back by a forced march 
and join Beauregard at Bull Run. Patterson could 
not hold him; he was between Beauregard and 
Patterson, and every advance of the latter drove 
him toward the former. Could he not have followed 
him and re-enforced McDowell ? It may be said that, 
with a dashing leader arid vigorous troops in splendid 
condition that was possible, with or without orders. 
But he had no orders. He had vainly solicited them 
from hour to hour. The auspicious moment past, 
Patterson felU^ack when Johnston disappeared from 
his front, and after the defeat of our army he was 
overwhelmed with bitter but ignorant criticism. 

We need not reopen the subject further. Thus 
much it has been necessary to say, because Thomas, 
the highest officer in his command, took strong 
ground in his favor when the subject was under- 
going a heated discussion. In a letter to General 



THE CAMPAIGN WITH PATTERSON. 



35 



Patterson, written before Atlanta on August 8, 1864, 
three years after the date of these occurrences, he 
says: " Judging of them (the volunteer troops) as of 
other volunteer troops, had I been their commander 
I should not have been willing to risk them in a 
heavy battle coming off within a few days of the ex- 
piration of their service. I have always believed, 
and have frequently so expressed myself, that your 
management of the three months' campaign was able 
and judicious, and was to the best interests of the 
service, considering the means at your disposal and 
the nature of the troops under your command." 
Some military writers may differ from General 
Thomas on this subject ; few will deny that he was 
a competent critic and honest in his judgment. The 
opinion expressed in the letter just cited is that of a 
trained soldier, a hero in many actions, and who 
was already known as the Rock of Chickamauga. 

Note, — I have received the following communication, bearing 
upon a matter contained in this chapter, from a lady closely con- 
nected with General Thomas. I prefer to give it as written, 
rather than simply to embody it in my narrative : 

" General Thomas came out of Texas with a year's leave of 
absence, in November, i860, to join Mrs. Thomas in New York, 
having obtained the leave some months and only waiting for 
some one to relieve him at his post, without any thought of 
political troubles in the country, and with no reference to the 
arrow wound, from which he speedily recovered and never felt 
any effects afterward. He met with a serious accident on his 
journey, not from a railroad disaster, as commonly asserted, but 
from a misstep in getting out of the car at night while the train 
was taking in water somewhere near Lynchburg. Deceived by 
the shadows of the moonlight, he stepped out on to what he sup- 
4 



36 GENERAL THOMAS. 

posed was the road, but proved to be down a deep ravine, sustain- 
ing a fall of twenty feet or more. He continued his journey to 
Norfolk, where Mrs. Thomas joined him and remained there 
until he was able to go to his mother's home in Southampton 
County, Virginia, suffering severely. After a visit of several 
weeks he went with Mrs. Thomas to New York, stopping a few 
days at Washington en route. It was while in New York that he 
fully realized the extent of his injury, and, fearing he would never 
be able to do duty again with his regiment, he began to think 
what he could do in the event of being obliged to give up his 
military life. Mrs. Thomas saw in the columns of the National 
Intelligencer an advertisement for commandant of cadets at the 
Virginia Military Institute, read it aloud to him, and asked if he 
could do that duty. He said he thought he could, and accord- 
ingly wrote to the superintendent. Major F. H. Smith, asking 
about the vacancy, and received word in reply that the vacancy 
had been filled. There the matter re-.ted, and from these facts the 
story has grown that General Thomas applied for an appointment 
in the Confederate army. He was in New York when his regi- 
ment arrived from Texas, and could easily have obtained a surgeon's 
certificate for inability to do any duty, but preferred to make the 
effort, suffering and disabled as he was. He obeyed the order im- 
mediately to join his regiment at Carlisle and refit it for service. 
It was while on the train for Carlisle that he first heard of the at- 
tack on Fort Sumter, and wrote to Mrs. Thomas on his arrival : 
' Whichever way he turned the matter over in his mind, his oath 
of allegiance to his Government always came uppermost.' "' 



CHAPTER III. 

APPOINTED A BRIGADIER GENERAL. 

Kentucky and the Union — General Robert Anderson at Louis- 
ville—Sherman, Buell, Mitchel — Doubts concerning Thomas 
overcome — Appointed brigadier August 17, 1861 — Assigned 
to the Department of the Cumberland — "The dark and 
bloody ground " — Preponderating sentiment for the Union — 
Governor Magoffin — Bell and Everett — Lincoln — Neutrality 
— Buckner and the " Home Guard " — Cumberland Gap — 
Thomas goes toward East Tennessee — Zollicoffer — Nelson's 
camp, " Dick Robinson " — Brownlow, Nelson, and Andrew- 
Johnson — Want of troops and supplies — Forward and back — 
Attempt to supersede Thomas — Incessant labor. 

A NEW promotion now awaited Colonel Thomas. 
With the rapid rush of affairs it was soon manifest 
that the border State of Kentucky would be the 
ground of fierce contention between the opposing 
forces. Should it be swept into the secession ranks, 
or should it remain with the Union ? The most 
strenuous efforts were made on both sides. General 
Robert Anderson, who had become widely known by 
his defense of Fort Sumter, and who was a native of 
Kentucky, had been sent to take command of the 
Department of the Tennessee, and had made his 
headquarters at Louisville. He had accepted on 



38 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



condition that he might name his subordinate briga- 
diers. With regard to three of them he had no 
trouble — viz., William T. Sherman, Buell, and O. M. 
Mitchel. He was in doubt as to the fourth, and was 
just about to nominate Simon B. Buckner, who soon 
after went into the Confederate ranks, when his atten- 
tion was called to Colonel Thomas, whom he had 
known in the service before. He nominated Thomas 
to the President, and this nomination was fortified 
by the recommendation of the Hon. Samuel J. Ran- 
dall, who had served under him in the first City 
Troop of Philadelphia during the campaign of Gen- 
eral Patterson. 

The Government still looked askance upon an 
officer of Virginia birth, and who also belonged 
to the Second Cavalry, the ranks of which had been 
greatly depleted by the wholesale resignation of 
Southern officers with whom it had been largely filled 
by Jefferson Davis. 

General Sherman, in his Memoirs, declares as much 
when he says that General Anderson, who had gone 
to Washington to present his views and receive in- 
structions, and had asked for the appointment of 
certain officers to serve under him as brigadiers, 
had some difficulty in prevailing on Mr. Lincoln to 
appoint George H. Thomas, a native of Virginia, to 
be brigadier general, because so many Southern offi- 
cers had already left the army to join the Confed- 
erate service. 



APPOINTED A BPvIGADIER GENERAL. 



39 



Thomas was doubly unfortunate because, besides 
being suspected by the Federal Government, he was 
regarded by many at the South as a traitor whose sin 
was unpardonable. The scruples of the President 
were, however, overcome. His appointment as briga- 
dier general dates from August 17, 1861, and he was 
assigned to the Department of the Cumberland on 
the 24th of the same month. Beyond the recognition 
of his merits by his comrades in the army, he was as 
yet an unknown man, and the first steps of the career 
now opening to him were full of doubt and danger, 
which would tax not only his military judgment but 
also his moral courage to the utmost. The region 
in which he was called to serve and try his '' 'prentice 
hand " was the debatable land between the North 
and South — a veritable " Chevy Chase." 

In order to form a just estimate of what was be- 
ing done and what was to be done in Kentucky, it 
becomes necessary to take a look backward upon the 
political condition of affairs in that State. Peopled 
mainly by emigrants from Virginia and the Carolinas, 
it was considered by the casual observer to be as 
Southern in its character as any of the States about to 
secede and enter the Southern Confederacy ; and yet, 
to the astonishment of the Southern people them- 
selves, it became evident, as political matters were 
converging to a crisis in 1861, that Kentucky would 
be loyal to the Union. " It is unquestionably though 
painfully true," says Edward A. Pollard, "that the 



40 ■ GENERAL THOMAS. 

great body of the people of Kentucky were the ac- 
tive allies of Lincoln." 

Kentucky had been known in its earlier history 
as the "dark and bloody ground" of fierce Indian 
tribes; it continued to deserve the name during the 
Revolution, when Great Britain formed alliances with 
the Indians. The treaty of peace and Jay's later 
treaty did not entirely stop the fighting there. It 
came into the Union as a State in 1792, and ranked 
with the South in character. But the preponderance 
of loyal men in Kentucky required gradual demon- 
stration ; indeed, it took some time for men to know 
their own minds. 

In 1859 it seemed that the State was so strongly 
proslavery in the approaching controversy that 
Governor Magoffin was elected on that issue, and it 
might be well feared that it would join the Southern 
States in the coming contest. 

In i860, however, this fear was dispelled by the 
nomination of a Presidential ticket with the names of 
Bell and Everett, which certainly looked toward 
gradual emancipation, which then seemed possible. 
That ticket was elected in Kentucky, and this greatly 
strengthened the hands of Union men. They began 
at once to fight the secession movement at every 
point, and to dwell upon the vast commercial ad- 
vantages which Kentucky would enjoy within the 
Union. Just after the election of Lincoln the State 
Legislature met, and while they defended slavery as 



APPOINTED A BRIGADIER GENERAL. 41 

an existing institution, they were strong for the 
Union, denounced secession, and deprecated war. 
Then began a game of wits. A State guard was 
organized which was intended to be neutral ; but 
when Buckner took command of it and posted it at 
Bowling Green, it was soon declared to be in the 
secession interests. Governor Magoffin had refused 
to enlist the troops called for by Lincoln's proclama- 
tion ; but when, on July 4, 1861, the President called 
an extra session of Congress, the members sent from 
Kentucky were all Union men. This was the signal 
for political disintegration ; the secessionists of Ken- 
tucky scattered to the South and took up arms with 
the South ; the State was strong for the Union. The 
controversy became and remained indeed a purely 
political one, but the soil of Kentucky was the scene 
of varied strategy and bloody battles to the end of 
the war. 

Buckner, with the Home Guard, had joined the 
Confederate ranks and taken post at Bowling Green, 
Kentucky, on the Big Barren Branch of the Green 
River, a tributary of the Ohio, to await the progress 
of events and soon to join fiercely in the strife. Thus 
the State was in a condition of the greatest turmoil ; 
loyal Kentuckians were in danger of being overpow- 
ered and silenced by secession forces. Honest but 
ignorant men were told that their slaves would be at 
once taken from them, although the President had 
declared that he had no such purpose. Such men 



42 GENERAL THOMAS. 

armed to defend their property. In this condition of 
things it seemed good policy to send to Kentucky of- 
ficers of Southern birth who had remained loyal to the 
Union and who could yet understand the difficulties 
of their Southern brethren. Among these were Thom- 
as J. Wood, Rousseau, Ward, R. W. Johnson, and Boyle. 
Such was certainly the reason also of sending 
Thomas to Kentucky, and^ great hopes were enter- 
tained of the Union movements there. With the ex- 
ception of the early and tentative affairs in Western 
Virginia under McClellan and Rosecrans, there had 
as yet been no Federal victory. The battle of Bull 
Run, fought in July, 1861, was a great defeat for the 
Union arms. The whole loyal North was on the 
tiptoe of expectation and impatient hope for some 
cheering event to wipe out that disgrace. New gen- 
erals were being appointed. Troops were in motion 
and being encamped upon objective points of the 
irregular chess board. A gleam of victory would be 
hailed with the greatest enthusiasm, and the general 
who should achieve it would be regarded, among the 
host of untried commanders, as the " coming man " 
who was so greatly needed. Such were some of the 
strong incentives among the data of the problem 
presented to Thomas in Kentucky. Just at this 
juncture General Anderson's health failed, and he 
asked to be relieved of his command, in which he was 
succeeded by General William T. Sherman early in 
September, 1861. 



APPOINTED A BRIGADIER GENERAL. 



43 



We may now stop for a moment to consider the 
strategy of the proposed campaign. An examination 
of the ground will display its main features at a 
glance. Thomas had studied the situation, both of- 
fensive and defensive. His purpose was to go at 
once into East Tennessee, in which there were many 
loyal Union men cruelly oppressed by the Confeder- 
ate forces raised in that region and by public South- 
ern opinion. These he would rescue and relieve 
from their sufferings, and thus at the same time re- 
cruit the Union ranks. He would also seize the rail- 
road, the main artery of the Confederacy, running 
from Richmond into Georgia, Alabama, and Missis- 
sippi. Thus he would cut their communications 
with the North, and provide a good starting point 
for the Southern movements. Chattanooga would 
fall into Union hands. 

Many of these loyal East Tennesseeans who had 
fled into Kentucky were clamorous for an immediate 
movement of Union troops to relieve their oppressed 
brethren. Thomas reported to Sherman at Louis- 
ville on September 6, 1861, and saw at once the dif- 
ficult nature of the problem as I have endeavored to 
show it; it was not only a military but a political 
situation. There were many impatient people mak- 
ing a din about his ears from the very start. The 
authorities at Washington were urging the move- 
ment upon Sherman, and Sherman was astounding 
them with the magnitude of his demands for the 



44 GENERAL THOMAS. 

success of such a movement. The army was ex- 
pecting it, and the loyal East Tennesseeans, backed 
rather impatiently by ex-Governor Andrew Johnson 
and others, were clamorous to be taken back home 
protected by Union troops. But where were the 
troops with which to accomplish this ? They were 
not yet collected, and when collected they could 
hardly be called troops. 

Lieutenant William Nelson, of the navy, a loyal 
Kentuckian, who happened to be at home on furlough, 
was given, without its interfering with his naval 
rank, an appointment as brigadier general of volun- 
teers. He was a man cast in a gigantic mould, of 
stern character, dogmatic will, great energy, and 
strong prejudice. He was selected to form the 
nucleus of an army for this campaign. With this 
purpose he established his headquarters in middle 
Kentucky very near the Kentucky River, about fifty 
miles south of Frankfort, which he named " Camp 
Dick Robinson." 

There were congregated the most motley crowd 
that ever bore the name of soldiers. There were 
loyal men of Kentucky and Tennessee, especially 
East Tennessee, called '^Andrew Johnson's men"; 
adventurers from Ohio to whom such an opportunity 
was a Godsend ; but the prevailing spirit was that 
of loyalty to the Union. They were not deceived by 
the proffer that if they would disband so would 
Buckner — every day showed the absolute impracti- 



APPOINTED A BRIGADIER GENERAL. 45 

cability of such a course; nor by the specious proc- 
lamation of Zollicoffer, that he was coming *' to de- 
, fend the soil of a sister Southern State against an in- 
vading foe, and that no citizen of Kentucky was to 
be molested in person or property, whatever his 
political opinions, unless found in arms against the 
Confederate Government, or giving aid and comfort 
to the enemy by his counsels." 

The moving spirits on the Union side in East 
Tennessee besides Andrew Johnson, later to be 
President of the United States, were " Parson Brown- 
low," who stirred the people by his rugged ha- 
rangues, and T. A. R. Nelson, a patriot of a poetic 
temperament and golden-mouthed oratory. " It is 
not difficult," says General Howard, ''to imagine all 
the chaos of this big camp. The ever-changing 
commanders of the department or district, and the 
ambition of great men, who, as yet unused to war, had 
come hither to assert their prerogatives, were among 
the prime causes. Above and below Thomas there 
wa,s commotion and perpetual unrest. Steady, strong, 
firm, deliberate, he brought order out of confusion." 

Recruits were taken thither without equipment 
and without proper supplies of any sort ; every day 
accessions were made of men, but not of supplies; 
and yet out of these chaotic elements it was hoped 
that a skillful commander could at once create an 
army. Thomas was the devoted man to whom this 
duty was intrusted. He was assigned to the com- 



46 GENERAL THOMAS. 

mand of " Camp Dick Robinson " on September 12th. 
The disloyal Kentuckians laid plans to capture him 
on his journey thither, but he avoided their snares 
and arrived safely on the 15th, where he found about 
six thousand men, and where his eyes were at once 
opened to the difficulty of the situation. The pros- 
pect was indeed a gloomy one. There was great 
want of arms, ammunition, food, clothing, and 
shelter. His first act was to appoint a quarter- 
master and a commissary of subsistence. The men 
were soon comfortably sheltered and fed. Then he 
wrote with great insistency for a full supply of ra- 
tions, cartridges, and muskets. Men, he said, were 
of no use without these ; and yet men were coming 
in numbers. The very fact of his taking command 
caused many loyal men to flock to the standard, 
while disloyalty found its place in the rapidly in- 
creasing armies of the Confederacy or in the form of 
the guerrilla warfare. 

He set himself busily to work to give form and 
consistence to this heterogeneous mass. It was 
soon organized into six regiments ; others were 
added later. Other regiments in better condition 
were also forwarded to him ; these were all arranged 
in four brigades, constituting the First Division of 
" the Army of the Cumberland," with a proportional 
force of unattached cavalry and artillery.* 

* " Such was the promising nucleus of that great army which 
later on swept through Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, the two 



APPOINTED A BRIGADIER GENERAL. 47 

The department was now commanded by General 
Sherman, and the troops thus far organized had been 
designated the Army of the Cumberland on account 
of the great strategic value of that river. Thomas 
was obliged also to create a staff out of his undis- 
ciplined material. By constant drills and a rigorous 
system of camp police he had effected a great trans- 
formation, and his troops were every day becoming 
more and more fitted, as they were more and more 
anxious, to be led against the enemy. After this 
preparation they now only waited for orders, and 
these were earnestly solicited. 

In what direction should he move ? His first 
suggestion was to advance rapidly through Cumber- 
land Gap upon Knoxville, an important strategic 
point as we have seen, and after destroying the East 
Tennessee and Virginia Railroad he would follow 
the enemy in the mountains and capture or disperse 
his army. But the enemy had not been idle either. A 
force under General Zollicoffer, acting, it is said, with- 
out orders, had made a rapid advance upon Loudon 
through the Cumberland Gap, that narrow and vital 
mountain pass, very near the point where the States 
of Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee meet. It was 
a fair trial of conclusions between the two forces, 
Thomas intending to pass through Cumberland Gap 

Carolinas, and Virginia, and was finally reviewed at Washington, 
before it melted away into the peaceable elements from which it 
had thus early been organized." 



48 GENERAL THOMAS. 

into East Tennessee, while Zollicoffer really passed 
through it into Kentucky. According to the Con- 
federate account, Zollicoffer had already, on Septem- 
ber 29th, dispersed a small Union camp at Barbours- 
ville on the Cumberland, about seventy miles north 
of Knoxville. Then General Schoepf, who had been 
sent out by General Thomas to contest his ad- 
vance, in the fear of being flanked by the enemy 
from Bowling Green, had rapidly retired. Thus 
the plans of the Union general were changed ; he 
pushed forward a large party to obstruct the roads 
by which the enemy would advance, and at the same 
time called urgently for re-enforcements. His ac- 
tion seemed to throw Zollicoffer into a state of in- 
decision ; instead of marching in advance from Lou- 
don to Rock Castle Hills, he fell back to Cumber- 
land ford. 

While Thomas was exhibiting incessant activity 
in bringing order out of this chaos and catching 
glimpses of success at the end, he was almost 
stunned by a letter received from General O. M. 
Mitchel at Cincinnati, who had, like himself, been 
recently appointed a brigadier general and was 
only a few days his senior, inclosing an order from 
the Secretary of War directing him to take com- 
mand of the department, and to supersede Thomas 
in the conduct of the campaign upon which he had 
just entered. Thomas might well object, for thus 
he would be robbed of the glory which should follow 



APPOINTED A BRIGADIER GENERAL. 



49 



from its success. He was not the man to permit 
this. The Government might supersede him, it was 
true, but he would not fight under Mitchel in that 
campaign. He wrote to him courteously but firmly, 
expressing his dissatisfaction, and declaring that he 
would refuse to serve under him. Should the order 
be enforced he would retire. 

In the chaotic condition of affairs in that region 
it may well be doubted whether the publication of 
this order was dictated by any suspicion as to the 
loyalty and ability of Thomas. In its state of doubt 
and uncertainty the Government was glad to listen 
to any suggestions which might lead to success, and 
thus it was that Mitchel was advanced, with little 
consideration of the man whom he should supersede. 
But yet it is probable that he thought it implied 
suspicion, and he felt that he must vindicate both 
his patriotism and his powers. He also wrote to 
Sherman, who was still in command in that region of 
the forces now called the Army of the Cumberland. 
The prompt reply was very gratifying, *'You are 
authorized," Sherman said, " to go on and prepare 
your command for active service. General Mitchel 
is subject to my orders, and I will, if possible, give 
you the opportunity to complete what you have be- 
gun." Thus his first great peril was overcome. 
The unbiassed reader will at once concede that 
Thomas was right. To be superseded was tanta- 
mount, in his judgment, to a charge against him that 



CO GENERAL THOMAS. 

he had not shown himself the man for the occasion. 
That demanded a reason, and a strong one. Did it 
imply incapacity or disloyalty ? He had a right to 
know ; indeed, he felt that, instead of being neglected 
or set aside, he deserved special consideration. 
However, the order was suspended, and Thomas 
pushed preparations forward as rapidly as possible. 

The larger strategy of the enemy was now mani- 
fest. His long and weak line, greatly exaggerated in 
numbers, in order to deceive the Union generals, ex- 
tended from Fort Henry through Bowling Green 
and up the Cumberland as far as Cumberland Gap. 
Thomas, who was now in firm command of the First 
Division, consisting of four brigades, was operating 
against its right, but with obstacles not only in his 
front but in his rear and in his midst. The troops 
were still undrilled and undisciplined, they were ill- 
armed and ill-clad, but as an offset to these evils 
they were very earnest and ardent, and anxious to 
be led against the enemy. 



CHAPTER IV. 

MILL SPRINGS. 

Opposing counsels — Festina lente — Clamor from Washington — 
Schoepf toward Somerset — At Crab Orchard — Army of the 
Cumberland becomes Army of the Ohio — Sherman relieved 
by Buell — Schoepf left at Somerset — Back to Columbia — 
Zollicoffer and Crittenden advance — Mill Springs — Logan's 
Cross Roads — Fierce attack — Repulse — Rapid retreat — Re- 
cross the Cumberland — Pursuit soon abandoned — Great joy 
in the land — Thomas not mentioned in General Order — Re- 
sults of victory. 

While Andrew Johnson had been, indecorously 
and without a show of authority, urging Thomas to 
move into East Tennessee, Sherman had warned him 
not to push too far and endanger his line of communi- 
cations. The Government at Washington became 
also clamorous for a movement and a battle. He 
kept his own counsel, got such supplies and re-en- 
forcements as he could, and watched the apparently 
irresolute enemy. The result was cheering. Indeed, 
it was a military dance of forward and back. General 
Garrard with the Third Kentucky Regiment was at 
Rock Castle Hills, and as the enemy advanced 
Thomas sent a part of the First Brigade under 
its chief. General Schoepf, consisting of the Four- 
5 



52 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



teenth Ohio, Fourth Kentucky, and two batteries, to 
reconnoitre as far as Somerset. The latter had not 
moved far, however, before he came upon the pickets 
of ZoUicoffer, who had come from Cumberland Gap 
through Monticello, and who after a smart skirmish 
fell back. A week after, Thomas moved his head- 
quarters forward to Crab Orchard with full intent to 
beat up the enemy's quarters wherever he should 
be; but an order form Sherman again checked him, 
and required him to withdraw his command across 
the Kentucky River. The scouting was not well 
done and the air was full of rumors. 

The Confederate General A. S. Johnston had oc- 
cupied Bowling Green, and was said to have a com- 
mand of forty-five thousand men. It was afterward 
found that this had been magnified nearly threefold. 
It was asserted that he was about to cut the Union 
line between Thomas at Crab Orchard and McCook 
at Nolensville. Thus drawn back and held in leash, 
Thomas was obliged to abandon his scheme tem- 
porarily ; and he was not even permitted to re-en- 
force Schoepf at Somerset. All this was due to an 
important change which was about to be made. By 
an order bearing date of November 15th, the coming 
event having cast its shadow before, the Army 
of the Cumberland became the Army of the Ohio, 
General W. T. Sherman was relieved from the com- 
mand, and was succeeded by General Don Carlos 
Buell. The former had been considered visionary 



MILL SPRINGS. 



53 



even to the verge of insanity on account of his esti- 
mate given to the Secretary of War of the number 
of troops necessary for the successful conduct of 
the campaign in that region. When men of good 
common sense were declaring that, with seventy-five 
thousand three months' men for an entire army, sixty 
days would end the war, Sherman's estimate that 
two hundred thousand would be necessary in Ken- 
tucky and Tennessee alone seemed like the dream 
of a madman. His reputed ravings proved after- 
ward to be the utterance of sober truth, and the 
splendid method in his madness throughout the war 
was a strong factor in achieving the final Union 
success. General Buell was a noble soldier — one of 
the very best of his time. He was stern, determined, 
and dignified, somewhat cautious, but an excellent 
administrator. He too was later to suffer from the 
unmilitary impatience of his superiors. Both these 
generals knew Thomas well ; Sherman was his class- 
mate at West Point, and Buell, in the class after him, 
was three years his companion there. Caution, how- 
ever, was the order of the day at those headquarters. 
Schoepf was left at Somerset, while Thomas, in or- 
der to shorten the Union, line, was ordered to fall 
back upon Lebanon and Danville. The enemy bom- 
barded Schoepf, and he was then re-enforced. 

It was considered that Thomas could march 
more safely southward by M^ay of Columbia, to 
make connection with Schoepf, and that thus united 



54 GENERAL THOMAS. 

they could march upon the new camp of the enemy 
at Beech Grove. Crittenden had proceeded first to 
Mill Springs on the south bank of the Cumberland, 
and then, having surprised or outwitted the Union 
Ferry Guards, had encamped at Beech Grove on the 
north bank. 

The line of Thomas, who on the 29th was placed 
in command of all the troops east of New Haven, 
was thus posted : The First and Second Tennessee 
and the Seventh Kentucky were at Loudon ; the 
Fourteenth Ohio, Tenth Indiana, and Fourth and 
Tenth Kentucky, with a battery, were at Lebanon ; 
the Third Kentucky and First Kentucky Cavalry 
were at Columbia ; the Thirty-third Indiana was 
at Crab Orchard ; the Thirty-first Ohio, the Thirty- 
first Ohio Battery, and a contingent of Cavalry were 
at Camp " Dick Robinson " ; the Seventeenth and 
Thirty-third Ohio, with a battery, were near Som- 
erset. This line did not long remain ; the forces 
were moved by every whim or fancy from head- 
quarters. 

We may pause for a moment to take a glance at 
the force which Thomas was now about to encoun- 
ter. It numbered between ten thousand and fifteen 
thousand men. The advance, consisting of two 
thousand men, was commanded by General Zolli- 
coffer, a native Tennesseean, a man of great worth, 
an editor, and a member of Congress, who in 1861 
had become a brigadier general in the Confederate 



MILL SPRINGS. 55 

service. He had led the advance, but this and the 
whole remaining force were under the command of 
General George B. Crittenden, a graduate of West 
Point and a soldier of experience, who had served 
in the Black Hawk War, the Texan Revolution of 
1835, and the Mexican War. His encampment at 
Beech Grove betokened his purpose to fight, and 
now instructions had been given to Thomas to meet 
him. It was claimed afterward, in extenuation of his 
defeats, that Crittenden had no alternative but to 
fight. He was almost without supplies, and the 
country could not provide them. General Critten- 
den joined the advance and assumed the command 
on January i, 1862, 

On December 29th Buell ordered Thomas to 
march southward and to join Schoepf. This was the 
permission so long waited for. He started on the 
31st from Lebanon through Columbia ; but so serious 
were the troubles and the obstacles that confronted 
him that it took him eighteen days to march to 
Logan's Cross Roads, so near Mill Springs, on the 
southern bank of the Cumberland, that it is the 
alternative name of the battle field. It was an un- 
commonly rainy season. The roads were very diffi- 
cult for the transportation of supplies and ammuni- 
tion and for the movement of artillery. 

Again, as his progress was retarded, new clamors 
arose at his delay. At Logan's Cross Roads, when 
he reached it, he communicated with Schoepf, who 



56 GENERAL THOMAS. 

sent him re-enforcements ; and he was obliged to 
pause until he could in a manner reorganize and 
prepare for the work before him. Thus, moving 
himself with a small division from Columbia, he was 
to join Schoepf, who was marching with his brigade 
from Somerset, thirty miles south. They were to 
join forces before the enemy could attack either in 
detail. Crittenden's force had crossed the Cumber- 
land at a point between the two and ten miles south 
of Thomas. It must be observed that at the last 
moment this union of the forces of Thomas and 
Schoepf was a delicate matter in front of the enemy. 
It was a question of exactitude in point of time. The 
place where Schoepf was to join him was at or near 
Beach Grove, and thus he would defeat the purpose 
of the enemy to strike the Union army in detail. 

The description of the field of battle may be 
epitomized. Thomas lay along the Somerset road 
and across the Mill Springs road. His purpose of 
advance and attack was fortunately forestalled by 
Crittenden, who left his camp at Beach Grove on 
the Cumberland and marched at a quick step the 
ten miles to Logan's Cross Roads on the evening of 
January i8th. Early the next morning, hoping to 
overpower Thomas before he had concentrated his 
troops and disposed them for battle, Crittenden, 
driving in Wooiford's cavalry, attacked vigorously 
and was promptly repulsed. Zollicoffer had moved 
at midnight, and at the dawn of Sunday — a dark and 






\^»l/i (Ihio I 1^ GEN .THOMAS 

//\HEtfOQUARTERS 




Slvetc-li 

OF 
The battlefield of 

LOGA>'S CROSS ROADS, 

OR 

MILL SPRINGS. 

January 10th, JSG3. 



J'irst rosition 




COIMFEO. 


m ca)i:^n^ 


Second 


-= 


— 




i 


Third 
Final 




vw 


f 



.#/ 








I 



MILL SPRINGS. 



57 



rainy Sunday — the attack was made. The enemy 
advanced to the crest of the last intervening hill. 
There halting, he sent for re-enforcements. Critten- 
den's advance was disclosed by Woolford's cavalry. 

The attack was expected and received by Colonel 
Manson's Second Brigade, supported by Colonel S. 
S. Fry, of the Fourth Kentucky. These troops held 
the enemy in check. With all speed General Thomas 
ordered forward the Tenth Indiana. Thus met in 
front, the enemy, advancing through a cornfield, en- 
deavored to flank the left of Colonel Fry's regiment; 
but the prompt advance of the Tennessee Brigade 
against the enemy's right, and the rapid firing of a 
section of Captain Kinney's battery, posted to the 
left of that regiment, put a stop to his advance. The 
Fourth Kentucky and the Tenth Indiana, being now 
out of ammunition, were replaced by the Second Min- 
nesota and the Ninth Ohio, who charged the enemy 
on his left v/ith fixed bayonets. But there was no 
longer need of force. Crittenden had had enough of 
the fight ; he fell back in haste. The Union line was 
reformed, an advance, conducted with due caution, 
forced the enemy still farther back to his distant in- 
trenchments, and on reaching them Thomas ordered 
a vigorous cannonade upon them. It is said that in 
the confusion Zollicoffer mistook Fry's command for 
some of his own troops, and, advancing to join them, 
was killed by a pistol shot fired by Fry himself. At 
the same time Fry's horse was shot, Thomas had 



58 GENERAL THOMAS. 

followed the enemy closely, and on the afternoon 
of the 19th he reformed his line of battle very 
near to their intrenchments and opened upon them 
with his artillery. But the battle of Mill Springs 
had been already won. 

Through the night Thomas made all his arrange- 
ments in preparation for an attack at dawn, not 
doubting that he would meet with a stern resistance. 
We may judge of his astonishment when he found at 
the earliest streaks of day that Crittenden had left 
his intrenchments with such precipitancy that he had 
abandoned everything behind them — one hundred 
and sixty wagons filled w4th supplies, and all his ar- 
tillery and ammunition trains. It was very difficult 
to understand this lame and impotent conclusion of 
his boastful advance. The disorder in his ranks, 
however, whatever the reason, merged into panic. 
He made haste to cross the Cumberland and place it 
as a barrier between himself and his triumphant foe. 
This was done by a steamer and three ferryboats, 
which were then burned to obstruct the pursuit. 
Thomas, crossing a portion of his force in skiffs, pur- 
sued him as far as Monticello, where the enemy had 
arrived in a starving condition, and then slowly re- 
turned to Somerset. The Union losses had not been 
great ; they were but one officer and thirty-eight 
men killed, fourteen officers and one hundred and 
ninety-four men wounded. Those of the enemy 
were greater — viz., one hundred and twenty killed, 



MILL SPRINGS. 50 

three hundred and forty-nine wounded and prisoners. 
Computing the numbers actually engaged, there was 
a great disparity between the forces. The army of 
Crittenden numbered in action twelve thousand men, 
while that of Thomas consisted of eight regiments, 
or scant seven thousand men. 

The battle is know^n by three titles — Logan's 
Cross Roads, Fishing Creek, and Mill Springs; the 
last named is the most commonly used. It was hailed 
with shouts of joy throughout the country. Buell's 
order of the day — January 23, 1862 — conveys the 
thanks of the commander in chief to Thomas and 
his army for what he calls their brilliant victory. It 
is certainly unaccountable, except on the conviction 
that the Government did not look with great confi- 
dence upon Thomas, that the Secretary of War makes 
no mention of him by name or title in the order from 
Washington concerning the victory. He is lavish of 
praise for the prompt and spirited movements and 
daring battle of Mill Springs on the part of the 
United States forces, but he does not mention Thomas 
either by name or implication. The omission is 
marked, and Thomas felt it. Nor was he promoted 
for this victory. Others who had done nothing as 
yet were being promoted, but it was required of him 
to do something more before he should be. The 
Legislature of Ohio, then in session, was more gen- 
erous. The battle, as we have seen, was fought on 
January 19th. Under date of January 28th a resolu- 



6o GENERAL THOMAS. 

tion was passed thanking Thomas and his men in 
good set terms for their important victory. 

If the battle of Mill Springs was barren of imme- 
diate results it was not the fault of Thomas. As at 
the present time we look back upon it, we wonder 
that he was not permitted to carry out the plans for 
the conquest and occupancy of East Tennessee which 
he alone had clearly excogitated and had thus actually 
begun ; but at least the rebel line was broken and 
must be readjusted. The victories of Grant at Fort 
Henry and Fort Donelson, and the concentration of 
troops on the Tennessee to meet the enemy at Pitts- 
burg Landing, diverted the attention of the authori- 
ties from Thomas's scheme, and even for a time ob- 
scured its importance. 

We may pause for a moment, however, to see 
what had been really demonstrated by this battle of 
Mill Springs to the anxious and expectant country : 

I. It was the first victory achieved by the Union 
arms. Everything before had been tentative; the 
country was waiting to see whether its armies were 
to manoeuvre, advance, and fall back, according to 
the precepts of the " circumlocution office," or 
whether the generals meant business and fight. Here, 
then, was a downright honest blow, a knock-down 
blow which struck the keynote of actual fighting 
and success; a victory so complete and disastrous to 
the enemy that the moral results were large — entirely 
out of proportion to the material gains. 



MILL SPRINGS. 6l 

II. It was not merely a piece of battle tactics 
which routed the enemy for the moment ; it was a fine 
exhibition of strategy, which destroyed the right of 
an extremely long strategic line, which made it pos- 
sible to invade East Tennessee, destroy the trunk 
line of railroad, occupy Chattanooga, and greatly 
shorten the war. All that was in the purpose of 
General Thomas, but circumstances had conspired 
against him. 

III. It created a general and presented a type and 
an example for others to imitate. Up to this time 
we had no generals; the Government was making 
experiments. Many men who had never commanded 
a brigade, and many others who had never com- 
manded anything, but were clever politicians, were 
sent into the field to demonstrate their incapacity. 
The failures were more numerous than Beau Brum- 
mell's cravats ; but here, on the contrary, was dis- 
closed to the view of the country a real general, who 
had commanded and held well in hand ten thousand 
men, and with a portion of them had defeated in fair 
battle a force of the enemy nearly double his own. 
Thomas was literally the first general in point of time 
developed by the war, and equal, as will be seen in 
the course of the war, to any which it developed. 
The battle of Mill Springs established his reputa- 
tion as a soldier and an accomplished general. 

IV. It defeated the schemes of the secessionists 
and secured Kentucky to the Union. It made a 



62 GENERAL THOMAS. 

grand gathering center for Union men and diffused a 
Union spirit. It constituted the State a strong base 
of supplies, containing many points of departure for 
the Union army moving southward. To the loyal 
men of Kentucky and Tennessee it was great happi- 
ness to see such a feat accomplished in their own ter- 
ritory by a Virginian who was likewise an American 
patriot. 

Thus it is that, while in point of numbers of killed 
and wounded the battle of Mill Springs does not 
figure among the great actions of the war, it must be 
conceded that when we consider its early delivery, its 
inauguration of successful fighting' in the Southern 
campaign, the difficult and hazardous character of 
this bold, initial experiment, it rises to an importance 
disproportioned to the numbers engaged. It proved 
Thomas to be independent, earnest, determined, and 
valiant, with a sense of superiority to his adversary, 
with a prestige which accompanied him through his 
entire career. It showed him to be a man whose self- 
respect was great, who would not be overslaughed or 
set aside with impunity, and it swept away among all 
right-minded men the false suspicions which had been 
entertained as to his loyalty to the Government. 

It should also be observed that, had Thomas been 
permitted to carry out his plans and been rapidly 
re-enforced, he might have moved at once ; he might 
have taken Knoxville and Chattanooga almost by a 
coup-de-inain and greatly hastened the end of the 



MILL SPRINGS. 63 

war. It was perhaps too much, however, to expect 
at that time, and the Union troops were neither 
numerous nor veteran enough for such a campaign, 
however excellent their general might be. 

Extract from General Thojfias's Report of the Battle 
of Mill Springs. 

" Headquarters First Division, Department of the Ohio, 
" Somerset, Ky., fanuary ji, 1862. 

*' Captain : I have the honor to report that, in 
carrying out the instructions of the general com- 
manding the department, contained in his commu- 
nication of December 29th, I reached Logan's Cross 
Roads, about ten miles north of the intrenched camp 
of the enemy on the Cumberland River, on the 17th 
instant, with a portion of the Second and Third 
Brigades, Kinney's battery of artillery, and a bat- 
talion of Woolford's cavalry. The Fourth and 
Tenth Kentucky, Fourteenth Ohio, and Eighteenth 
United States Infantry being still in rear, detained 
by the almost impassable condition of the roads, I 
determined to halt at this point, await their arrival, 
and to communicate with General Schoepf. 

" The Tenth Indiana, Woolford's cavalry, and 
Kinney's battery took position on the main road 
leading to the enemy's camp. The Ninth Ohio 
and Second Minnesota (part of Colonel McCook's 
brigade) encamped three fourths of a mile to the 
right on the Roberts post-road. Strong pickets 
were thrown out in the direction of the enemy be- 
yond where the Somerset and Mill Springs road 
comes into the main road from my camp to Mill 
Springs, and a picket of cavalry some distance in ad- 



64 GENERAL THOMAS. 

vance of the infantry. General Schoepf visited me 
on the day of my arrival, and, after consultation, I 
directed him to send to my camp Standart's battery, 
the Twelfth Kentucky, and the First and Second 
Tennessee Regiments, to remain until the arrival of 
the regiments in the rear. 

*' Havmg received information, on the evening of 
the 17th, that a large train of wagons with its escort 
was encamped on the Robertsport and Danville 
road, about six miles from Colonel Steedman's camp, 
I sent an order to him to send his wagons forward 
under a strong guard, and to march with his regi- 
ment (the Fourteenth Ohio) and the Tenth Ken- 
tucky, Colonel Harlan, with one day's rations in 
their^haversacks, to the point where the enemy were 
said to be encamped, and either capture or disperse 
them. 

" Nothing of importance occurred from the time 
of our arrival until the morning of the 19th except 
a picket skirmish on the night of the 17th. The 
Fourth, the battalion Michigan Engineers, and Wet- 
more's battery joined on the i8th. About half past 
six o'clock on the morning of the 19th the pickets 
from Woolford's cavalry encountered the enemy ad- 
vancing on our camp, retired slowly, and reported 
their advance to Colonel M. D. Manson, command- 
ing the Second Brigade. He immediately formed 
his regiment (the Tenth Indiana) and took a position 
on the road to await the attack, ordering the Fourth 
Kentucky, Colonel S. S. Fry, to support him, and 
then informed me in person that the enemy were 
advancing in force and what disposition he had 
made to resist them. I directed him to join his 
brigade immediately, and hold the enemy in check 



MILL SPRINGS. 



65 



until I could order up the other troops, which were 
ordered to form immediately, and were marching to 
the field in ten minutes afterward. The battalion 
of Michigan Engineers, and Company A, Thirty- 
eighth Ohio, were ordered to remain as guard to 
the camp. Upon my arrival on the field soon after- 
ward I found the Tenth Indiana formed in front of 
their encampment apparently awaiting orders, and 
ordered them forward to the support of the Fourth 
Kentucky, which was .the only entire regiment then 
engaged. I then rode forward myself to see the 
enemy's position, so that I could determine what 
disposition to make of my troops as they arrived. 
On reaching the position held by the Fourth Ken- 
tucky, Tenth Indiana, and Woolford's cavalry, at a 
point where the roads fork to go to Somerset, I 
found the enemy advancing through a cornfield and 
evidently endeavoring to gain the left of the Fourth 
Kentucky Regiment, which was maintaining its po- 
sition in a most determined manner. I directed one 
of my aids to ride back and order up a section of 
artillery and the Tennessee Brigade to advance on 
the enemy's right, and sent orders to Colonel McCook 
to advance with his two regiments (the Ninth Ohio 
and Second Minnesota) to the support of the Fourth 
Kentucky and Eighteenth Indiana. 

"A section of Captain Kinney's battery took a 
position on the edge of the field, to the left of the 
Fourth Kentucky, and opened an effective fire on a 
regiment of Alabamians which was advancing on 
the Fourth Kentucky. Soon afterward the Second 
Minnesota, Colonel H. P. Van Cleve, arrived, report- 
ing to me for instructions. I directed him to take 
the position of the Fourth Kentucky and Tenth In- 



66 GENERAL THOMAS. 

diana, which regiments were nearly out of ammu- 
nition. The Ninth Ohio, under the immediate com- 
mand of Major Kaimmerling, came into position on 
the right of the road at the same time. Immediately- 
after these regiments had gained their positions the 
enemy opened a most determined and galling fire, 
which was returned by our troops in the same spirit, 
and for nearly half an hour the contest was main- 
tained on both sides in the most obstinate manner. 

" At this time the Twelfth Kentucky, Colonel W. 
A. Hoskins, and the Tennessee Brigade, reached the 
field on the left of the Minnesota regiment, and 
opened fire on the right flank of the enemy, who 
then began to fall back. 

" The Second Minnesota kept up a most galling 
fire in front, and the Ninth Ohio charged the enemy 
on the left with bayonets fixed, turned their flank, 
and drove them from the field, the whole line giving 
way and retreating in the utmost disorder and con- 
fusion. 

"As soon as the regiments could be formed and 
refill their cartridge boxes I ordered the whole force 
to advance. A few miles in rear of the battlefield a 
small force of cavalry was drawn up near the road, 
but a few shots from our artillery — a section of 
Standart's battery — dispersed it, and none of the 
enemy were seen again until we arrived in front of 
their intrenchment. 

" As we approached their intrenchments the di- 
vision was deployed in line of battle, and steadily 
advanced along the summit of the hill of Mouldens. 
From this point I directed their intrenchments to 
be cannonaded, which was done until dark by Stand- 
art and Wetmore's batteries. Kinney's battery was 



MILL SPRINGS. 



67 



placed in position on the extreme left of Russell's 
house, from which point he was directed to fire 
on their ferry to deter them from attempting to 
cross. 

" On the following morning Captain Wetmore's 
battery was ordered to Russell's house, and assist- 
ed with his Parrott guns in firing upon the ferry. 
Colonel Hanson's brigade took position on the left, 
near Kinney's battery, and every preparation was 
made to assault their intrenchments on the following 
morning. The Fourteenth Ohio, Colonel Steedman, 
and the Tenth Kentucky, Colonel Harlan, having 
joined from detached service soon after the repulse 
of the enemy, continued with their brigade in pur- 
suit, although they could not get up in time to join 
in the fight. These two regiments were placed in 
front, in my advance on the intrenchments the next 
morning, and entered first, General Schoepf having 
also joined me the evening of the 19th with the 
Seventeenth, Thirty-first, Thirty-fifth, and Thirty- 
eighth Ohio, his entire brigade, and entered with 
the other troops. On reaching the intrenchments 
we found that the enemy had abandoned everything 
and retired during the night. Twelve pieces of ar- 
tillery, with their caissons packed with ammunition ; 
one battery wagon and two forges ; a large amount 
of small arms, mostly the old flint-lock muskets, and 
ammunition for the same; one hundred and fifty or 
sixty wagons and upward of one thousand horses 
and mules ; a large amount of commissary stores, 
intrenching tools, and camp and garrison equipage, 
fell into our hands. A correct list of all the cap- 
tured property will be forwarded as soon as it can 
be made up and the property secured. 
6 



68 ^GENERAL THOMAS. 

" The steam and ferry boats having been burned 
by the enemy on their retreat, it was found impos- 
sible to cross the river and pursue them; besides, 
their command was completely demoralized, and re- 
treated with great haste and in all directions, mak- 
ing their capture in any numbers quite doubtful if 
pursued. There is no doubt but that the moral 
effect produced by their complete dispersion will 
have a more decided effect in re-establishing Union 
sentiments than though they had been captured." 

In order to present a picture which is at once a 
companion and a counterpart and which magnifies 
the feat of arms of Thomas by exhibiting the utter 
discomfiture of his enemy, we give the following : 

Extracts fro7ti General G. B. Crittenden' s report of the 
Battle of Mill Sprifigs. 

" The enemy sought evidently to combine their 
forces stationed at Somerset and Columbia, and 
when such junction was made to invest my intrench- 
ments. I deemed it proper, therefore, to make an 
attack before the junction could be effected, feeling 
confident, from the reports of the cavalry pickets 
made at a late hour, that the waters of Fishing 
Creek were so high as to prevent them from uniting. 
My information in that respect was correct. 

" Soon after daylight on the morning of January 
19th the cavalry advance came in contact with the 
pickets of the enemy after a march of nearly nine 
miles over a deep and muddy road. With a few shots 
the enemy's pickets were driven in, retiring about a 
quarter of a mile to a house on the left of the road. 



MILL SPRINGS. 



69 



From this house and woods in the rear of it quite 
a brisk fire was opened upon the head of the column. 
Skirmishers having been thrown forward, General 
ZoUicoffer's brigade was formed in line of battle 
and ordered to advance upon the enemy, whom I 
supposed would come out from their camp, which 
we were now approaching to take position. The 
road here extended straight in front for near a mile 
toward the north. 

"A company of skirmishers from the Mississippi 
regiment advancing on the left of the road, after 
sharp firing, drove a body of the enemy from the 
house and the woods next to it, and then, under or- 
ders, crossing the road, fell in with their regiment. 
Following this company of skirmishers on the left of 
the road to the point where it crossed to the right, 
the regiment of Colonel Cummings (Nineteenth Ten- 
nessee) kept straight on, and crossing a field about 
two hundred and fifty yards wide at double-quick, 
charged into the woods where the enemy was shel- 
tered, driving back the Tenth Indiana Regiment 
until it was re-enforced. 

"At this time General Zollicoffer rode up to the 
Nineteenth Tennessee and ordered Colonel Cum- 
mings to cease firing, under the impression that the 
firing was upon another regiment of his own brigade. 
Then the general advanced, as if to give an order to 
the lines of the enemy, within bayonet reach, and 
was killed just as he discovered his fatal mistake. 
Thereupon a conflict ensued, when the Nineteenth 
Tennessee broke its line and gave back. Rather in 
the rear and near to this regiment was the Twenty- 
fifth Tennessee, commanded by Colonel Stanton, 
which engaged the enemy, when the colonel was 



70 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



wounded at the head of his men ; but this regiment, 
impressed with the same idea which had proved fatal 
to General Zollicoffer — that it was engaged with 
friends — soon broke its line and fell into some dis- 
order. 

"At this time — the fall of General Zollicoffer 
having been announced to me — 1 went forward in 
the road to the regiments of Colonels Cummings 
and Stanton, and announced to Colonel Cummings 
the death of General Zollicoffer, and that the com- 
mand of the brigade devolved upon him. 

" There was a cessation of firing for a few mo- 
ments, and I ascertained that the regiment of Colo- 
nel Battle was on the right and the Mississippi regi- 
ment in the center, neither as yet having been ac- 
tively engaged, and the enemy in front of the entire 
line. I had ordered General Carroll to bring up his 
brigade, and it was now in supporting distance, dis- 
played in line of battle. I now repeated my orders 
for a general advance, and soon the battle raged 
from right to left. When I sent my aid to order 
the Fifteenth Mississippi to charge, I sent by him an 
order to General Carroll to advance a regiment to 
sustain it. He ordered up for the purpose Colonel 
Murray's (Twenty-eighth Tennessee) regiment, which 
engaged the enemy on the left of the Mississippi 
regiment and on the right of Stanton's (Tennessee) 
regiment. I ordered Captain Rutledge, with two of 
his guns, forward in the road to an advanced and 
hazardous position, ordering Colonel Stanton to sup- 
port him, where I hoped he might bring them to play 
effectively upon the enemy ; but the position did not 
permit this, and he soon retired under my order. At 
this point the horse of Captain Rutledge was killed 



MILL SPRINGS. 



71 



under him. Very soon . the enemy began to gain 
ground on our left, and to use their superior force 
for flanking in that quarter. 

^' I was in person at the right of the line of 
Stanton's regiment, the battle raging, and did not 
observe this so soon as it was seen by Colonel 
Carroll, who moved the regiment of Colonel Cum- 
mings, then commanded by Lieutenant- Colonel 
Walker, to the left, to meet this movement of the 
enemy, and formed the Seventeenth Tennessee, com- 
manded by Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, to support the 
regiments on the left. The regiments of Murray, 
Stanton, and Cummings were driven back by the 
enemy, and while reforming in the rear of the Sev- 
enteenth Tennessee, that well -disciplined regiment 
met and held in check for some time the entire right 
wing of the Northern army. These regiments on 
my left and on the left of the road retired across 
the field a distance of about two hundred and fifty 
yards, and there for a time repulsed the advancing 
enemy. Especially the regiment of Colonel Stan- 
ton, partially rallied by its gallant field officers, 
formed behind a fence, and, pouring volleys into the 
ranks of the enemy coming across the field, repulsed 
and drove them back for a time with heavy loss. 

" For an hour now the Fifteenth Mississippi, un- 
der Lieutenant-Colonel Walthall, and the Twentieth 
Tennessee, under Colonel Joel A. Battle, of my cen- 
ter and right, had been struggling with the superior 
force of the enemy. 

" I can not omit to mention the heroic valor of 
these two regiments, officers and men. When the 
left retired they were flanked and compelled to leave 
their position. In their rear, on the right of the 



72 GENERAL THOMAS. 

road, was the regiment of Colonel Powell (Twenty- 
ninth Tennessee), which had been formed in the 
rear and ordered forward by me some time before. 
General Carroll ordered this regiment to face the 
flanking force of the enemy which was crossing the 
road from the left side, which it did, checking it with 
a raking fire at thirty paces. In this conflict Colo- 
nel Powell, commanding, was badly wounded. The 
Sixteenth Alabama, which was the reserve corps of 
my division, commanded by Colonel Wood, did at 
this critical juncture most eminent service. Having 
rushed behind the right and center, it came to a 
close engagement with the pursuing enemy, to pro- 
tect the flanks and rear of the Fifteenth Mississippi 
and Twentieth Tennessee, when they were the last, 
after long fighting, to leave the front line of the bat- 
tle ; and, well led by its commanding oflicer, in con- 
junction with portions of other regiments, it effec- 
tually prevented pursuit and protected my return to 
camp. 

" Owing to the formation and character of the 
field of battle I was unable to use my artillery and 
cavalry to advantage in the action. During much 
of the time the engagement lasted rain was falling. 
Many of the men were armed with flint-lock muskets, 
and they soon became unserviceable. 

" On the field and during the retreat to camp 
some of the regiments became confused and broken, 
and great disorder prevailed. This was owing in 
some measure to a want of proper drill and dis- 
cipline, of which the army had been much deprived 
by reason of the nature of its constant service and 
of the country in which it had encamped. 

" During the engagement, or just prior to it, the 



MILL SPRINGS. 



73 



force under General Thomas was increased by the 
arrival, on a forced march, of a brigade from his 
rear, which I had hoped would not arrive until the 
engagement was over. This made the force of the 
enemy about twelve thousand men. My effective 
force was four thousand. The engagement lasted 
three hours." 



CHAPTER V. 

CORINTH AND PERRYVILLE. 

Forts Henry and Donelson — Buell at Nashville — Battle of Pitts- 
burg Landing — Defeat and flight of Beauregard — Thomas in 
command of the right wing — Siege of Corinth — Major general 
of volunteers — Resumes command of his division — Joins Buell 
at Louisville — Declines to supersede him — Battle of Perry- 
ville — McCook — Crittenden and Gilbert — Thomas no special 
command — Bragg retires — Buell relieved by Rosecrans — 
Thomas dissatisfied — In command of center — On to Mur- 
freesboro — Bragg strongly posted. 

As we have seen, the rapid retreat of the enemy- 
after Mill Springs baffled further pursuit ; and the 
hurly-burly of events in a different direction so 
occupied the military authorities that the scheme 
of marching to Knoxville, and thence to Chatta- 
nooga, was at once abandoned, or rather indefinite- 
ly postponed. It was impossible so to augment 
Thomas's force as to permit him to carry out such a 
plan. 

The Confederate generals Floyd and Pillow, who 
had ignominiously escaped from Fort Donelson in 
a panic, had passed rapidly through Nashville and 
were closely followed by Buell's force. In order to 
retard the pursuit they had destroyed the suspen- 



CORINTH AND PERRYVILLE. 75 

sion bridge, but Buell improvised crossings in boats, 
and was soon in possession of the capital of Ten- 
nessee, where he was joined by Thomas with his 
division. 

In the meantime General Grant had marched 
down the Tennessee to a point called Pittsburg 
Landing. It had been selected by General Charles 
F. Smith, and there he was soon to be confronted 
by A. S. Johnston with a large Confederate army. 

There are several moot questions connected with 
this battle of Pittsburg Landing, or Shiloh, which 
may or may not be settled after this generation has 
passed away. Was Grant's army surprised there ? 
Was it so driven back and disabled that the battle 
would have been lost without the strong re-enforce- 
ments and assistance of Buell ? We need not dis- 
cuss these questions here. One fact is patent, how- 
ever : the Army of the Tennessee was indeed very 
sorely pressed when Buell with the Army of the Ohio, 
on April 7th, moved at the most fortunate moment 
to its succor. Together they defeated the enemy. 
Whatever doubts there were of Grant's ability to 
maintain himself, they were dispelled by Buell's ar- 
rival, which was accelerated by the ever-increasing 
roar of artillery, telling him of the fierce contest 
going on around the little church of Shiloh and 
along the retiring left flank of Grant's army toward 
the landing itself. 

General Albert Sidney Johnston, the Confederate 



^6 GENERAL THOMAS. 

commander, had been killed early in the action, and 
General P. G. T. Beauregard, a thorough and valiant 
soldier, had succeeded to the command and driven 
back the left flank of Grant's army as upon a pivot. 
It was not an enviable task which Beauregard had 
thrust upon him, to assume command in the very 
heat of an action, planned by another ; and now, 
pressed and outnumbered by this new force of 
Buell, he had no alternative but a precipitate re- 
treat toward Corinth, an important strategic point 
twenty-nine miles from the battlefield of Pittsburg. 
The principal value of Corinth is that it lies at the 
junction of the Memphis and Charleston and the Mo- 
bile and Ohio Railroads, which are the lines of com- 
munication from the Mississippi to the Atlantic and 
from the Ohio to the Gulf of Mexico. Beauregard 
fortified this position, and there — to speak not qui.te 
technically — he was besieged by General Halleck, 
who had assumed the command of both Federal 
armies, now comprising a well-appointed force of 
about one hundred thousand men. 

Beauregard's orders and proclamations indicate 
not only his view of the importance of the position, 
but of his power to maintain himself there, and 
induced in the Federal commander an excess of 
caution in his approach. Thomas, who had not 
come up in time to take part in the battle of Shiloh, 
being in the rear of Buell's column, was now placed 
by Halleck in command of the right wing, consist- 



CORINTH AND PERRYVILLE. yj 

ing of several divisions — a recognition of his gen- 
eralship which was very gratifying to him. In view 
of succeeding events, it is curious to note that at 
this time Sherman was temporarily under his com- 
mand. In the opinion of the best military critics, 
Corinth might then have been taken by a vigorous 
assault ; instead of that, it was formally besieged, 
and the siege lasted for more than a month. It 
should be mentioned, however, in partial extenua- 
tion of this delay, that the movements of the 
army were rendered difficult by numerous obstacles. 
From the time of starting, on April 9th, from Pitts- 
burg Landing, the weather was continuously bad, 
the roads execrable, and much of the way needed to 
be corduroyed ; add to these difficulties the fact 
that the exact condition of things within the lines 
of Corinth was unknown to the Federal commander ; 
more so, perhaps, than it should have been. 

Halleck, who had been an engineer officer, was 
thus prompted to invest a weakly intrenched place 
and approach it with all the technique of a move- 
ment upon a permanent work. The least that can 
be said is that he was overmastered by his excessive 
caution. He delayed attacking, he made manoeuvres 
of approach, but he never did deliver a formal as- 
sault. At the last he was surprised that Beauregard 
had silently left the place, after having put some 
Quaker guns in position, still further to intimidate 
his halting enemy. 



78 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



It was during this siege of Corinth, and on April 
25, 1862, that Thomas received his promotion as 
major general of volunteers in somewhat tardy 
recognition of his excellent service at Mill Springs. 
He had nothing to do with the strategy or grand 
tactics of this movement, but was ready at any mo- 
ment to launch his troops like a thunderbolt upon 
the intrenchments of Beauregard, and would doubt- 
less have won further honor if the assault had been 
ordered. After the occupation of Corinth he was 
placed in temporary command, and remained there 
until June 22d. At that time, and at his own re- 
quest, Thomas was returned to the command of his 
old division, and proceeded to join Buell in his fur- 
ther movements. This was a busy time for him. In 
beating up the enemy's quarters and looking out for 
his communications, he was ordered in succession to 
Huntsville, to Decherd, to Pelham, and to McMinn- 
ville, where, on the flank and front, discretion and 
forecast were needed. It was evident that he pos- 
sessed both. 

The plans of the Confederate commander Bragg 
were soon manifest. He was about to make a des- 
perate experiment. He would combine his forces 
and invade Tennessee and Kentucky. At first it 
seemed that he would make Nashville his objective 
point, but before reaching it he appeared to deflect 
his army and to march upon Louisville. At this 
time General Halleck was created general in chief 



CORINTH AND PERRYVILLE. 



79 



of the army and called to Washington, and the task 
of confronting Bragg was confided to General Don 
Carlos Buell, who had divined the purposes ot 
Bragg, and appears to have been master of the 
situation. He ordered Thomas to join him with 
four divisions without delay, and then proceeded 
with his advance column to Louisville, which he 
reached by a forced march on June 25th. This was 
greatly to the joy of the large loyal element in that 
capital, and to the amazement and bitter disgust of 
the secessionists. Thus Bragg's purpose to march 
on Louisville was thwarted. 

Would his advance on Nashville be more suc- 
cessful ? Ground had been lost, the Confederates 
were assuming the offensive ; a great struggle was 
still in the near future. The Government at Wash- 
ington, wanting great results, was dissatisfied even 
with this brilliant strategy of Buell, and was dis- 
posed to hold him responsible for this new and con- 
sequential invasion of Kentucky by the Confederate 
army. Without seeking for explanations, they re- 
lieved him summarily from his command of the 
Army of the Ohio, and ordered General Thomas to 
assume it. Thomas, however, was not the man to 
become the instrument of such injustice, and de- 
clared himself at once against it. Buell, who had 
deserved well of the republic, was humiliated by an 
unexpected blow. Besides, he was on the eve of a 
serious conflict for which he had made due and 



8o GENERAL THOMAS. 

careful preparation. He bore the blow with stoical 
philosophy, but Thomas telegraphed at once to ask 
that the order be withdrawn or suspended — an act 
which vindicated publicly his noble character. Most 
subordinate commanders would have jumped at the 
tempting opportunity. This was on September 29, 
1862. The order was suspended, and on October 
ist Buell marched out to give battle to Bragg, with 
Thomas as second in command. 

This brings us to the battle of Perryville, which, 
in addition to being a fair stand-up fight in open 
field, was apparently intended by the Government to 
give Buell an opportunity to revindicate himself and 
satisfy their exacting impatience. Generals were to 
be tried and flung away with little regard to justice. 
Brilliant, not partial success, was what was required. 
Before considering this battle we may certify our- 
selves of the motives of Thomas's action. Many 
persons have attributed his protest against the re- 
moval of Buell entirely to diffidence of his own 
powers. This might indeed have been so. It is 
true that any general might hesitate to take com- 
mand of an army on the eve of battle with the de- 
tails of whose organization and administration he 
was not familiar, but in a great emergency such re- 
luctance might have been overcome. Indeed, the 
order relieving Buell contained already these three 
provisos: he was not to be relieved ''if he was in 
the presence of the enemy preparing to fight, if he 



CORINTH AND PERRYVILLE. gl 

had gained a victory, or if Thomas was absent." 
General Thomas has, however, told us himself his 
reasons in simple and unmistakable language : 

" I am not," he said, " as modest as I have been 
represented to be ; I did not request the retention 
of General Buell in command through modesty, but 
because his removal and my assignment were alike 
unjust to him and to me. It was unjust to him to 
relieve him on the eve of battle, and unjust to my- 
self to impose upon me the command of the army at 
such a time." 

But It should here be observed, that while he was 
more than willing under such circumstances to re- 
main Buell's subordinate, it is not to be inferred that 
he would have been willing to let any other officer 
take the place he had declined, without remon- 
strance. He only refused it that Buell might re- 
tain it. We may say here, in passing, that the 
delay occasioned by the order and its suspension 
caused Buell the loss of twenty -four hours and 
a golden opportunity for which he was not respon- 
sible. 

We need not dwell upon the battle of Perryville 
except so far as it relates to General Thomas, and 
that part is neither large nor important. In such a 
work as this details are unnecessary, and indeed im- 
possible. We can give, only the general movement 
of the battle and the part played by Thomas, which 
indeed was not a very prominent one. Subjected to 



82 GENERAL THOMAS. 

military criticism, the battle was faulty in many re- 
spects. Thomas, as second in command, was greatly 
trammeled, or rather his value was neutralized ; he 
commanded no troops specifically ; was supposed 
to have a general supervision of the field, but was 
really confined to such a position as his chief direct- 
ed. His duties were therefore of a nondescript and 
ambiguous character. The Army of the Ohio had 
been divided into three corps, each consisting of 
three divisions. The First Corps was commanded 
by Major-General A. McD. McCook, the Second 
by Major-General Thomas L. Crittenden, and the 
Third by Colonel C. C. Gilbert, who had been 
nominated brigadier general of volunteers by the 
President, but not yet, nor ever, confirmed, by the 
Senate. Thomas was directed to make his head- 
quarters with Crittenden's corps. 

The situation in which the Union army now found 
itself was grave. The expeditions of Forrest and 
Morgan in July, 1862, had greatly restored the con- 
fidence of the secessionists in Kentucky and Tennes- 
see. Murfreesboro had been captured by a coup de 
jfiain on the 13th of July, and Buell's communications 
with Nashville were threatened. His dispatches 
were intercepted and false ones sent, and it was of 
the greatest importance to advance at once to check 
the enemy's temerity in attempting to turn his left 
flank. 

Leaving Louisville on the ist of October, Buell's 



CORINTH AND PERRYVILLE. 83 

army was concentrated at Bardstown, about fifty 
miles south, on the 7th. A battle was imminent. It 
might have been postponed by Buell, but Bragg took 
the initiative. The intended order of the troops was: 
McCook on the left, Gilbert in the center, and Crit- 
tenden on the right. The Confederates were di- 
vided into two corps: the right under Polk, consist- 
ing of the divisions of Cheatham and Withers ; the 
left under Hardee, with the divisions of Anderson 
and Buckner. 

Unfortunately, however, the Federal order had 
not been completed. Crittenden had not yet ar- 
rived. Only two divisions of McCook's corps were 
in position, and against this incompleteness Bragg 
ordered three divisions in mass to be thrown.* This 
attack fell principally upon McCook's left division, 
commanded by General Jackson, who was there and 
then killed. It was in great straits, and clamored 
for aid from the center, but succor did not come ; 
and after a desperate conflict, McCook's left was 
driven back, and only rallied under cover of the 
center. Thus it did not entirely leave the field. 
The other division of McCook, which had come in 
advance under General Rousseau, w^as intended to 
maintain connection with the left division of Gil- 
bert's corps ; but, by a mischance, the left of Gilbert 
had been incautiously moved away, and there was a 

* It was fighting for fully two hours before Buell received in- 
telligence of the fact. 
7 



84 GENERAL THdMAS. 

considerable gap just across Doctor's Creek, between 
himself and Rousseau's right. Into that opening, 
with a quick perception and by a flying march, 
Bragg had thrust Buckner's division. It had at 
once formed line on Rousseau's flank, facing it at 
right angles, and, unfortunately, neither the com- 
manding general nor his second in command was on 
the field at that point to direct the prompt move- 
ment required by this emergency. 

The situation was indeed most unexpected and 
anomalous — one Confederate division thrust between 
two Union divisions, and, as it were, flanking both, 
while six other Federal divisions were in its rear and 
could at a word have annihilated it. Buell was still 
at some distance in the rear. Thomas, occupying 
the nominal position of second in command, had 
been directed to take post with Crittenden's corps 
on the right. He therefore could have no just 
knowledge of what was transpiring on the left 
center. 

It is easy enough now to see that if McCook's 
two divisions had changed front against Buckner, 
and if Gilbert also had made a wheel to the left 
with part of his force, Buckner's division would 
have been crushed or captured. A forward move- 
ment by Crittenden and a subsequent wheel to the 
left would have taken in flank and rear the entire 
attacking force of Bragg. But such movements 
required prompt intelligence of the situation and 



CORINTH AND PERRYVILLE. 8$ 

concert of action, which, as we have seen, were im- 
possible at that time.* 

These are criticisms after the battle. Later in 
the war, and with officers and troops more experi- 
enced in military problems, such mistakes were less 
liable to be made, and yet they sometimes were 
made. They form a severe part of military educa- 
tion, and the successful general is he who profits by 
such experience. The enemy did not follow up his 
advantage, although he had rudely broken the 
Union line. At nightfall General Buell, as soon 
as he comprehended the situation, sent orders to 
Thomas to move one division of Crittenden's to the 
center at the needed point, and two brigades to as- 
sist General Rousseau, who, although thrust back, 
was still contesting his ground against Buckner. 

But, in spite of his partial success and the dis- 
comfiture of the Union army, strange to say, Bragg 
had no thought of continuing the contest. He had 
indeed telegraphed that a great Confederate victory 
was gained at Perryville, but it was a barren victory. 
He did not begin his retreat until the 12th of Oc- 
tober. The Comte de Paris calls it very properly 
" a reverse for both parties," but in point of fact the 
advantage was with the federal troops. 

* In point of fact, not more than half of Buell's army had really 
been engaged. The brunt of the action was borne by eleven 
brigades, and their terrible fighting is indicated by their loss in 
less than four hours of four thousand men. Crittenden was not 
on the field at all until dark, when the action was entirely over. 



86 GENERAL THOMAS. 

The Union army remained on the field, and 
Buell, before his retirement, had ordered Thomas to 
proceed to Glasgow and Bowling Green, while 
Bragg, his plans defeated and a new combination 
being rendered necessary, fell back into Tennessee. 
The withdrawal of the Confederate forces to the 
South and the occupation of the field of battle by 
the Federals were at first regarded at Washington as 
indications of good success, but as fuller tidings were 
received this opinion was changed, and the Govern- 
ment, being dissatisfied with Buell, again determined 
to relieve him from the command. He had, whether 
anticipating this action or not, retired to Louisville, 
leaving Thomas in his place. 

It would be naturally concluded that now 
Thomas would receive and accept the command. 
Most persons were therefore very much surprised, 
and Thomas himself most painfully so, when it was 
found that another general was to be appointed^ 
General Rosecrans, whose success against General 
Price at luka had already commended him to the 
favorable notice of the Government. He was indeed 
by a few days the junior of General Thomas as a 
major general, and the date of commission, while it 
was not absolutely an assurance of promotion, was 
at that time, cceteris paribus^ a recognized factor in 
preferment to command; and certainly Thomas had 
already exhibited such a genius for war as gave him 
every reason to expect the promotion. He felt ex- 



CORINTH AND PERRYVILLE. g/ 

tremely humiliated, and made dignified expostula- 
tions. The Government thought, or affected to 
think, that when before the battle of Perryville he 
had declined to supersede Buell, he meant to ex- 
press a permanent disinclination to assume com- 
mand, a diffidence of his own powers, and a desire 
to evade responsibility. Nothing could be more 
absurd or farther from the truth. The reasons for 
his former action have already been fully given. 
That action showed him to be a man at once gener- 
ous and just. That conjuncture belonged to the 
past. No such reasons now existed, and in consider- 
ing this new condition of affairs we can not do 
better than to let him speak for himself, as he has 
done in his letter to General Halleck. With com- 
mendable dignity he passes in rapid review the prin- 
cipal events of his short but brilliant career and his 
just claims to the consideration of the Government. 
Speaking of the former occasion, when the order 
relieving General Buell was suspended at his request, 
he says : 

'* The order relieving him and placing me in 
command was suspended at my request, but to-day 
I find him relieved by General Rosecrans, my junior, 
although I do not feel conscious that any just cause 
exists for overslaughing me by placing me under my 
junior, and I am therefore deeply mortified and 
grieved at the course taken in this matter." 

In his answer General Halleck repeats the mis- 



88 GENERAL THOMAS. 

apprehension in these words : " You having virtually 
declined the command at that time, it was necessary 
to appoint another, and General Rosecrans was se- 
lected. It was not possible to give you command 
after you had declined it." 

It is not the part of a just historian to impute 
motives without just grounds, but the biographer 
must express his astonishment that the opportunity 
was not offered to Thomas and thus the chance of 
misconception avoided. At any rate, it would seem 
that they wanted Rosecrans more than they did 
Thomas. The whole question was thoroughly dis- 
cussed at Washington, and when they determined to 
put Rosecrans at the head of that army he was the 
junior not only of Thomas but of McCook and Crit- 
tenden. Where there is a will there is a way ; so, in 
order to remedy that obstacle, his commission as a 
major general, which had been dated August i6th, 
while Thomas's was April 25th, was now arbitrarily 
changed to March 21st. After all, we are forced to 
the conclusion that, passing over all who had been 
involved in the check at Perryville, they wanted a 
new man ; they should only have been honest enough 
to say so. 

It should be borne in mind that another factor 
of the greatest importance in this struggle had now 
appeared in the preliminary proclamation of Presi- 
dent Lincoln, issued on the 22d of September, just 
before the battle of Perryville, giving notice that on 



CORINTH AND PERRYVILLE. g^ 

the ist of January, 1863, all persons held as slaves 
within any State or any part of a State the people 
whereof should then be in rebellion against the 
United States should be thenceforward and forever 
free. This was the prompt, irresistible, inexorable 
logic of events, which moves rapidly to its conclu- 
sions. Just one month before, on the 22d of Au- 
gust, he had said to Mr. Greeley : " My paramount 
object is to save the Union, and not either to save 
or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union with- 
out freeing any slave, I would do it; if I could save 
it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it ; and if I 
could do it by freeing some and leaving others 
alone, I would do that." One month later he had 
freed the slaves of all that were in rebellion, and a 
little more than three months after that, on the 
ist of January, 1863, the decree went forth that 
negro slavery was abolished throughout the land. 
This, soon sanctioned by Congress, became a su- 
preme law, and affected the use of negroes in both 
armies. But it was so thoroughly a foregone con- 
clusion, that it had already entered into the plans of 
many of the loyal generals.* 

Immediately upon his appointment Rosecrans 
lost no time in preparations for the new campaign 

* Just how it would affect certain generals was still a matter 
of doubt, and it may be that, with some lingering of his first 
suspicion as to Thomas, Lincoln may have preferred not to give 
him so important a command. 



go GENERAL THOMAS. 

in Tennessee. Under date of October 24th the De- 
partment of the Cumberland had been reformed, to 
include that part of Tennessee lying east of the 
Tennessee River, and the army now commanded by 
Rosecrans was again called the Army of the Cum- 
berland. This was divided into three corps — the 
right, center, and left — commanded respectively by 
Generals McCook, Thomas, and Crittenden. 

The two contending forces made busy prepara- 
tion for a new conflict. From the 7th of November 
to the 26th of December the main army of Rosecrans 
was encamped around Nashville, while numerous ex- 
peditionary movements were made to feel the enemy 
and to guard the approaches. The railroads were 
secured, magazines established, and the men thor- 
oughly equipped for the impending movement. 
Bragg's army was intrenched around Murfreesboro, 
about forty miles south, where Rosecrans was or- 
dered to attack him, unless he should assume the 
initiative and advance upon Rosecrans. 

Thomas had wisely declined to be retained as 
second in command, having observed in the case of 
Grant at Corinth, and having experienced in his own 
case in the last battle, that it meant rank without 
authority or power. There would, in my judgment, 
have been a different story to tell of Perryville if he 
had commanded a corps there. He now accepted 
the command of the center corps, because, as was 
happily proved afterward, he could exercise im- 



CORINTH AND PERRYVILLE. gi 

plicit authority, maintain perfect relations with the 
other corps, and have credit for what he accom- 
plished. His corps was now larger than the others. 
It consisted of four divisions, while the rest had 
only three. His division commanders were Gen- 
erals Rousseau, Negley, Dumont, and Fry. 

Whatever criticisms may hereafter be made upon 
the career of General Rosecrans, he was then known 
as a fighting man and a good general. In the earliest 
days of the war he had beaten the enemy at Rich 
Mountain and Carnifex Ferry. Later he had won a 
victory over Price at luka, and had driven that gen- 
eral and Van Dorn away from Corinth. He had 
graduated in the engineers at West Point, and had 
well-formed notions of the science of war. He en- 
tered upon his new duties with alacrity and vigor, 
and to have a man like Thomas at his right hand 
was a tower of strength. He meant business. His 
first care was to restore the communications by rail- 
road from Louisville to Nashville, and thus to estab- 
lish two strong bases of supplies; or rather, we might 
say, the whole railroad line formed, so to speak, a 
long connecting base between the two, upon which 
the army could depend. This precaution being well 
taken, and the work thoroughly accomplished prin- 
cipally by Thomas's troops, the great object in view 
was to beat up Bragg's quarters at Murfreesboro or 
wherever he could find him, drive him from Ten- 
nessee, capture Chattanooga, and bring the whole 



92 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



State finally and permanently into the Union ranks. 
They had been long enough trying to do this. It 
was high time to accomplish it.* Thomas's troops 
were constantly in motion. With his headquarters 
at Gallatin, he had superintended the repairs and 
fortification of the railroad between the two capi- 
tals. Large magazines of supplies and munitions 
had been formed at Nashville and at the secondary 
base, Louisville. Toward the end of December 
everything was in readiness. The army was put 
in motion, the corps marched by different roads 
but within supporting distance upon Murfreesboro. 
Thomas was in advance with two divisions and two 
brigades on the Franklin road ; the rest of his corps 
were still detached but would soon join him.f On 
the 30th of December the whole Union army was in 
front of Murfreesboro. Such was the impetuosity 
of Rosecrans that he thought Bragg had evacuated 
the town. Instead of making a careful reconnois- 
sance he ordered Crittenden to occupy it, but soon 
he found out that he was mistaken ; Bragg was in- 
trenched in an exceedingly strong line, and was as 
full of fight as his Union enemy. 

* Bragg's army from the 19th to the 26th of October was pass- 
ing through Cumberland Gap, and thence he moved to Chatta- 
nooga, the objective point, whence, after due reorganization and 
preparation, he might set out to intercept and fight Rosecrans. 

f McCook marched by the Nolensville road, and Crittenden 
by the direct road to Murfreesboro. All moved cautiously upon 
that town, expectmg, indeed, to meet the enemy at Triune. 



CORINTH AND PERRYVILLE. 



93 



Indeed, he was waiting for him this time, as be- 
fore, on his chosen field of battle, not in ambush or 
in the employment of stratagem, but in open and 
defiant array. He had the retreat from Perryville, 
which was equal to a defeat, to atone for, and 
the Confederate authorities were as urgent that he 
should overthrow Rosecrans as the headquarters at 
Washington were that Rosecrans should destroy him. 
His was already the losing cause, and the most des- 
perate efforts were needed to restore it to hopeful 
vigor. These efforts General Bragg made to the 
utmost of his ability. 



CHAPTER VI. 

THE BATTLE OF STONE's RIVER.* 

The field — Bragg's line — Defensive-offensive — First Union move 
— The right wing routed — The left pushed back — The center 
retired — Possible withdrawal — " This army can't retreat " — 
New position — Semicircle of fire — Thomas repulses attack 
with promptness and skill — Crittenden crosses the river — 
Driven back — Union artillery scatters enemy — Bragg aban- 
dons his wounded — First telegram to Richmond — The bloody 
crossing — Federal victory — New arrangement of corps — Cam- 
paign of Tullahoma — Long rest and delay. 

We must pause for a moment to take a glance at 
the battlefield soon to be resonant with the thunders 
of warfare and bloody from the holocaust of vic- 
tims. Before doing so we present a brief outline of 
the numerical strength and composition of the con- 
tending armies. The Army of the Cumberland, or- 
ganized as the Fourteenth Army Corps, consisted of 
two wings and a center. The right wing, com- 
manded by General A. McD. McCook, was com- 

* I have adopted the geographical name of this river, although 
it would be more commonly called Stone River, as it has been in 
the past. It is spelled Stone's River in the reports, etc., con- 
tained in the War of the Rebellion Record. In Lippincott's 
Gazetteer, however, it is given as Stone River. 



THE BATTLE OF STONES RIVER. 



95 



posed of three divisions, commanded respectively by- 
General Jefferson C. Davis, General Richard W. 
Johnson, and General P. H. Sheridan. The left 
wing was commanded by General T. L. Crittenden. 
The three divisions of which it was composed were 
commanded respectively by Generals T. J. Wood, 
John M. Palmer, and H. P. Van Cleve. The center, 
under Thomas, had for its division commanders 
Generals Rousseau, Negley, S. S. Fry, who seems to 
have replaced Generals Dumont and R. B. Mitchell. 
A fifth division, not engaged at Stone's River, was 
commanded by General J. J. Reynolds. Each of 
these large commands had an adequate contingent 
of artillery, and Thomas had portions of three regi- 
ments of cavalry, but the body of the cavalry was 
formed into a division under the command of Gen- 
eral D. S. Stanley. Such was the Union army. By 
the night of December 30th they were in position. 

To meet it and arrest its progress, the Confeder- 
ate Army of the Tennessee, commanded by General 
Bragg, consisted of two corps under Generals Polk 
and Hardee. The divisions of Polk's corps were 
commanded by Cheatham and Withers, and each con- 
tained four very heavy brigades. Hardee's corps 
was composed of two divisions under Breckinridge 
and Cleburne. McCown's divisions of Kirby Smith's 
army were temporarily serving with Hardee in this 
action. General Joseph Wheeler was in command 
of all the cavalry, formed into four brigades, one of 



96 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



which was commanded by himself and the other 
three by Buford, Pegram, and Wharton. 

To a cursory glance before the action the chances 
of the combatants seemed to be about even ; there 
was little disparity in force, for, while Rosecrans had 
forty-three thousand men, Bragg had about forty- 
six thousand. The latter had the advantage of posi- 
tion carefully selected and thoroughly intrenched ; 
his slight excess of numbers was made up by excel- 
lent re-enforcements from the corps of Kirby Smith, 
and he was burning with desire to retrieve what, 
after all, was the disaster at Perryville. Appar- 
ently acting on the defensive, he was like the lion 
crouched for a spring. 

On the other hand, the Union army had the pres- 
tige of advance, which is much in itself. It had a 
new confidence in a fresh general who had won 
laurels in other fields. It had a thorough and far 
better reorganization since Perryville. Crittenden 
would have a chance to fight, McCook an oppor- 
tunity to retrieve himself, and Thomas, no longer 
second in command, would be permitted to show his 
superb staying and supporting power; for the battle 
was to be fought on different lines from those origi- 
nally projected. 

And now let us look at the field upon which was 
to be achieved a signal victory, in winning which 
Thomas played a most brilliant part. Murfreesboro 
is situated on the west fork of Stone's River, or 



THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER. 



97 



rather about a mile east of it. The flow of the 
stream is a little west of north, and it empties into 
the Cumberland about five miles from Nashville. 
Less than ten miles below Murfreesboro it is joined 
by Overall Creek. The battle was fought in part 
between these two streams and on both sides of 
Stone's River. The Nashville and Chattanooga 
Railroad follows the general northwestern direction 
of the river. 

General Bragg, who thus far seemed to be en- 
tirely on the defensive, had intrenched himself in a 
strong line in front of Murfreesboro and on the left 
bank, with his right crossing the stream about two 
miles in front of the town. Most of his line was 
drawn up in a strong triple formation. The divi- 
sion on his left was that of McCown, temporarily 
detached from Kirby Smith. That flank was covered 
by Wharton's brigade of cavalry. In first formation, 
at least, the order from left to right was — Cleburne, 
Cheatham, Withers — and across the river, forming 
the extreme right, was the division of Breckinridge, 
supported on the flank by Wheeler with the remain- 
ing three brigades of cavalry. Bragg's headquarters 
were in the rear on the east side of the river and on 
the Nashville turnpike. 1 have said that Bragg was 
on the defensive-offensive. He would await the at- 
tack of the advancing Union army with the hope of 
defeating it so thoroughly that he might pursue it 
back into the coveted border States to resuscitate the 



q8 general THOMAS. 

secession spirit and to take all the chances which for- 
tune should throw into his hands ; or, if that were 
delayed, he would himself attack. His hopes were 
high and his troops confident. He had not long to 
wait. Upon this strong Confederate line the Union 
army was about to advance. On the right, on high 
ground near the Franklin pike, opposite the strong 
Confederate left, was McCook's corps. 

As the Confederate line extended beyond Mc- 
Cook's right, making his line a very faulty one, which 
Rosecrans had recognized, but not corrected, he re- 
sorted to a stratagem. The night before the action 
he extended his line by false camp fires for some 
distance, the result of which was the strong exten- 
sion of the enemy's line, which was to take McCook 
in flank and rear at the very first onset. On the 
left, in a bend of the river, was Crittenden's wing. 
Thomas, with the center on a rolling slope, was 
either to act independently or as a reserve in sup- 
port of the right or left, as circumstances might 
require. It was now daybreak, of December 31st. 
The enemy's left unfortunately extended beyond 
McCook's right as he was coming into position, 
and this gave them a great advantage over him. 
They advanced to the attack, and their assault 
was delivered with such vigor that the Union right 
wing was at once turned, was driven back and 
to the left a long distance, and in their retreat 
fell upon Thomas's two divisions, which were fortu- 



THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER. qq 

nately enabled to stem the current setting like a 
mill race to the rear. The Confederates claimed, 
although rio doubt their account is exaggerated, that 
in this attack the right of the Union army was 
entirely surprised. The artillery horses were not 
harnessed, and so several Federal batteries were cap- 
tured. In any case the situation was bad enough. 
The Union right was pushed back during five hours 
of incessant fighting, brigade after brigade being led 
in by the enemy with great impetuosity to complete 
the work. It was here that Sheridan signalized him- 
self by the splendid fighting of his division against 
attacks in front and flank, and even in rear : when he 
did fall back it was in part for lack of ammunition. 
Negley also did much with his division partially 
to stem the tide. Rousseau was ordered to the 
right and rear of Sheridan. Thomas was also 
there, and was to prove a tower of defense in this 
emergency. His policy had been to make two par- 
tial changes of front, falling back in good order 
and refusing his right. Prisoners were taken and 
guns were lost during these movements, in John- 
son's and Sheridan's divisions. Having thus thrust 
back as upon a pivot the Union right, Bragg then 
determined to crush the left flank, which was held 
by Palmer's division, and two brigades of Wood's 
division, constituting the principal portion of Crit- 
tenden's troops, and supported by one brigade of 
Sheridan's division of McCook's corps. In the mean- 
8 



lOO GENERAL THOMAS. 

time Rosecrans, instead of re-enforcing McCook, 
formed, by the aid of Thomas, a new line of battle 
on several oval-shaped hills and also on a crest in 
rear of the left, from which, by a concentrated 
semicircular fire of artillery in all directions, he might 
resist the attacks of the enemy from any direction. 
He wisely masked his artillery, and the troops lay 
behind the eminences, guns and men awaiting the 
attack. Fifty of these guns were placed on the left 
of this new line, and would give a good account of 
those rash enough to assail them. The general and 
the troops were fully awake to the situation, and 
Thomas was the hero of the occasion. Thus much 
of the battle had taken place on the 31st of Decem- 
ber and had seemed decidedly to go against the 
Union army. Encouraged by his great success, 
Bragg ordered his left center, which had also swung 
around to the right, to make a final assault at sun- 
set — intended to be a coup de grace. It did indeed 
shake the Union troops just taking position on their 
new line, but it was at last thoroughly repelled or 
held in check, while Thomas was slowly retiring. 
To form this new line. General Thomas with five 
brigades had stopped the advance on the Federal 
right and had thus saved the army. In the words 
of Van Home, " General Thomas gained greater 
distinction in other battles, but never did he meet a 
crisis with more promptness and skill." There is a 
story that late that night, at a meeting of the prin- 



THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER. jqi 

cipal officers, something was said about a possible 
retreat, and Rosecrans awakened Thomas, who had 
fallen asleep, and put to him the question, "Will 
you protect the rear on retreat ? " Starting out of 
his slumber, Thomas ejaculated, " This army can't 
retreat! " and at once fell asleep again. In justice 
to Rosecrans it should be said that nothing could 
have been more gallant than his conduct in the suc- 
ceeding conflict, especially as he rode down to the 
Round forest under the concentrated fire of the 
enemy. It was then that Colonel Garesche, his aid, 
had his head taken off by a cannon shot at his side, 
and three orderlies were killed in quick succession. 

Rosecrans adopted the opinion that the army 
could not retreat. On the morning of the ist of 
January he had concluded in his own words "to 
fight or die." Provisions and ammunition were rap- 
idly brought up from the rear. The men were in 
good spirits and condition ; they were now almost 
impregnably posted. If the enemy was not ready to 
attack they would resume the offensive; they would 
anticipate Bragg's purpose to assault the Union 
left. With this purpose General Crittenden sent sev- 
eral brigades across the river to threaten the ene- 
my's right. These brigades were fiercely attacked 
by the Confederates under Breckinridge, who pur- 
sued them to and across the river to a considerable 
distance, but the pursuers rushed into a terrible trap. 
It was then that the fifty guns masked on the left of 



I02 GENERAL THOMAS. 

Crittenden's corps opened upon their advance with 
a murderous fire, before which they recoiled in dis- 
may. And at that juncture Colonel John F. Miller 
with a brigade of Negley's division, which had been 
sent from Thomas to re-enforce Crittenden, fell upon 
them, drove them at the point of the bayonet 
through and beyond their own line of works toward 
Murfreesboro. The entire situation was changed. 
Bragg had expended his fury in these attacks. The 
discomfiture of his right settled the question. His 
hopes were destroyed. He made some desultory 
and faint attacks upon Thomas's center, which were 
promptly met and repulsed ; and so, on the night of 
January 3d and on the morning of the 4th, leaving 
his dead and wounded behind, he retired rapidly to 
the South. The Union army had lost eight thousand 
five hundred, and the Confederates, according to 
General Bragg's report, over ten thousand. There 
is such a discrepancy in the accounts of the capture 
of prisoners on both sides, that it is very difficult to 
get at the truth, even by a collation and comparison 
of the official reports. 

The partial success of Bragg at Perryville has 
led the Southern historian to claim a victory there, 
but he acknowledges his defeat at Stone's River. A 
great defeat it was in its consequences, injurious 
as they proved to be to the Confederate arms. The 
moral disaster was also immense. He had lost middle 
Tennessee, and with it the confidence of the Con- 



THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER. 103 

federate authorities. For some time before the ac- 
tion Bragg had abandoned the idea that Rosecrans 
would attack him. His well-appointed army of be- 
tween forty and fifty thousand men had been passing 
a delightful time at Murfreesboro. It was the scene 
of joy and festivity. Gay parties in the town and in 
the camp were the order of the day. There seemed 
to be no apprehension for the immediate future, and 
especially did the grand Christmas ball give a new 
and famous illustration of Byron's Waterloo. Just 
one week after, the fields around Murfreesboro were 
thickly strown with the dead of both armies — 

" Rider and horse, friend, foe, in one red burial blent." 

The day after Christmas, in the midst of a steady 
rain, the news had come in that the Union army was 
on its march, and this had been to Bragg in the nature 
of a surprise. To summarize further, we have seen 
that the action of the 31st had given to the Confed- 
erate forces a decided success. The Union troops 
had been driven back for a long distance, and had 
lost many prisoners and guns. It was then that 
Bragg had prematurely telegraphed to Richmond, 
proclaiming the news of a great victory before it 
had been half achieved. His w^ords were, " God has 
granted us a happy New Year." 

When night came down upon the ist of January 
the loss and the carnage were evidenced by the fact 
that two thousand men had fallen in the single at- 



]04 GENERAL THOMAS. 

tack of Breckinridge on the Union left. The Con- 
federates appropriately call it the bloody crossing 
of Stone's River. 

On Sunday morning, January 4th, a reconnois- 
sance disclosed the departure of Bragg's army, and 
Murfreesboro was occupied by the Federal troops. 
Thomas entered the town on Monday, January 5th, 
preceded by Stanley's cavalry. Rosecrans did not 
proceed farther, but remained there to reorganize 
and recruit, and wait for more favorable weather. 
The authorities at Washington and the whole coun- 
try were overjoyed at the success. Congratulatory 
orders were issued, and eulogistic resolutions were 
passed by Congress and the Legislatures of several 
Northern States. 

It would, of course, have been well if Rosecrans 
could have followed Bragg immediately, and to the 
public mind this seemed possible; but the military 
critic knows that after such a hard-fought battle 
an orderly pursuit can not be made. Whether six 
months were necessary for reorganization and a par- 
tial state of inaction was warranted, are more ques- 
tionable considerations. Long stays in permanent 
camps are not beneficial to troops. But more of 
this hereafter. 

Measured by the actual conditions of the battle- 
field, it was a Union victory. The enemy had been 
repulsed at all points, the disaster to the right wing 
on the first day had been splendidly retrieved on the 



THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER. 105 

following days, and then Bragg had retired from the 
field, leaving his wounded behind. 

Major William Lambert, in his admirable oration 
at Rochester before the Society of the Army of the 
Cumberland, happily epitomizes the value of Thom- 
as's services in this action : "At Stone's River, when, 
in spite of Sheridan's superb stand, the troops upon 
Thomas's right, flanked and overborne, were forced 
back ; when his left was alike exposed by the retire- 
ment of its immediate supports, and he was com- 
pelled to fight on front and flanks : the rapidity with 
which he changed front while thus heavily engaged, 
and, forming line at right angles to his first position, 
gave direction and stability to the army's new for- 
mation, not less than the sturdiness with which he 
fought his division throughout the entire action ; 
and the vigor with which he asserted in the night 
conference ' This army can't retreat,' made his-service 
in this battle second only to that he rendered at 
Chickamauga." 

It has been thought by some critics that Rose- 
crans was in as good a condition for an immediate 
advance as Bragg was for an orderly retreat. This 
is hardly just. After so bloody a battle there must 
be time to rest and recover, and, to say the least of 
it, the new campaign of Rosecrans required the col- 
lection of supplies for at least twenty-five days' sub- 
sistence, the carrying of ammunition for at least two 
great battles, the securing of the railroad commu- 



I06 GENERAL THOMAS. 

nications, and a great increase to the cavalry ; for the 
enemy's cavalry were ten or twelve thousand strong, 
and we had a very inadequate force to cope with it. 

Rosecrans made a change of designation in the 
commands. Instead of right and left wings and 
center, the army was divided into corps, McCook 
having command of the Twentieth, Thomas of the 
Fourteenth, and Crittenden of the Twenty-first. 

It is hardly necessary to dwell farther upon the 
splendid services of Thomas and his corps in this 
battle. In the great rush of McCook's corps to the 
rear on the first day he stood firm at the right cen- 
ter, stemming the apparently resistless tide, while he 
established the new line and made the later arrange- 
ments practicable. He massed the artillery on the 
heights, brought the pursuit to a standstill, and then 
converted it into a disastrous retreat. Now that the 
confusion of reports and dispatches has been brought 
into something like order, Thomas emerges from 
the record as the most important and prominent 
man of that field — a man destined, if he should be 
spared, for greater achievements. His newly desig- 
nated Fourteenth Corps consisted of four divisions, 
commanded respectively by Generals Rousseau, Neg- 
ley, Brannan, and J. J. Reynolds, all good men and 
true, and to be thoroughly tested in the next great 
action between the two. armies. 

It seemed that the time of that action was at 
hand, for during the early months of the year, while 



THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER. 



107 



Rosecrans was resting and reorganizing at Murfrees- 
boro, Bragg had established his headquarters at Tul- 
lahoma, a small town on Rock Creek, thirty-two 
miles from Murfreesboro, and at the junction of two 
trunk lines of railroad, the Nashville and Chatta- 
nooga and the McMinnville and Manchester. It 
was a good defensive position, if Bragg really meant 
it to be a base of operations; it would enable him to 
move rapidly on an interior line from that part of 
the Tennessee River where it forms the boundary 
between Mississippi and Alabama, to that other part 
where it covers Chattanooga. 

It seems more than probable, however, that this 
conduct of Bragg was of the nature of a feint to 
deceive Rosecrans, and to draw him off from a direct 
movement, while he perfected his plans with regard 
to Chattanooga. 

Thus began what has been dignified by the name 
of the Tullahoma campaign; it was of only ten 
days' duration — from the 23d day of June to the 4th 
of July. Rosecrans was not deceived. If Bragg 
meant it in earnest, he would drive him from his de- 
fenses on Duck River, with his headquarters at Tul- 
lahoma, or fall upon his line of communication and 
cut him off from Chattanooga. Bragg did not wait 
for Rosecrans's coming. Thomas, with the Four- 
teenth Corps, moved toward Manchester and threat- 
ened his right, whereupon the Twentieth Corps was 
moved upon Liberty Gap, and this gave McCook an 



I08 GENERAL THOMAS. 

opportunity to retrieve his ill fortune at Stone's 
River. Thomas moved to Hooven's Gap. Thus, 
with his flank threatened at Tullahoma, after a show 
of resistance, Bragg retreated to Chattanooga. 

The movements of Thomas from Manchester and 
of McCook from Tullahoma were unable to bring 
him to a stand ; he burned the bridges and crossed 
the Cumberland range, and Rosecrans was now free 
to make his plans for a more direct advance upon 
Chattanooga. The possession of the gaps in that 
line had been feebly contested by the enemy sim- 
ply to gain time; they were now held by Thomas 
and McCook, while Crittenden, with the left wing, 
would find no opposition in a direct march upon this 
mountain range. 

It was thought that the spirit of action infused 
in the Union army by this movement to Tullahoma 
would increase in strength, and lead Rosecrans to 
move at once upon Bragg's new position; but there 
was to be another long and unfortunate delay, and 
the reader chafes, as the authorities at Washington 
did, as he foresees the results which were to follow. 
We may here anticipate a little. Bragg was at 
Chattanooga, but it was manifest that he could 
not continue to hold the town ; Rosecrans could cut 
him off from his Southern communications. He 
must come outside and fight him. Should Bragg 
defeat him, he could hold Chattanooga ; should he 
be defeated, he could retreat to the South. 



THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER. 



109 



Halting on the northwestern side of the Cumber- 
land Mountains, Rosecrans continued his plans and 
preparations for crossing the Tennessee. The pre- 
cious months of summer were passing, the enemy 
was consolidating and strengthening his schemes of 
resistance, and explicit orders were being sent from 
Washington urging Rosecrans to move ; so that, 
when he did, it was under pressure. 

General Halleck said he was blamed at Washing- 
ton for not urging Rosecrans to move forward more 
rapidly, while Rosecrans was blaming him for that 
very urgency. It is impossible to decide in such a 
case. It is worthy of observation, however, that in 
the case of several generals of the highest order the 
impatience of the Government at Washington has 
been proved unjust and injurious, and so the benefit 
of the doubt may be given to Rosecrans. 

During the long inaction of the Army of the 
Cumberland, from January to June, while thousands 
of officers and men were procuring leave of absence, 
Thomas did not ask for a furlough, which he might 
have had, to visit his wife and friends at the North. 

Extracts from General Thomas's Report of Stone's River. 

"Headquarters (Centre) Fourteenth Army Corps, 
" Department of the Cumberland, 

" Murfreesboro, fanuary /j, 1863. 

"Major: I have the honor to submit to the 
major general commanding the Department of the 
Cumberland the following report of the operations 



no GENERAL THOMAS. ' 

of that part of my command which was engaged in 
the battle of Stone's River, in front of Murfreesboro. 
It is proper to state here that two brigades of Fry's 
division and Reynolds's entire division were detained 
near Gallatin and along the Louisville and Nashville 
Railroad to watch the movements of the rebel leader 
Morgan, who had been for a long time on the watch 
for an opportunity to destroy the railroad. 

" Rousseau's, Negley's, and Mitchell's divisions 
and Walker's brigade of Fry's division were concen- 
trated at Nashville ; but Mitchell's division being 
required to garrison Nashville, my only available 
force was Rousseau's and Negley's divisions and 
Walker's brigade of Fry's division — about 13,395 ^^" 
fective men. 

'''' December 26th. — Negley's division, followed by 
Rousseau's division and Walker's brigade, marched 
by the Franklin pike to Brentwood, at that point 
taking the Wilson pike. Negley and Rousseau were 
to have encamped for the night at Owens's Store. 
On reaching the latter place, Negley, hearing heavy 
firing in the direction of Nolensville, left his train 
with a guard to follow, and pushed forward with his 
troops to the support of Brigadier-General J. C. 
Davis's command, the advance division of McCook's 
corps, Davis having become hotly engaged with the 
enemy posted in Nolensville and in the pass through 
the hills south of that village. Rousseau encamped 
with his division at Owens's Store; Walker with his 
brigade at Brentwood. During the night a very 
heavy rain fell, making the crossroads almost im- 
passable, and it was not until the night of the 27th 
that Rousseau reached Nolensville with his troops 
and train. Negley remained at Nolensville until 10 



THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER. m 

A. M. on the 27th, when, having brought his train 
across from Wilson pike, he moved to the east over 
an exceedingly rough byroad to the right of Crit- 
tenden, at Stewartsboro, on the Murfreesboro pike. 
Walker, by my orders, retraced his steps from Brent- 
wood and crossed over to the Nolensville pike. 

" Dece7nber 28th. — Negley remained in camp at 
Stewartsboro, bringing his train from the rear. 
Rousseau reached Stewartsboro on the night of the 
28th; his train arrived early next day. 

^''December 2gth. — Negley's division crossed Stew- 
art's Creek, two miles southwest and above the 
turnpike bridge, and marched in support of the head 
and right flank of Crittenden's corps, which moved 
by the Murfreesboro pike to a point within two miles 
of Murfreesboro. The enemy fell back before our 
advance, contesting the ground obstinately with 
their cavalry rear guard. Rousseau remained in 
camp at Stewartsboro, detaching Starkweather's 
brigade with a section of artillery to the Jefferson 
pike, crossing Stone's River, to observe the move- 
ments of the enemy in that direction. Walker 
reached Stewartsboro from the Nolensville pike 
about dark. 

'■'' December joth. — A cavalry force of the enemy, 
something over four hundred strong, with two pieces 
of artillery, attacked Starkweather about 9 a. m., 
but were soon driven off. The enemy opened a 
brisk fire on Crittenden's advance, doing but little 
execution, however. About 7 a. m. during the morn- 
ing Negley's division was obliqued to the right, 
and took up a position on the right of Palmer's divi- 
sion of Crittenden's corps, and was then advanced 
through a dense cedar thicket, several hundred 



J 12 GENERAL THOMAS. 

yards in width, to the Wilkinson crossroads, driving 
the enemy's skirmishers steadily and with considera- 
ble loss — our loss comparatively small. About noon 
Sheridan's division of McCook's corps approached 
by the Wilkinson crossroads, joined Negley's right, 
McCook's two other divisions coming up on Sheri- 
dan's right, thus forming a continuous line, the left 
resting on Stone's River, the right stretching in a 
westerly direction and resting on high wooded 
ground a short distance to the south of the Wilkin- 
son crossroads, and, as has since been ascertained, 
nearly parallel with the enemy's intrenchments, 
thrown up on the sloping land bordering the north- 
west bank of Stone's River, Rousseau's division, with 
the exception of Starkweather's brigade, being or- 
dered up on the Murfreesboro pike in the rear of the 
center. During the night of the 30th I sent orders 
to Walker to take up a strong position near the 
turnpike bridge over Stewart's Creek and defend 
the position against any attempts of the enemy's 
cavalry to destroy it. Rousseau was ordered to 
move by 6 a. m. on the 31st to a position in rear of 
Negley. This position placed his division with its 
left on the Murfreesboro pike and its right extending 
into the cedar thicket through which Negley had 
marched on the 30th. In front of Negley's position, 
bordering a large open field reaching to the Mur- 
freesboro pike, a heavy growth of timber extended 
in a southerly direction toward the river. Across 
the field, running in an easterly direction, the enemy 
had thrown up rifle-pits at intervals from the timber 
to the river bank, to the east side of the turnpike. 
Along this line of intrenchments, on an eminence 
about eight hundred yards from Negley's position, 



THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER. 113 

and nearly in front of his left, some cannon had 
been placed, affording the enemy great advantage in 
covering an attack on our center. However, Palm- 
er, Negley, and Sheridan held the position their troops 
had so manfully won on the morning of the 30th 
against every attempt to drive them back, and re- 
mained in line of battle during the night. 

''^ December J 1st. — Between 6 and 7 a.m., the ene- 
my, having massed a heavy force on McCook's right 
during the night of the 30th, attacked and drove it 
back, pushing his division in pursuit in echelon and 
supporting distance until he had gained sufficient 
ground to our rear to wheel his masses to the right 
and throw them upon the right flank of the center, 
at the same moment attacking Negley and Palmer 
in front with a greatly superior force. To counter- 
act this movement I had ordered Rousseau to place 
two brigades with a battery to the right and rear 
of Sheridan's division, facing toward the west, so 
as to support Sheridan should he be able to hold 
his ground, or to cover him should he be compelled 
to fall back. About eleven o'clock General Sheri- 
dan reported to me that his ammunition was en- 
tirely out, and he would be compelled to fall back 
to get more. As it became necessary for General 
Sheridan to fall back, the enemy pressed on still 
farther to our rear, and soon took up a position 
which gave them a concentrated cross-fire of 
musketry and cannon on Negley's and Rousseau's 
troops at short range. This compelled me to fall 
back out of the cedar woods and take up a line 
along a depression in the open ground within good 
musket range of the edge of the woods, while the 
artillery was retired to the high ground to the right 



114 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



of the turnpike. From this last position we were 
enabled to drive back the enemy, cover the forma- 
tion of our troops, and secure the center on the high 
ground. In the execution of this last movement, 
the regular brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Shep- 
erd. Eighteenth United States Infantry, came under 
a most murderous fire, losing twenty-two officers 
and five hundred and eight men in killed and 
wounded, but, with the co-operation of Scribner's 
and Beatty's brigades and Guenther's and Loomis's 
batteries, gallantly held its ground against over- 
whelming odds. The center having succeeded in 
driving back the enemy from its front, and our ar- 
tillery concentrating its fire on the cedar thicket 
on our right, drove him back far under cover, from 
which, though attempting it, he could not make any 
advance. 

^''January z, i86j. — Repeated attempts were 
made by the enemy to advance on my position 
during the morning, but they were driven back be- 
fore emerging from the woods. Colonel Stark- 
weather's brigade of Rousseau's division, and Walk- 
er's brigade of Fry's division, having re-enforced us 
during the night, took post on the right of Rousseau 
and left of Sheridan, and bore their share in repel- 
ling the attempts of the enemy on the morning of the 
ist instant. For the details of the most valuable 
service rendered by these two brigades on the 30th 
and 31st of December, 1862, and the ist, 2d, and 3d 
of January, 1863, I refer you to their reports. In 
this connection I also refer you to the report of 
Lieutenant-Colonel Parkhurst, commanding the Ninth 
Michigan Infantry (on provost duty at my head- 
quarters), for the details of most valuable service 



THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER. 



115 



rendered by his command on the 31st of December 
and ist and 2d of January. Negley's division was 
ordered early in the day to the support of McCook's 
right, in which position it remained during the night. 

'''•January 2d. — About 7 a. m. the enemy opened a 
direct and cross-fire from his batteries in our front, 
and along our position on the east bank of Stone's 
River to our left and front, at the same time making 
a strong demonstration with infantry, resulting, how- 
ever, in no serious attack. Our artillery — Loomis's, 
Guenther's, Stokes's, and another battery (the com- 
mander's name I can not now recall) — soon droveback 
their infantry. Negley was withdrawn from the ex- 
treme right and placed m reserve behind Crittenden's 
right. About 4 p. m. a division of Crittenden's corps, 
which had crossed Stone's River to reconnoiter, was 
attacked by an overwhelming force of the enemy, 
and, after a gallant resistance, compelled to fall 
back. The movements of the enemy having been 
observed and reported by some of my troops in the 
center, I sent orders to Negley to advance to the 
support of Crittenden's troops should they want 
help. This order was obeyed in most gallant style, 
and resulted in the complete annihilation of the 
Twenty-sixth Tennessee rebel regiment and the cap- 
ture of their flags ; also in the capture of a battery, 
which the enemy had been forced to abandon, at the 
point of the bayonet. (See Negley's report.) 

^^ January 3d. — Soon after daylight the Forty- 
second Indiana, on picket in a clump of woods about 
eight hundred yards in front of our lines, was at- 
tacked by a brigade of the enemy, evidently by su- 
perior numbers, and driven in with considerable loss. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Shankling, commanding the regi- 
9 



Il5 GENERAL THOMAS. 

ment, was surrounded and taken prisoner while gal- 
lantly endeavoring to draw off his men from under the 
fire of such superior numbers. From these woods the 
enemy's sharpshooters continued to fire occasionally 
during the day on our pickets. About 6 p. m. two 
regiments from Colonel John Beatty's brigade of 
Rousseau's division, co-operating with two regiments 
of Spear's brigade of Negley's division, covered by 
the skillful and well-directed fire of Guenther's Fifth 
United States Artillery and Loomis's First Michigan 
batteries, advanced on the woods and drove the 
enemy not only from its cover, but from their in- 
trenchments a short distance beyond. For the de- 
tails of this gallant night attack I refer you to the 
reports of Brigadier-General Spear, commanding 
Third Brigade of Negley's division, and Colonel 
John Beatty, commanding Second Brigade of Rous- 
seau's division. 

*' The enemy having retreated during the night 
of the 3d, our troops were occupied during the morn- 
ing of the 4th in burying the dead left on the field. 
In the afternoon one brigade of Negley's division 
was advanced to the crossing of Stone's River, with 
a brigade of Rousseau's division in supporting dis- 
tance in reserve. 

^'January ^th. — My entire command, preceded by 
Stanley's cavalry, marched into Murfreesboro and 
took up the position we now hold. The enemy's 
rear guard of cavalry was overtaken on the Shelby- 
ville and Manchester roads, about five miles from 
Murfreesboro, and, after sharp skirmishing for two 
or three hours, was driven from our immediate front. 
The conduct of my command from the time the 
army left Nashville to its entry into Murfreesboro 



THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER. ny 

is deserving of the highest praise, both for their 
patient endurance of the fatigues and discomforts of 
a five days' battle, and for the manly spirit exhibited 
by them in the various phases of this memorable 
contest. I refer you to the detailed reports of the 
division and brigade commanders, forwarded here- 
with, for special mention of those officers and men of 
their commands whose conduct they thought worthy 
of particular notice." 



CHAPTER VII. 

FORWARD TO CHATTANOOGA. 

The Titanic terrain — Terra incognita — Dissolving views — Chatta- 
nooga the prize — Evacuated by Bragg, with intention to re- 
turn — Rosecrans urged to move — The field — Ridges, rivers, 
and gaps — Topography of Chattanooga — *' Hawk's Nest " — 
Chickamauga Creek — " River of death" — Missionary Ridge — 
Rosecrans's misjudgment — Occupies Chattanooga and orders 
pursuit — Bragg waits for him — Thomas ordered to Lafayette 
— Bragg concentrated there — Attacks Union left — Then right 
— Table of both armies — Crittenden driven back — McCook 
scattered. 

Although it is only the purpose of this narrative 
to describe the part taken in the campaigns and bat- 
tles of the war by the subject of this biography, we 
are here met by the unmathematical paradox that 
the part taken by Thomas was not equal to, but in 
a peculiar sense greater than, the whole. In order 
to prove this it becomes necessary to present at 
somewhat greater length an outline sketch of the 
entire campaign in which it is claimed that he 
played so important a part. 

This is no easy task. Amid the jargon of re- 
criminations, the immense amount of statistics, the 
rapid transformations and dissolving views of the 



FORWARD TO CHATTANOOGA. ng 

march to the battlefield, and of the field itself, the 
impartial critic finds himself surrounded by difficul- 
ties. Eager claimants for eulogistic recognition are 
on either hand, and before him at every step are 
well-conceived excuses for failure. In one of his 
essays on history Carlyle says : " The most gifted 
man can observe, still more can record, only the 
series of his own impressions. His observation, 
therefore, to say nothing of his other imperfections, 
must be successive, while the things done were often 
simultaneous. The things done were not a series 
but a group." This is worthy of notice by military 
critics. It is true of the movement of large armies, 
and eminently so of the battle now to be considered. 
Chickamauga presents such a labyrinth both as to 
time and space, as to series and groups, that the 
historian would be irrecoverably lost were it not for 
the threefold clue of magic thread presented by the 
skill, valor, and endurance of Thomas, which alone 
gives system and symmetry to the story. From first 
to last Thomas was the guiding spirit and splendid 
hero of the battle. 

The campaign of Chattanooga was in all respects 
the most colossal and difficult of the war. It was the 
conflict of Titans upon gigantic camping grounds. 
That there should have been blunders and partial 
failures is not at all to be wondered at when we con- 
sider the immense difficulties of the problem — the 
vastness of the great theater, its extremely broken 



I20 GENERAL THOMAS. 

and diversified nature, mountain ranges, narrow 
gaps, deep valleys, thick forests, rivers and streams 
in snakelike and bewildering convolutions. All these 
features were of the nature of obstacles to the Fed- 
eral advance, and at the same time a defense and 
protective covering to the Confederate positions. 
Thus from the outset it was an unequal conflict. 

The great objective point for both armies was 
Chattanooga. It was the purpose of Rosecrans to 
occupy it permanently, and that of Bragg to return 
to it after he should have defeated the Union army. 
We have seen that, as early as the battle of Mill 
Springs, Thomas had hoped to capture it. 

One year later Buell was marching upon it when 
he was stopped by Bragg at Perryville. The move- 
ment upon Chattanooga was again begun when 
Rosecrans succeeded Buell, and it had been again 
delayed by reason of the battle of Stone's River. 
Bragg, as we have seen, had occupied it, and at first 
sight it seems strange that he should have evacu- 
ated the town at the approach of the Union army. 
It will soon appear, however, that the alternative 
was forced upon him. He was not well provided 
with materials and provisions with which to stand a 
siege. His communications both north and south 
were endangered by the advance of Rosecrans ; and 
so he left the town temporarily, to give battle to 
Rosecrans, to defeat him, and to drive him back 
upon the route of his advance. That being accom- 



FORWARD TO CHATTANOOGA. 121 

plished, Bragg would return at once to Chattanooga, 
lose no time in fortifying and fully supplying the 
place, secure his communications, especially those 
with the South, and constitute it an impregnable 
base of future operations. He came very near ac- 
complishing all this. 

It has been already seen that the long stay of 
Rosecrans at Murfreesboro, only temporarily broken 
by the campaign of Tullahoma, was so irritating to 
the authorities at Washington that they sent urgent 
requests, and at last imperative orders, to Rosecrans 
to move upon Bragg without any further delay. As 
we proceed in our inquiries we are the more inclined 
to consider the Union general wise in his caution and 
delay. He was pained and perplexed by the ignorant 
impatience of the authorities at Washington. His 
correspondence with the W^ar Department, from Jan- 
uary to July, discloses the great needs of his army 
in all kinds of equipments ; the necessity of abun- 
dant material to be supplied as he advanced along 
lines of communication which would be taxed to 
their utmost ; and, in addition to this, the deliberate 
care to put his troops in the best marching and 
fighting order. Such things can not be properly 
done in a day. Even genius is powerless to ac- 
complish them. 

It is curious to observe the diametrically opposite 
views taken of the military situation at this junc- 
ture. It will be remembered that Grant was besieg- 



122 GENERAL THOMAS. 

ing Vicksburg, and there certainly was an intimate 
relation between that siege and the proposed move- 
ment from Murfreesboro. To the authorities at 
Washington it seemed that great promptitude in 
both cases would be reciprocally important. To 
Rosecrans it appeared not well '* to fight two great 
battles at the same time." In point of fact, the critic 
is not disposed to lay great stress upon this contro- 
versy. Grant, with his preponderance of numbers, 
needed nothing from Rosecrans except to keep 
Bragg in his front ; while, without perceiving the 
significance of Rosecrans's view, he could certainly 
well afford to wait until he was ready to fight his 
own battle. The moral effect of the capture of 
Vicksburg was indeed very great, but materially it 
had little to do with Rosecrans and his fortunes. 

On this question of the long delay at Murfrees- 
boro it should further be said, that while it was 
natural that the Washington authorities should be 
anxious for speedy and successful results, the six 
months consumed by Rosecrans form a very small 
period in the annals of a great war ; and not only 
the general in command but his immediate subor- 
dinates were, prejudice apart, the best judges of the 
time to move as well as the manner of movement. 

" To show," says Rosecrans in a letter to Halleck 
of June II, 1863, ''how differently things are viewed 
here, I called on my corps and division commanders 
and generals of cavalry for answers in writing to 



FORWARD TO CHATTANOOGA. 



123 



these questions : i. From your best information, do 
you think the enemy materially weakened in our 
front ? 2. Do you think this army can advance at 
this time with reasonable prospect of fighting a 
great and successful battle ? 3. Do you think an 
advance advisable at this time ? To the first, eleven 
answered No, six Yes, to the extent of ten thousand. 
To the second, four Yes, with doubts ; thirteen No. 
To the third, not one Yes ; seventeen No. Not one 
thinks an advance advisable until Vicksburg's fate 
is determined. Admitting these officers to have a 
reasonable share of military sagacity, courage, and 
patriotism, you perceive that there are graver and 
stronger reasons than probably appear at Washing- 
ton for the attitude of this army. I therefore coun- 
sel caution and patience at headquarters. Better 
wait a little to get all we can ready to insure the 
best results, if by so doing we, perforce of Provi- 
dence, observe a great military maxim, not to risk 
two great and decisive battles at the same time. We 
might have cause to be thankful for it ; at all events, 
you see that, to expect success, I must have thorough 
grounds, that when I say ' Forward ! ' my word will 
inspire conviction and confidence where both are 
now wanting." 

It is due both to General Rosecrans and to Gen- 
eral Thomas to say that the latter is understood to 
have heartily supported what he considered the nec- 
essary delay of that army at Murfreesboro, and that 



124 GENERAL THOMAS. 

he was not actuated in his opinion by any desire for 
personal rest or absence during this period. 

Preliminary reconnoissances, as we have seen, 
had been already made. Palmer's and Wood's di- 
visions of the Twenty-first Corps began the crossing 
of the Cumberland Mountains on August i6th. By 
the ist of September all had crossed; on the 8th of 
that month his whole army had passed over the 
Tennessee, and the main body was encamped in 
Lookout Valley, near the western slope of Lookout 
Mountain, and it was his apparent intention to move 
in force upon Bragg's southern communications. 
As we approach the bloody field of Chickamauga 
we must cast a comprehensive glance at the ground 
over which Rosecrans was moving and the field 
upon which the hostile armies were to meet. 

Chattanooga is situated in one of the numerous 
coil-like bends of the Tennessee River. South and 
west of it the ground is broken into long ridges, 
with narrow intervening valleys, running down and 
abutting against the river. Through these valleys 
are streams flowing into the river, and through the 
ridges at long distances apart are precipitous gaps, 
through which the Union army must pass. The first 
ridge reckoning from the west is the plateau of 
Sand Mountain, attaining an elevation of twenty- 
two hundred feet. Next to that is Will's Val- 
ley, merging at the north into Lookout Valley, 
through which flows Lookout Creek, along the east- 



FORWARD TO CHATTANOOGA. 125 

ern side of which is the extended range of Lookout 
Mountain, running up to the Tennessee River just 
below Chattanooga. Its top is twenty-four hundred 
feet high. East of this is a small valley called Mc- 
Lemore's Cove, in which the West Chickamauga 
takes its rise and flows northward, emptying into 
the Tennessee about three miles above Chatta- 
nooga. A short distance west of Chattanooga is 
Missionary Ridge, a long narrow elevation, between 
which and Lookout Mountain the Chattanooga 
River flows and empties into the Tennessee just 
below the city. 

Northeast of Missionary Ridge is the famous 
Chickamauga Creek, now about to be the scene of 
one of the bloodiest battles of the war. On the east 
side of Pigeon Mountain and at the extremity of 
Pea Vine Ridge is the town of Lafayette, about fif- 
teen miles south of Chattanooga, on the Southern 
Railroad. It was occupied by the Confederates in 
force. Lee and Gordon's Mills, on the Chickamauga 
Creek, about ten miles north of Lafayette, was to 
play an important part in the battle. Rossville and 
Rossville Gap are just at the southern end of Mis- 
sionary Ridge. Among the principal towns on or 
near the Tennessee which also figure in the cam- 
paign are Bridgeport and Stevenson. Through the 
former a portion of Bragg's army crossed in his 
retiring movement, as also did a portion of the 
Union army in its advance. Through the latter 



126 GENERAL THOMAS. 

Rosecrans received, at a lengthening distance, his 
principal supplies from Nashville. 

It is interesting to observe that, by a curious co- 
incidence, the Cherokee Indian names of Chatta- 
nooga and Chickamauga have an involuntary but 
romantic connection with the purposes of the con- 
tending armies and the bloody history of the cam- 
paign. Chattanooga, the great objective point, to 
hold which both were exerting their utmost powers, 
means " hawk's nest," and is analogous to the eyrie 
which gave its name in history to the House of 
Hapsburg; while Chickamauga means "the river 
of death." Mission or Missionary Ridge is so 
called because upon it was a Roman Catholic Mis- 
sion, with chapel and school, for the Cherokee In- 
dians. As we have already seen, Rosecrans, when he 
began his movement in the latter days of June, 
pressing Bragg back to TuUahoma and cutting the 
railroad at Decherd, had a force of about sixty 
thousand men, which, however, by constant re-en- 
forcements, had increased by September to ninety- 
two thousand. 

The following is a tabulated statement of the 
composition of his army : I. The Fourteenth Corps, 
General Thomas, contained four divisions — viz., 
Baird, Negley, Brannan, J. J. Reynolds. II. The 
Twentieth Corps, General McCook, three divisions 
— viz., J. C. Davis, R. W. Johnson, and Sheridan. 
III. The Twenty -first Corps, General Crittenden, 



FORWARD TO CHATTANOOGA. 



127 



three divisions — viz., T. J. Wood, Palmer, and Van 
Cleve. IV. The Reserve Corps, General Gordon 
Granger, one division — viz., J. B. Steedman. V. The 
Cavalry Corps, General R. Mitchell and Colonel E. 
M. McCook. 

In the early days of August, Bragg having con- 
tinued to retreat, Rosecrans slowly followed. The 
conviction was growing stronger upon him that all 
he would have to do was to pursue the enemy. It 
still increased in strength when Bragg, having made 
feeble resistance at the gaps of Cumberland Moun- 
tain, passed through them and crossed the river 
mainly at Bridgeport. He burned the bridge at that 
crossing and went into Chattanooga, but he did not 
remain there long. When he evacuated the town 
the conviction of Rosecrans became a certainty that 
Bragg was in full retreat. Then, fearing lest he 
should escape him, the Union general pushed his 
troops rapidly forward, and in his attempt to find 
out Bragg's lines of retreat he extended his army 
loosely in a long line from left to right^ in order 
that he might not fail to intercept the enemy, what- 
ever might be his line of flight. This was hazardous 
in the extreme. McCook was separated from Thomas 
by a distance of forty miles or more on the right, 
while Crittenden was on the other side twenty miles 
from the center.* In order further to deceive Rose- 

* In point of fact, McCook was completely insulated at Al- 
pine, where he remained until the nth. 



128 GENERAL THOMAS. 

crans into the opinion that he was retreating, Bragg 
also resorted to various stratagems, not unusual on 
such occasions. . Men were sent into the Union lines 
with the news that Bragg had left Chattanooga and 
was beginning a rapid retreat southward, and he 
also made a few movements in order to strengthen 
that belief. 

Thomas was not for an instant deceived by 
these. He alone, among the generals of that army, 
seemed really to divine the nature of the situation, 
and he pointed out the extreme danger of allowing 
such intervals between the corps. He even took the 
responsibility of ordering McCook to close in upon 
him, and it was not a moment too soon. Bragg, he 
repeated, was not retreating at all. He was only 
luring the Union army on to his own chosen 
ground. He would see their dispersed condition, 
and attack the separated corps in detail. By taking 
strong ground south of Chattanooga, he would se- 
cure his own communications, put himself in the 
most advantageous position, cut Rosecrans off from 
Chattanooga, and there await the re-enforcements, 
which would give him preponderating strength to 
strike the Union corps as they were passing through 
the mountain gaps. It was a well-conceived and 
well-digested plan, and certainly for a short time 
General Rosecrans was thoroughly deceived. This 
delusion of Rosecrans was, however, soon dissipated. 

Even then, had he simply occupied Chattanooga 



FORWARD TO CHATTANOOGA. 129 

and intrenched his army strongly around it, his 
campaign, thus far so well conducted, would have 
been a great success, with no drawbacks. He 
would have avoided the bloody battle of Chicka- 
mauga and been in far better condition than he was 
after that action. As he awoke from his delusion 
he drew together with great precipitation the sepa- 
rate corps before Bragg could strike them in detail. 
With one division of the Twenty-first Corps, which 
had crossed the river at Battle Creek, he occupied 
Chattanooga on the morning of the 9th of Decem- 
ber. But they did not fortify the town. Leaving 
only one brigade there to hold it, Crittenden pushed 
on with the rest of his corps in the furtherance of 
Rosecrans's plan of pursuit to Ringgold. Here 
again his eyes began to be opened. The way 
was strongly barred by the enemy, so Crittenden 
turned aside toward Lafayette. There also was a 
lion in the path; so he fell rapidly back to Lee and 
Gordon's Mill. The military critic may adopt the 
judgment of Van Horn. Of the condition of things 
at this time he says: ^' In view of the manifest 
practicability of the concentration of the army at 
Chattanooga, Thomas urged Rosecrans to abandon 
his scheme of pursuit, to establish his army at that 
point and perfect communications with Bridgeport 
and Nashville. Had this been done, the offensive 
could have been taken from Chattanooga as a base. 
Thomas was opposed to a movement which would 



130 GENERAL THOMAS. 

bring on a battle when the army, having nearly ex- 
hausted its supplies transported from Bridgeport, 
could not follow up a victory in the event of win- 
ning one, and where, if defeat should be the issue, 
the problem of supplies would be difficult of solu- 
tion." But the counsel of Thomas was set aside. It 
still appeared to the commanding general that Bragg 
was moving as rapidly as possible upon Rome, where 
indeed a few advanced troops were throwing up 
extensive intrenchments. So, on the 9th of Sep- 
tember, Rosecrans ordered a general pursuit by 
the whole army. To Thomas that day he wrote 
in the following decided language : " The general 
commanding has ordered a general pursuit of the 
enemy by the whole army. . . . He directs you to 
move your command as rapidly as possible to La- 
fayette." To the same purpose. General Critten- 
den, who, as we have seen, had occupied Chatta- 
nooga with one brigade, while with the remainder 
of the Twenty-first Corps he was to follow the 
enemy rapidly, was embarked in this general pur- 
suit. General McCook with the detachments of 
the Twentieth Corps was to move toward Rome 
through Alpine and Summerville, to turn the enemy's 
flank and cut off his retreat. Thus at the outset the 
campaign was let and hindered by a first most griev- 
ous error. 

In endeavoring to carry out his orders, General 
Thomas moved through Stevens's and Cooper's Gaps, 



FORWARD TO CHATTANOOGA. 



131 



Negley's division leading through the former into 
McLemore's Cove, twenty miles south of Chatta- 
nooga. 

While the Union troops were acting under these 
mistaken orders, a glance at Bragg's movements 
will show that, so far from any thought of retreat, he 
had been quietly taking position on the 7th and 8th 
of September on a strong line from Lee and Gor- 
don's Mill to Lafayette along the main road lead- 
ing south from Chattanooga, and fronting the slope 
of Lookout Mountam. Everything now tended to 
Bragg's advantage. 

The following is a concise table of the Confed- 
erate army under General Bragg : L Polk's corps, 
two divisions, Cheatham and Hindman. H. D. H. 
Hill's corps, two divisions, Cleburne and Breckin- 
ridge, in. Buckner's corps, two divisions, A. P. 
Stewart and Preston. IV. Walker's corps, two di- 
visions, Liddell and Gist. V. Longstreet's corps, 
which arrived later, and just before the battle of 
the 20th, three divisions. Hood, McLaws, and Bush- 
rod R. Johnson. VI. Wheeler's cavalry corps, two 
divisions, Wharton and Martin. VII. Forrest's cav- 
alry corps, two divisions, Armstrong and Pegram. 
In order to give Bragg every available fighting 
man, the Georgia militia were guarding the depots 
and bridges. 

Brag^ was concentrated along this line, was in 
readiness to strike in any direction, and enthusiastic 
10 



132 GENERAL THOMAS. 

at the evident misapprehension of the situation by 
Rosecrans. It seemed a new illustration of the old 
fable of " the spider and the fly." His army had at 
first consisted of the corps of Polk and Hill, which, 
with the contingents of all kinds, had amounted to 
fifty-nine thousand men. Re-enforcements, as the 
above table shows, had been coming in daily under 
Buckner, Breckinridge, and Johnston. Some of 
these re-enforcements, it has been asserted, were in 
violation of military law. They were said to be 
drawn from Grant's front in large numbers, and 
many of them had been paroled by him under a 
promise not to fight until duly exchanged ; it is 
alleged that they were never exchanged, but were 
sent at once to confront Rosecrans. Thus it seems 
that the Confederate armies had already begun to 
feel that want of men which was to lead before long 
to their final defeat. At last, in the nick of time, 
just before the battle of the 20th was joined, two 
divisions under Longstreet arrived from the Army 
of Virginia. These, added to his main force, gave 
Bragg on the morning report of the i8th more than 
ninety thousand men. 

The force of Rosecrans which was to try con- 
clusions with this army amounted, as we have seen, 
to ninety-five thousand men. When Rosecrans or- 
dered the pursuit, Thomas, whose corps then formed 
the center of the Union army, marched toward La- 
fayette, and was, as we shall see, the first to engage 



FORWARD TO CHATTANOOGA. 



133 



the enemy. From that moment the conviction must 
have grown upon the clear mind of Thomas, as it is 
certainly apparent to the military reader, that the 
fortunes of the Union army were in his keeping. 
In obedience to his orders, he had moved cau- 
tiously over Lookout Mountain, through Stevens's 
and Cooper's Gaps, toward Dug Gap in Pigeon 
Mountain, about nine miles beyond. 

On the night of the 9th of September Bragg or- 
dered a large force to attack Negley in the gap the 
next morning, and he afterward declared that had 
the generals carried out his instructions Negley 
would have been overpowered by numbers. He was 
probably mistaken, for with his usual sagacity and 
prudence Thomas had foreseen this possibility, and 
ordered the divisions of Baird, Reynolds, and Bran- 
nan forward to support Negley in order to repel 
Bragg's projected attack. Strange to say, this ex- 
cellent caution of Thomas was regarded with impa- 
tience by Rosecrans, who had not yet divested him- 
self of the idea that Bragg was in full retreat. Nor 
did he seem to see that this caution of Thomas was 
greatly to the advantage of McCook and Crittenden, 
whose corps were yet at wide distances apart and 
needed concentration, and were anxiously awaiting 
orders to that effect. Thus it happened that when 
Bragg advanced later through Catlett's Gap and 
Dug Gap to overpower Negley and his supports, 
Thomas withdrew his force by Bailey's Cross Road 



134 GENERAL THOMAS. 

toward Lookout Mountain, where the Fourteenth 
Corps was concentrated. We repeat that from that 
time General Thomas seems to the disinterested 
spectator like a man already anticipating, in dim 
outline indeed, the great responsibility which was to 
fall upon him. 

He was loyally devoted to the administration of 
Rosecrans, and could not fail to see in what a mas- 
terly manner the campaign had been thus far con- 
ducted. He was ready to obey orders, but he already 
began to notice how mistaken some of those orders 
were. He saw with anxiety the separation of the 
corps out of supporting distance. He did not agree 
with Rosecrans in his opinion that Bragg was about 
to retreat ; and that this was what his temporary 
evacuation of Chattanooga meant. He saw that the 
Confederate general was obliged thus to cover his 
Southern communications and fight a desperate bat- 
tle ; and, holding these opinions while others did 
not, he felt that the brunt of the attack was to fall 
upon him, and that if he could not bear it the day 
was lost. In such a light at least does the entire 
conduct of Thomas appear to the military critic. 
Nor does this opinion come after the facts; it was 
clearly that of Thomas before the battle. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUG A. 

Bragg leaves Thomas to attack Crittenden — Position of troops on 
the 17th and i8th — Thomas on the left bank of the Chicka- 
mauga from Owen's Ford to Gowan — McCook withdraws to 
the rear — Crittenden on the left center in the rear — Thomas 
holds the left — Furious attacks on the left, on the right, and 
on the center — Order of Rosecrans to T. J, Wood makes a 
gap in the line — Penetrated by Longstreet — The forlorn hope 
and the Gordian knot — Rosecrans goes to Chattanooga — Final 
attack — Steedman's division of Granger's corps — Thomas re- 
tires in good order — " The Rock of Chickamauga." 

While thus the enemy was strongly concentrated 
opposite our center, the projected pursuit by the 
right and left wings had not simply come to a 
standstill, but the conditions were entirely reversed 
to close up upon Thomas. McCook had thrown his 
trains backward, and there had been some confusion 
and countermarching among his troops pending his 
reception of further orders. 

When he found, on receiving the order to join 
Thomas, that he could not do so by the nearest line, 
he had sent back his trains to the summit of the 
mountain ; and when he received the repeated order 
he could only obey it by moving through Valley 



136 GENERAL THOMAS. 

Head and ascending the mountain through Hender- 
son's Gap. This detour caused great delay, and it 
was not until the 17th that the three corps were in 
supporting distance. It will always cause the mili- 
tary reader to wonder that Bragg in the meantime 
had not attacked them in detail with superior num- 
bers. That he did not accomplish this was no doubt 
in part due to the fact that he did not know the 
military position with great exactness. He was war- 
ranted in doubting that such a military blunder had 
been committed ; and when the Union army was 
most extended the distances were too great for him 
to strike promptly. On the left, Crittenden had 
taken position on the Chickamauga on August 12th, 
at and around Lee and Gordon's Mill. As it was 
evident the enemy would not retreat, he was or- 
dered to attack and drive them away ; this made a 
temporary change in Bragg's plan. He seems to 
have determined to postpone his movement against 
Thomas until he could crush Crittenden. That ef- 
fectually accomplished, he would again mass his 
forces against Thomas, drive him back in confu- 
sion, and, coming upon the flank of McCook, would 
send him flying through the air. This programme 
would perhaps have been carried out successfully 
had it not been for the want of activity on the part 
of his subordinates. Bragg was handicapped by 
some men who were counselors rather than lieuten- 
ants. The attack upon Crittenden was confided to 



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 



137 



Polk, and was to have been made at dawn on Sep- 
tember 13th. The Confederate divisions that were 
to make it were those of Hindman and Cheatham, 
supported by the divisions of Walker, with Buck- 
ner's divisions in reserve. Cleburne, of Hill's corps, 
occupied Dug Gap and was watching Thomas. 
General Bragg's plan was not carried out according 
to his orders. 

We may now pass over the intervening days of 
preparation and experiment until the evening of Sep- 
tember 17th, when the adverse forces were thus 
posted : Thomas's corps was still on and near the left 
bankx)f the Chickamauga River, from Owen's Ford 
to Gowan, Brannan's division being on the right; 
then Baird, Negley, and Reynolds. Crittenden's 
corps was still in front of Lee and Gordon's Mill, 
comprising the divisions of Palmer, T. J. Wood, and 
Barnes's brigade of Van Cleve's. McCook's corps, 
which had retraced its steps from Alpine, had finally 
taken ground and shape to the right and rear on the 
slope of Missionary Ridge, covering the roads to 
Stevens's and Cooper's Gaps. 

This campaign, which in its doubtful and tactive 
movements had consumed more than twenty days 
from the time when Rosecrans made his first move- 
ment to cross the Cumberland Mountain, becomes, as 
we are on the eve of the great conflict of Chicka- 
mauga, so full of detail that space is entirely wanting 
to describe it fully in these pages. By September 



138 GENERAL THOMAS. 

17th the corps of the Union army were fortunately 
within supporting distance, and then and the next 
day they were in readiness for the conflict : although 
up to this time there had been partial conflicts for 
many days, the real action of the battle of Chicka- 
mauga is comprised in two days of hard fighting — 
September 19th and 20th. The eyes of Rosecrans 
had now at last been entirely opened to the real 
purpose of the enemy, and terrible attacks on the 
Union left and center were further to convince him 
of his unfortunate mistake. 

Another glance a-t the topography must be taken 
before the great battle begins. Chickamauga Creek 
rises near the base of Missionary Ridge, runs in a 
northeast direction, and enters the Tennessee River 
about six miles above Chattanooga. The following 
rapid changes had been made in the Union line: 
Crittenden was moved to the rear and right, and 
Thomas was obliqued to the left. Thus the Union 
army had its right near Lee and Gordon's Mill and 
its left near the Rossville road. Besides the fierce 
fighting, a new danger impended. It now became 
evident that Bragg's purpose was to cut Rosecrans 
off from Chattanooga, and, to give him greater force 
with which to do this, Longstreet had, as we have 
related, just arrived with his troops from Virginia 
on the night of the i8th, and had taken position at 
once for the battle of the next day. 

That night was a very busy one. There was no 



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 



39 



sleep for the Federal army ; they worked ail night, 
completing the alignment and throwing up slight inr 
trenchments. This incessant labor was not com- 
pleted until two hours before day on the 19th. The 
dreadful note of preparation was heard on every 
hand. A full moon and a cloudless sky made the 
entire scene visible. The night was very cold, and 
the men, instead of gathering wood, warmed them- 
selves by setting the fences on fire where they stood. 
Thus the entire position was clearly delineated by 
the blazing fences. 

Had General Rosecrans chosen even at that mo- 
ment to withdraw without a battle, it does seem that 
he might have entered Chattanooga by the Dry Val- 
ley and the Lafayette road and rapidly fortified him- 
self there to stand a siege. He preferred, however, 
to fight; and, on the whole, we applaud his decision ; 
to have shunned the battle then would have caused 
the loss of prestige and reputation. Strategy and 
grand tactics were at an end. Battle tactics and 
hard pounding were in order. The chances of suc- 
cess were even, the forces about equal. The bat- 
tlefield presented no advantages of sun and air to 
either combatant ; but the stake was very unequal. 
If Bragg were defeated, he would retreat to the 
South, as he eventually did after the battle of Mis- 
sionary Ridge. If Rosecrans were cut off from Chat- 
tanooga and pursued, it would have been very hard 
to save the Union army from utter ruin ; indeed, in 



140 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



the judgment of the best military critics, it would 
have been impossible. 

First Day, September ip. — With the dawn of the 
19th both armies were ready for action. The ene- 
my were posted on the right bank of the creek in 
two wings, commanded respectively by Polk and 
Longstreet.* In the front of the right wing were 
the three divisions of Cleburne, Breckinridge, and 
Cheatham ; and in the left wing Stewart's and 
Hood's divisions. The furious attack with over- 
whelming numbers upon Thomas was designed to 
be made at the break of day, and explicit orders 
had been sent to Polk to that effect. 

Thomas was in ignorance indeed that an over- 
whelming force was very near him, and might have 
been surprised had not a strong reconnoissance under 
Brannan disclosed the enemy and brought on the 
battle in a more patent way. The attack of the ene- 
my was, however, furious, and at first seemed over- 
powering ; but, although driven back, the Union force 
soon rallied and by a counter-charge disputed the 
field ; timely re-enforcements were sent by Rosecrans. 
The purpose of the enemy was for Hood to swing 
round his right and envelop Crittenden, while Wal- 
ker should attack in front and join Hood, and then 
united they would force their way into the gap be- 

* Some of his troops — three small brigades — participated in 
the battle of the 19th. Longstreet himself did not arrive until 
that night ; he reported in person to Bragg at 11 o'clock. 



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 



141 



tween the latter and Thomas. At the same time 
D. W. Hill was posted so as to defeat any Union 
attempt on the left flank of the Confederates ; for 
while Bragg was intent upon turning the Union left, 
he was not without concern as to his own left. 

When the attack came it was with tremendous 
force. It was directed against the left of Thomas, 
who now held the left of the line, for Crittenden had 
been already moved to the right and rear. Had it 
been thoroughly successful it would have cut off the 
last chance of retreat, should that become neces- 
sary, into the defenses of Chattanooga. McCook 
had been withdrawn by order of Rosecrans to form 
a new line on the right ; and thus disintegrated as 
corps, brigades of both these corps were sent to the 
left from time to time to Thomas as he needed them. 
The furious assault of the enemy had been received 
by Baird and Brannan on the extreme left. It was 
also aided by Forrest's cavalry. The Union troops 
were driven back about a mile and a half, with the 
loss of several guns. There they rallied, and, form- 
ing a new line, awaited a new attack ; but it did not 
come at that point. This time there was a desperate 
attempt made upon Thomas's right flank, which had 
been rapidly re-enforced by divisions from McCook's 
corps. This, however, was only partially successful, 
for General Hazen, with admirable forecast, had 
posted twenty guns on a commanding eminence, 
which forced the enemy back, with great loss. Af- 



142 GENERAL THOMAS. 

ter a slight lull a heavy column of the enemy then 
advanced upon Thomas's center. There he was less 
vulnerable, and repulsed the assaulting force with- 
out difficulty. 

Such, in brief, was the record of the fight on Sep- 
tember 19th. The Union troops were slightly re- 
tired, and the Confederates still retained the ardor 
and prestige of attack.* The next day would decide 
the difficult question, and it looked doubtful indeed. 
Thus battered on both flanks and in the center, on 
the evening of the 19th Thomas fell back slightly 
and readjusted his line, especially strengthening his 
left flank, the point of vital importance, which the 
enemy was determined to overpower, and the defeat 
of which would cut the army off from Chattanooga. 
All other assaults were subordinated to this impor- 
tant purpose. 

During the night of the 19th there was great ac- 
tivity in both camps. Bragg had readjusted the 
two wings of his army ; f the right, still commanded 
by Polk, contained the four divisions of Cleburne, 

* The whole army of Rosecrans, by reason of the nature of 
the attacks, had been constantly obliquing to the left ; and during 
the night of the 19th the same order of divisions was observed 
from left to right — viz., Baird, Johnson, Palmer, Reynolds, and 
Brannan, Baird refusing his left, and Brannan in echelon. Neg- 
ley, who had been posted on the right of Brannan, was moved to 
the left of Baird. 

f At the last and opportune moment — viz., at midnight on the 
19th — Longstreet arrived from Virginia with a strong re-enforce- 
ment, and these troops were at once placed in line of battle. 



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 



143 



Breckinridge, Cheatham, and Walker. The left, 
under Longstreet, comprised the six divisions of 
Stewart, Preston, Johnson, Anderson, Hood, and 
McLaws. These were disposed in double lines, with 
a strong cavalry force on the right flank. The new 
line of Thomas occupied a similarly extended front. 
From left to right were the divisions of Baird, Palm- 
er, Reynolds, Brannan, Wood, Davis, Sheridan, and 
Wilder. Gordon Granger had one division of his 
corps near Rossville. The Union troops worked 
most industriously all night ; ammunition was dis- 
tributed, intrenchments were made^ and trees were 
cut down to form abatis in front. The manifest de- 
termination of Bragg to roll up Thomas's left flank 
made all this activity more than necessary. The 
furious assaults of yesterday were to be repeated 
on the morrow. 

Second Day, September 20. — At early dawn Thom- 
as sent to Rosecrans to request that Negley's di- 
vision, which had been detached, should be placed 
in position on his threatened left. It was slow in 
coming, and by eight o'clock only one brigade — 
that of Beatty— had arrived. And at early morning, 
according to Bragg's explicit orders, the divisions of 
Polk's corps were to make their attack. When before 
daylight Bragg, who was in the saddle, took a posi- 
tion from which he expected to see the prompt fulfill- 
ment of his orders, he was greatly astonished to find 
no sign of movement. He dispatched a staff officer 



144 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



to General Polk's headquarters, who had been ab- 
sent from his advance during the night and who 
was taking a late breakfast. The adjutant received 
from him the excuse that the divisions designated to 
make the attack were partly overlapped by Long- 
street's troops and could not move ; so the attack 
was not made until nearly ten o'clock.* About that 
time Breckinridge and Cleburne made a fierce assault 
upon the Union left, Cleburne directly in front, and 
Breckinridge swinging round to the left, again trying 
to inclose it. Then began a movement forward and 
back ; the enemy were repulsed ; the attacking party 
was re-enforced; the ground was again lost, but was 
partially recovered by Stanley's brigade of Negley's 
division, and Vanderveer's of Brannan's. Breckin- 
ridge's left wheel was reversed, and the Union left 
was temporarily relieved and strongly held by Baird's 
division. The movements on the field were now 
rapid and numerous. Baird's division was re-enforced 
by a brigade of Wood's, and Thomas directed a large 
number of guns to be placed on Missionary Ridge, 
to sweep by their fire the intervening ground and 
prevent the advance of the enemy. 

No sooner had these precautions been taken than 

* Bragg, dissatisfied with this excuse, suspended Polk from his 
command and preferred charges against him. Upon a point of 
legal informality Jefferson Davis quashed the charges and restored 
Polk to his command. This very act invalidated Bragg's author- 
ity and robbed him of power. 



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{Second Day.) 

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THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 



45 



a new trouble sprang up on the right. McCook's 
troops, who had been retired, not anticipating an 
attack in that direction, and were being moved to 
the left and center in order to strengthen Thomas. 
Sheridan's division had been pushed forward from 
Missionary Ridge. Davis's division, after orders and 
counter-orders, had marched to take post between 
the right of Wood and the left of Sheridan. The 
right of the Union line being thus exposed by de- 
taching these divisions, the enemy took prompt 
advantage, and sent a force to flank the right and 
gain Thomas's rear. Thus a new moment of ex- 
treme peril was reached. Rosecrans was so im- 
pressed with the danger that he sent word to Thomas 
to refuse his right. This would have changed his 
order of battle which the situation of the left and 
center rendered impracticable. He laconically re- 
plied that the enemy was pushing him so hard he 
could make no changes. He was, indeed, fight- 
ing a Homeric battle single-handed against great 
odds. He called for re-enforcements, but the great 
confusion of the troops in his rear prevented their 
coming. 

Bragg, disregarding all other issues, then threw 
his whole force against Thomas, feeling almost cer- 
tain of success. Thus staggering under burdens too 
heavy to bear, and by no means disposed to relax 
his heroic efforts, a new misfortune occurred ; the 
gravest of all perils yet encountered came upon him 



146 GENERAL THOMAS. 

at this unfortunate moment. It was a mistake for 
wliich, as usual, ''nobody was to blame."* 

Contrary to the common practice, Rosecrans had 

* With regard to this very serious misapprehension the follow- 
ing is the statement of General Rosecrans : 

" Orders were dispatched to General Wood to close up on Rey- 
nolds, and word was sent to General Thomas that he should be 
supported even if it took away the whole corps of Crittenden and 
McCook. 

" General Davis was ordered to close on General Wood, and 
General McCook was advised of the state of affairs and ordered 
to close his whole command to the left with all dispatch. 

*' General Wood, overlooking the direction to close up on 
Reynolds, supposed he was to support him by withdrawing from 
the line and passing to the rear of General Brannan, who, it ap- 
pears, was not out of line, but was in echelon and slightly in rear 
of Reynolds's right. By this unfortunate mistake a gap was 
opened in the line of battle, of which the enemy took instant ad- 
vantage, and, striking Davis in flank and rear as well as in front, 
threw his whole division in confusion. 

" The same attack shattered the right brigade of Wood before 
it cleared the space. The right of Brannan was thrown back, 
and two of his batteries, then in movement to a new position, 
were taken in flank and thrown back through two brigades of Van 
Cleve, then on the march to the left, throwing his division into con- 
fusion, from which it never recovered until it reached Rossville." 

This general statement should be accompanied with General 
Wood's vindication. 

After describing his position on the field he says : 

" About eleven o'clock A. M. I received the following order : 

" ' Headquarters, Army of the Cumberland, 10.45 a. m. 
^^* General Wood, Cojnmanding Division : Close up on Gen- 
eral Reynolds as fast as possible and support him. 
" ' By order of Gc7ieral Rosecrans. 

" ' (Signed) F. S. Bond, A. D. C: " 

" It was delivered by an orderly. The order was not only man- 
datory, but peremptorily mandatory. It directed me to close 



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 



147 



sent by an orderly an order to General T. J. Wood 
direct, instead of through the corps commander. It 
was, that Wood's division should close up on Rey- 
nolds as rapidly as possible. Let it be observed that 
the relative positions of these divisions on the line 
were Reynolds, Brannan, Wood, and Sheridan, Bran- 
nan being a little in rear. Wood, construing the 
order literally, faced his division to the rear and 
marched past the rear of Brannan to the position of 
Reynolds, where he was not really wanted and 
where there was no place for him. The vacant space 
which he had left formed a gap in the center of 
Thomas's line. The enemy were not slow in per- 
ceiving this. Longstreet's men, Stewart's, Hood's, 
Kershaw's, and Hindman's divisions poured like a 
flood into it, and the Union line was cut in two. 
The situation was now unfortunate in the extreme. 
The long Confederate line already overlapped the 
Union line on the right. The left was by no means 
too secure; the right and rear were endangered, 

upon General Reynolds, a movement of one body from the rear 
to another body in front of it. But it gave the reason for the 
movement — viz., to support the body of troops in front — the most 
important reason that can exist on the field of battle. 

" With this order in my hand, with Brannan on my left, with no 
knowledge of Reynolds's position, but with a peremptory order 
to close up on him and support him, it was physically impossible 
to obey in any other way than I did — viz., by withdrawing from 
the line, passing to the left, finding Reynolds's position, closing 
up on him, and supporting him." — From General Wood's letter to 
the author. 

II 



148 GENERAL THOMAS. 

and now the center of the line was pierced. What 
was intended was that, simultaneously with Wood's 
movement, Davis and Sheridan should close to the 
left and fill the gap. A fatal delay occurred. Hind- 
man struck Davis in flank and rear and routed him 
while he was moving to fill the gap. Longstreet's 
troops followed up this movement. Thomas's right 
was driven to the rear ; his center swung round as 
upon a pivot. Could his left hold on ? That was 
the vital question. Here was the Gordian knot. 

Small congeries of troops gathered, and, led by 
the bravest men, instead of rushing with the rest to 
the rear, had come to join Thomas. Among these 
toward evening was the gallant Sheridan, who ap- 
peared at a vital moment with his own division and 
other scattering troops whom he had rallied around 
him. Thus, with about twenty thousand men against 
the entire army of Bragg, General Thomas held the 
key of the position ; everything depended upon him. 
The rest of the Union army was a disorganized mob 
flying to Chattanooga. Rosecrans had abandoned 
the field, and at four on that afternoon had tele- 
graphed to Washington, '' My army has been whipped 
and routed." He should have excepted Thomas, 
who had not been whipped or routed. Forced into 
a line of crescent form, his artillery advantageously 
posted, he repulsed the fierce attacks of Polk on his 
left and center, and of Longstreet on his right and 
rear. But unless succor should come speedily it was 



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 



149 



indeed a lost field ; but the re-enforcements came, 
not only timely but unexpected. 

When the action began, Granger with his troops 
was not upon the field at all, but was out on the 
Ringgold road. This makes his action the more 
meritorious, as in the great confusion of the battle 
and with the sounds of conflict in several directions, 
and especially not knowing that Rosecrans had left 
the field, a man of less decision would have waited 
for orders, and thus imperiled the fortunes of Thom- 
as as much as his timely appearance succored and 
supported them. Granger's troops won very de- 
served distinction on that occasion, and much of it 
was due to the splendid fighting of Steedman at the 
Horseshoe Ridge, 

The troops of Thomas were disposed in an ir- 
regular semicircle, Polk pounding upon his left, 
Longstreet on his right and rear, holding a strong 
and commanding ridge on their flank, and appar- 
ently there was nothing behind him but disorder and 
confusion. It was then that General Gordon Gran- 
ger, like Dessaix at Marengo, after ordering Steed- 
man with two brigades of the reserve division to 
move at a double quick toward the right, where the 
firing became louder and louder, galloped to find 
Thomas in person. Granger was in command, and 
therefore deserves the credit of the movement ; but, 
before he ordered it, it is due to Steedman to state 
that he was very anxious to make it himself, and 



50 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



earnestly begged permission to do so. Earlier in 
the day Rosecrans had posted him on the Ringgold 
road, to remain there until further directions. As 
the firing increased in volume, he had written two 
notes to Rosecrans asking permission to move. As 
no answers were received, it was supposed that they 
had miscarried. He then appealed to Granger, who 
gladly gave the order and preceded him to the field. 
Thus a fresh force of seven thousand five hundred 
men moved rapidly down to the relief of Thomas. 
As he descried their approach, there was a painful 
moment of uncertainty, like that of Napoleon at 
Waterloo, whether he or the enemy was being re- 
enforced. His line, at that time and just prior to 
the coming of Granger, was in the following order 
from left to right : Baird, Johnson, Palmer, Rey- 
nolds, Wood, and Brannan. But soon through the 
clouds of smoke and dust he caught one glimpse of 
the waving Stars and Stripes. 

When Steedman approached, Thomas was stand- 
ing alone in a clump of trees on Horseshoe Ridge, 
with the enemy trying to turn both flanks. For a 
moment he questioned whether he should send him 
to re-enforce his left, or make head against the 
masses of Longstreet that were overpowering his 
right and were already passing to his rear. He did 
not hesitate long. Pointing to the right, to the 
commanding ridge held by the enemy, he ejaculated, 
" Take that ridge ! " Steedman moved at once to 



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 151 

the attack, and, in spite of the fierce resistance of 
the enemy, took the ridge and the gorge, with the 
loss of twenty-nine hundred men ! There was no 
more desperate fighting during the war. The pene- 
trating wedge was thrown back upon their main 
Hne. The gap was filled and the Union rear se- 
cured. Thomas completed his contracted line; am- 
munition, which was running low, was issued to the 
troops, and this little army, with its heroic leader, 
constituted that '' Rock of Chickamauga," against 
which both wings of the Confederates had been 
hurled in unison and thrown back in evaporating 
spray. When directing the distribution of the re- 
maining ammunition, Thomas issued orders that 
when that was exhausted they must depend upon 
the bayonet ! All told, the force with which Thomas 
accomplished this achievement was about twenty- 
five thousand men. The Confederate columns which 
attempted to dislodge this force numbered between 
fifty and sixty thousand. 

Obstructed by the mass of troops moving to the 
rear, Rosecrans did not reach this portion of the 
field, and was ignorant of the heroic resistance 
Thomas was making. Securing a safe retreat for his 
army in Chattanooga, he sent word to Thomas to 
use his discretion in withdrawing the army. The 
laconic answer was, " It will ruin the army to with- 
draw it now; this position must be held till night." 
He was yet, however, to receive and repel an attack 



152 GENERAL THOMAS. 

of the whole Confederate line intended for a coup de 
grace. Receiving a portion of this attack, Thomas 
found that the time had come to retire. The mode 
of attack was well chosen, had Thomas remained to 
receive it fully. Their right was swung round again 
to envelop his left and to cut off his retreat, while 
their left was massed against the vulnerable points 
of the morning. It was now his policy to elude 
them. Orders were issued at nightfall to withdraw 
by divisions, Reynolds in front ; and yet in front of 
Reynolds there was danger. A body of the enemy 
had succeeded in passing through the woods and 
were now in rear of Reynolds — or rather, in his 
change of front, they were before him. Aided by 
Turchin's brigade, which made a splendid charge 
upon Liddell's division on the extreme right, he 
scattered this force and made some prisoners. 

Then Thomas formed a new temporary line at 
Rossville to cover his retiring movement, where he 
was joined by several of the generals who had been 
driven away or had retreated. By the dim light 
of a clouded moon he conducted the retreat with 
great caution and in good order. A strong rear 
guard alone confronted the enemy, and the attack 
so furiously begun was abandoned. Longstreet and 
Forrest were impetuously urgent that Bragg should 
at once advance the whole army in full pursuit. The 
former had directed General Wheeler with his caval- 
ry to cut off the retreating force from Chattanooga, 



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 



153 



but Bragg ordered a halt and recall. The darkness 
of the night, he said, and the density of the forest, 
rendered further movements uncertain and exceed- 
ingly dangerous. 

What would have been the issue had he moved is 
indeed a matter of speculation ; for, on the other 
hand, it has been asserted that, had the Union troops 
been rallied even partially and concentrated with 
Thomas at the vital point, such was the shattered 
condition of Bragg's army that it is more than prob- 
able a battle on the 21st would have resulted in a 
Union victory. Among the withdrawals due in part 
to the terrible onsets of the enemy, to the piercing 
of the Union line, and other causes incident to the 
vicissitudes of the battlefield, was that, as we have 
already seen, of the divisions of- Sheridan, Jefferson 
C. Davis, and Van Cleve. While Thomas held the 
field and retained his coolness in the midst of all 
this confusion, he could not understand why, as soon 
as they were rallied, they did not return to his aid. 
He sent explicit orders by his aid-de-camp, Colonel 
Thurston, that they should return across the coun- 
try from McFarland's Gap, which was only two or 
two and a half miles, and on which route there was 
no interposition of rebel force to prevent it. But 
these troops were in full march toward Rossville, 
and the order was not obeyed. Circumstances which 
do not appear on the record may explain what is 
otherwise inexplicable. We only know that it was 



154 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



after their arrival at Rossville that an attempt was 
made to obey the order. They moved by the direct 
road, and did not reach Thomas until the evening, 
so that it took all day to march seven or eight miles 
around two sides of a triangle, when they might have 
marched two and a half miles in an hour. 

I am not disposed to criticise General Sheridan 
and his associates, who did splendid service on that 
field, but the fact remains that, could this have been 
done with the eight or ten thousand men which 
Sheridan might have gathered and brought up in 
the nick of time, there would probably have been 
no occasion for Thomas to have left that battlefield 
at all, for he would have been able to withstand 
the final attack and drive the Confederate army 
away in dire confusion. Such was the clear con- 
viction of General Garfield, Rosecrans's chief of 
staff, who, instead of going with his leader into 
Chattanooga, had joined Thomas on the field. Epito- 
mizing the situation at a quarter to nine on Sep- 
tember 2oth : "On the whole," he says, "General 
Thomas and General Granger have done the enemy 
fully as much injury to-day as they have suffered 
from him, and they have successfully repelled the 
repeated combined attacks most fiercely made of the 
whole rebel army, frequently pressing the front and 
both our flanks at the same time. The rebels have 
done their best to-day, and I believe we can whip 
them to-morrow ; I believe we can now crown the 



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 155 

whole battle with victory. Granger regards them 
as thoroughly whipped to-night, and thinks they 
would not renew the fight were we to remain on the 
field." Whatever the views of Thomas were, al- 
though Rosecrans had virtually turned over the 
command into his hands, leaving it to his discretion 
when to withdraw, it would have been manifestly 
unwise in him to assume the responsibility of a new 
battle. His first movement was to post what there 
was of Crittenden's corps intact on Missionary 
Ridge, near Rossville ; McCook's men across the 
valley, with his cavalry covering the right flank ; 
while his own Fourteenth Corps was placed between 
the two, from Ringgold Gap to Dry Valley road. 

It is worthy of further note, perhaps, that among 
those who in the disorder of the field had joined 
Thomas was, as has been already said, General Gar- 
field, whose opinion has just been quoted. He dis- 
played a military spirit and great energy during the 
whole campaign, and especially in the fighting of 
the 20th, which formed one of the elements of that 
popularity which made him President of the United 
States ! As the alternative of fighting the enemy 
again had been given up, nothing remained but to 
withdraw the army into the defenses of Chattanooga. 
While retiring to Rossville, so curiously mingled was 
the field with Union and Confederate troops that 
Thomas captured five hundred of their men who had 
penetrated to the Union rear. 



156 GENERAL THOMAS. 

On the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st 
his guns were posted in large numbers on the low 
range of hills in his rear. To guard against the ad- 
vance of the enemy, the Dry Valley pass on the right 
and the Rossville pass on the left were strongly 
picketed. The Union army remained thus posted 
during the 21st, and then by a night march they 
traversed the four miles to Chattanooga, and on the 
morning of the 22d they were in at least temporary 
safety. The men set to work with a will as the ris- 
ing sun of that day dissipated the ghastly vision of 
the previous days. Ghastly indeed it was! The Union 
losses had been more than sixteen thousand, while 
by his furious onslaughts Bragg had sacrificed eight- 
een thousand men. Humanity shudders as the im- 
agination conjures up that Aceldama; the contorted 
forms of dead men and still writhing bodies of the 
wounded, presenting such an infernal holocaust as 
few even of Napoleon's battlefields had witnessed ! 
The intrenchments were soon secure against any at- 
tacks of the Confederates ; the guns were rapidly put 
into position and opened upon any rash bands of the 
enemy that appeared in sight. Soldiers soon forget 
their dangers and sufferings. Their spirits rose as 
the bands played national airs, and the Stars and 
Stripes flaunted defiance to the enemy from many 
flagstaffs. 

Bragg's resources were, however, not yet exhaust- 
ed. He posted his army around Chattanooga, encom- 



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 



157 



passing and covering the entire Union position. 
Holding the Southern railroads, he commanded the 
northern route to Dalton, and occupied the long line of 
Missionary Ridge. The tables were turned. Instead 
of the Union force besieging Bragg in Chattanooga, 
they were besieged by him, and, as we shall soon see, 
with a strong chance of compelling them to come out 
or die of starvation. 

We may now pause to take a more philosophic 
view of this great battle, and thus to place in a clear 
light the real claims of Thomas to the chief glory 
and distinction of tha*t field. Technically speaking, 
the battle of Chickamauga was a Confederate victo- 
ry, and, as far as the field was concerned, a Union 
defeat. General Bragg deserves praise for his well- 
conceived plans and timely orders, although he 
failed in what would have been a stroke of Napo- 
leonic genius — the destruction of the Union corps 
in detail while they were separated from each 
other. That was a golden opportunity lost. The 
Southern commander was not, however, properly 
supported by his subordinates. In a military point 
of view, he deserved to win. 

On the other hand, in common language, every- 
thing went against Thomas, and yet we have the para- 
dox that every adverse circumstance gave him an 
opportunity. His counsel was disregarded at the 
first. His corps was thrust single-handed into the 
jaws of disaster ; the other corps were at first insulated 



158 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



and afterward disintegrated, and could give him little 
assistance. By reason of an unfortunate order com- 
municated, not through him, to a subordinate di- 
rectly, his line was pierced. If at the beginning the 
armies had been of about equal strength, later, owing 
to untoward circumstances, he had maintained him- 
self with twenty-five thousand men against the rap- 
idly repeated attacks of more than twice that num- 
ber. His sublime valor and unequaled endurance 
received the plaudits of the enemy. " Never," said 
one of their historians, " did the Yankees fight better 
than just here." His own men called him thence- 
forth "The Rock of Chickamauga." He saved the 
army from flight and utter ruin, for flight would have 
meant the scattering of the troops, the unrelenting 
pursuit by Bragg, his occupation of Tennessee and 
Kentucky, and his seriously threatening the line of 
the Ohio. 

Thus the battle of Chickamauga displays to us 
this heroic man, towering above his colleagues by his 
cool and sensible judgment, his tenacity of purpose, 
and his splendid valor. His skill as a general was 
tested and proved by his making, as Lannes said to 
Napoleon, "his plans in the face of the enemy"; 
changing and modifying them with the numerous 
and rapid changes of the field ; assuming the com- 
mand and the responsibility with a clear grasp and 
a forecasting intelligence not surpassed by any 
general in the history of modern war. And his sol- 



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 



159 



diers were worthy of such a general, and were thor- 
oughly infused with his spirit. It must be a glorious 
and invaluable retrospect to those brave officers and 
men who are able to say, " I fought with Thomas 
at Chickamauga." 

Note. — Foi- an admirable summary of the part played by the 
artillery in the battle of Chickamauga, the reader is referred to a 
series of articles contributed by General John C. Tidball to the 
Journal of the Military Service Institution, particularly in Novem- 
ber, 1892, and January, 1893. He considers the experience of that 
action of great value in changing the system from details of bat- 
teries with regiments and brigades to the establishment of an 
artillery corps, under the command of a chief of artillery, so that 
batteries might be sent in logical connection to points where they 
were absolutely needed. He says : " Soon after the action the 
batteries were taken from infantry brigades ; two were allowed to 
each division, while the other seven of each corps were organized 
into a brigade and placed under the direct command of a field 
officer of artillery. The whole artilleiy of the army was under the 
direction of a higher chief. From this on there was an efficient 
service of artillery in the Army of the Cumberland." 



CHAPTER IX. 

THOMAS AT CHATTANOOGA. 

Military Division of the Mississippi — Grant in command — Rose- 
crans relieved by Thomas — Army of the Cumberland— Hook- 
er's grand division — " I'll hold the town till we starve "— 
Seventy miles of wagoning — Brown's Ferry — Great achievement 
of Baldy Smith — Bragg's astonishment — Longstreet detached 
to Knoxville — Sherman to attack Bragg's left — Hooker's ad- 
vance by Lookout — Thomas attacks and captures Missionary 
Ridge — "Without orders" — Confederates routed and pur- 
sued. 

After the first news at Washington that Rose- 
crans's army had been '' whipped and routed" there 
arrived the pleasing intelligence that Chattanooga 
had been occupied and the Army of the Cumberland 
was safe in its intrenchments. The relief was so 
great that congratulatory orders were issued. But 
still later news announced the partial defeat of Rose- 
crans, and the skill and heroism of Thomas, and so 
it was decided to make a change in the command. 
" The Rock of Chickamaiiga " was a taking title not 
only at headquarters but throughout the country, 
and it remains in history as his important and hon- 
orable cognomen. 

The gravity of the situation, however, was by no 



THOMAS AT CHATTANOOGA. i6i 

means misunderstood. It was considered so great 
that immediate re-enforcements were sent down from 
the Army of the Potomac, under General Hooker ; 
and General Grant, our most distinguished com- 
mander, the hero of so many fields, was ordered to 
concentrate a portion of his Western troops, under 
Sherman, at Chattanooga, and to assume the com- 
mand there in person. 

Hooker's column was extended at first from 
Nashville to Bridgeport, to secure the communica- 
tions by that line. He had under him the Eleventh 
and Twelfth Corps, and they arrived at Bridgeport in 
detachments from the 2d to the 5th of October. 
They were joined to the Army of the Cumberland 
and placed under General Thomas. Sherman was on 
his way by a rapid movement to Chattanooga. 

On the i6th of October an order was issued at 
Washington making the following changes in com- 
mand : The departments and armies of the Ohio, Cum- 
berland, and Tennessee were all united in " the Mili- 
tary Division of Mississippi." General Grant was 
placed at its head, with his temporary headquarters 
at Chattanooga. General Burnside, stationed at 
Knoxville, commanded the Department and Army of 
the Ohio, General Sherman that of the Tennessee, 
while General Thomas was placed in command of the 
Army of the Cumberland, from which Rosecrans had 
been relieved. Again Thomas protested against the 
proposed change, but in vain. He was the necessary 



l62 GENERAL THOMAS. 

man in spite of his reluctance. Chickamauga had 
made him so. 

Rosecrans, in his order announcing his retirement, 
commends to his troops the known prudence, daunt- 
less courage, and true patriotism of Thomas. While 
his promotion was an honor most richly deserved, 
it was a most dangerous one, full of trouble and 
great responsibility. As early as September 30th 
the Secretary of War had telegraphed : " The merits 
of General Thomas and the debt of gratitude the 
nation owes to his valor and skill are fully appreci- 
ated here, and I wish you to tell him so. It is not my 
fault that he was not in chief command months ago." 

A summary of the situation is as follows : It 
seems now to have been a mistake on the part of the 
authorities to let Burnside occupy Knoxville. It 
could not aid, but was destined to embarrass, the 
more vital operations at Chattanooga. Sherman was 
coming up as rapidly as possible with the Army of 
the Tennessee; and Hooker's grand division had 
arrived at Bridgeport, and was waiting for its assign- 
ment to a part in the coming drama. It was mani- 
fest that there would be no lack of numbers. The 
great danger was want of food ; every additional 
man would increase that danger. 

On his way to Chattanooga, Grant had stopped 
at Louisville, and had held a long conference with 
the Secretary of War, who had gone there to meet 
him. They discussed the situation ; they were more 



THOMAS AT CHATTANOOGA. 163 

than satisfied with the strong position of the Union 
army, with both flanks touching the Tennessee River 
— or rather, to be more exact, the left resting on 
Citico Creek and the right on Lookout Mountain, 
and then on Chattanooga Creek. Although it was 
encircled by the enemy all the way round from Mis- 
sionary Ridge to Lookout Mountain, there was little 
to fear in this regard. It could resist all attacks ; it 
could attack in turn ; but the overwhelming difficul- 
ty was whence and how to procure supplies, without 
which both resistance and attack would soon be im- 
possible. The situation was grave in the extreme, 
and It seemed almost without remedy. They needed 
provisions and forage, shoes and clothmg, ammuni- 
tion and medical stores, horses and mules. The men 
were reduced to half rations. The animals were with- 
out forage, their very bones seeming to rattle within 
their drawn hides. The precarious supplies which 
were received came in by the Anderson road, a very 
bad one at all seasons, but rendered almost impassa- 
ble by the autumnal rains. They came across Wal- 
den's Ridge, between the Tennessee River and the 
Sequatchie Valley, from Bridgeport, Ala., the whole 
distance being seventy miles. The wagon trains 
were shelled as they passed by detached forces of 
the enemy, and many of them were captured and de- 
stroyed by cavalry raids — Wheeler and Forrest seem- 
ing to be ubiquitous in all that region. 

More than ten thousand horses and mules had 



64 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



perished in the long line of wagoning, and Grant 
spoke with grim humor of the soldiers' daily fare 
when he called it " half a ration of bread, and beef 
dried on the hoof." It was with the knowledge of 
this condition of things that Grant had telegraphed 
to Thomas from Louisville, on the 19th of October, 
" to hold Chattanooga at all hazards." The reply of 
the latter was one of those laconic and epigrammatic 
sentences which become embalmed in history : " I 
will hold the town till we starve." At that moment 
the chances were certainly two to one that they would 
starve or surrender. There seemed, indeed, to be no 
other alternative. Without provisions men could not 
offer battle to the enemy ; starving men can not fight. 
Without provisions they could not retreat ; they would 
faint by the way. Without animals they could not 
carry away wagons or guns; so, had a retreat been 
attempted, they would have lost all their guns and 
munitions, and their cavalry would have failed them. 
The troops would have been dispersed in every direc- 
tion, and the enemy, hardly deigning to pursue them, 
would have attempted a Northern invasion. Indeed, 
General Grant wrote to Washington that "a. retreat 
would have been almost certain annihilation." 

There was great joy in the Confederate councils. 
Bragg with his strong force saw just such a vision 
of Federal disaster. He could afford to wait. His 
cavalry swarmed upon the Federal communications ; 
he had plenty of supplies himself ; Thomas could not 



THOMAS AT CHATTANOOGA. 165 

get them, and must soon surrender; surely Bragg's 
star, which had seemed to be sinking below the hori- 
zon, was again rising to the ascendant. 

The chief movements during the siege and in 
the battles which put an end to it are quite boldly 
defined, and were made in such a logical order that 
there was a clear consecution from first to last ; but 
the details were so numerous and shifting that they 
must be greatly condensed to come within the scope 
of this work, and many gallant men and heroic bodies 
of troops must pass with not even a mere mention. 
Under Grant and Thomas, regiments and brigades 
were moved in many directions without regard to 
their arrangement in corps or even divisions. It must 
therefore serve our purpose to specify the corps and 
their commanders, calling attention in the narrative 
principally to such divisions and brigades as played 
the most prominent part in the struggle about to 
begin. 

The Browns Ferry Affair. — Of one operation we 
must, however, pause to take special notice. The 
question of supplies was of course paramount in the 
mind of Thomas, even before the arrival of Grant, and 
he was very fortunate in having as his chief engineer 
an officer fertile in resources, of large experience, and 
prompt and skillful in execution. What is known as 
the Brown's Ferry affair, which is now to be briefly 
described, was suggested to Thomas and discussed 
with him by General William F. Smith, of the United 



1 56 GENERAL THOxMAS. 

States Engineers. As soon as General Grant arrived 
the plan was proposed to him, and he gave his assent 
to it. The peculiar topographical features of the situ- 
ation were the chief factors in the problem. Where 
the Tennessee River makes a loop just opposite 
Chattanooga, running southward and then turning 
northward again, the intervening ground being known 
as Moccasin Point, Brown's Ferry is situated — six 
miles distant by the circuitous water route, but less 
than a mile across Moccasin Point. The object in 
view, or rather the plan proposed, was that General 
Smith should embark with a small force in advance 
of eighteen hundred men on the pontoon boats, which 
he did on the night of October 27th. This force was 
under General William B. Hazen. They floated down 
the river in complete silence, and were landed at two 
points near Brown's Ferry. About twenty-two hun- 
dred additional men were marched across the bend 
of the river to re-enforce this first party, and were 
ferried over in the pontoons at daylight. In the 
meantime the first expeditionary force had seized the 
hills to the west, at the mouth of Lookout Valley, to 
the great surprise of the enemy, who had only placed 
there a small force, little suspecting an attack at that 
point. Their pickets were easily overpowered, and 
the spurs of the hills were occupied by our troops. 
The four thousand men who accomplished this work 
were Hazen's brigade of Sheridan's division, Fourth 
Corps, and Turchin's brigade of Baird's division of 



THOMAS AT CHATTANOOGA. 167 

the Fourth Corps. The entire force and the expedi- 
tion were commanded by General Smith. 

The effect was instantaneous. The enemy's de- 
tachment, finding itself in danger of being cut off, re- 
treated precipitately, leaving the Ferry in the hands 
of the Union troops. This was a great point gained. 
The way was now thrown open to the advance of 
Hooker and Palmer, but what was of far greater im- 
portance was the immense shortening of the line by 
which the Union army received its supplies. The 
river was opened between Bridgeport and Brown's 
Ferry, and there were two fine roads — one from 
Bridgeport to Brown's Ferry, and the other from 
Brown's Ferry to Kelly's. By means of the former 
road the distance was shortened to twenty-eight 
miles, and when supplies were taken up the river on 
boats from Bridgeport to Brown's Ferry there were 
but eight miles of wagoning as against the seventy 
miles of the day before. And this grand feat was 
the sudden and splendid harbinger of Union success 
soon to follow. Two steamers — one captured from 
the enemy and one recently built — were put into 
immediate requisition; others also were very soon 
employed, and all necessary provisions were brought 
to the troops around Chattanooga. Thomas recog- 
nized the value of this achievement in a subsequent 
report, in which he says: "To Brigadier-General 
William F. Smith should be accorded great praise, for 
the ingenuity which conceived and the ability which 



1 68 GENERAL THOMAS. 

executed the movement at Brown's Ferry." General 
Grant's recognition of its value is found in the fact 
that he at once recommended General Smith to be 
made a major general. Charles A. Dana, the Assist- 
ant Secretary of War, who was there at the time, 
says, in a dispatch of October 28th, "The great suc- 
cess is General Smith's operation at the mouth of 
Lookout Valley." 

The astonishment and chagrin of Bragg are inde- 
scribable. Up to that very moment he had seen for 
the Union army only the alternatives of starvation 
or retreat ; his certain hope was destroyed at a sin- 
gle blow. There never was a finer transformation 
scence in a war drama. The following order will 
show the change in the situation at a glance: 

" Chattanooga, November i, 1863. 
"Colonel Mackay : The Paint Rock will leave 
Bridgeport this day at 12 m., laden with rations and 
forage. Send down an order for her to land at Kelly's 
Ferry, else she will come up to Brown's Ferry, where 
there are no conveniences for unloading. Give or- 
ders also that the boats will continue to stop at 
Kelly's Ferry until further orders. Thirty-nine thou- 
sand rations of forage are at Kelly's Ferry now. Get 
up a due proportion of subsistence and forage as 
rapidly as possible, also clothing for the men. 
"Respectfully, 
"(Signed) George H. Thomas, 

" Major General., U. S. VoiufiteerSy Commanding ^ 



THOMAS AT CHATTANOOGA. 



69 



And now the siege was soon to give way to the 
battle. 

The Army of the Cumberland under General 
Thomas comprised the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Corps, commanded respectively by Generals Gordon 
Granger, and Palmer. The Eleventh and Twelfth, 
constituting the force brought by Hooker, were for 
the time united to the Army of the Cumberland, and 
entirely under the control of General Thomas. The 
Eleventh was commanded by General Slocum, and 
the Twelfth by General Howard. 

General Sherman did not arrive until November 
14th, and his troops were just behind him. As soon 
as he took a comprehensive view of the situation 
from Fort Wood, and saw the tents of the belea- 
guering force, he said, " General Grant, you are be- 
sieged"; and the answer was, "It is too true." But 
we are anticipating. 

Grant had arrived at Chattanooga on October 
23d. His first plan, before the arrival of Sherman, 
was disclosed in an order issued on November 7th. 
By it Thomas was directed to attack the enemy on 
the north end of Missionary Ridge. It was hoped 
that he might roll back their line on the right, and 
that also Bragg would be compelled to recall Long- 
street's force, which, it was reported, had gone to 
besiege Burnside at Knoxville. At Thomas's in- 
stance the order was, however, countermanded until 
the arrival of Sherman. As soon as he came the 



70 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



three generals rode to the nearest point of observa- 
tion, and Grant asked Sherman whether he thought 
he could make the proposed attack with success. 
This required the laying of the new pontoon bridge, 
and the attack on Bragg's right flank where Mission- 
ary Ridge abuts on Chickamauga Creek near the 
tunnel. He answered in the affirmative, and thus 
one part of the battle plan was settled in advance. 
It was hoped by this movement not only to thrust 
Bragg's right flank back by direct attack, but also, 
by seriously threatening his communications, to 
oblige him to fall back in order to secure them. It 
was also arranged in a general way that Thomas 
should support him not only by attacking in front, 
but also obliquely to the left, touching Sherman's 
right. This movement, however, was to take more 
decided shape a little later. We may anticipate by 
saying that Hooker was to come upon Bragg's left 
flank, and so to threaten it as to keep it in place, 
and not allow re-enforcements to be sent to the 
enemy's right. The way being now open, Thomas 
had ordered Hooker to cross the Tennessee at 
Bridgeport, which he had done, and Palmer, who 
was posted opposite Whitesides, had followed 
Hooker. 

When Grant assumed the command, on October 
23d, as for a time Thomas becomes a subordinate 
officer under Grant's orders, only enough need be 
said of the remainder of the campaign to assign to 



THOMAS AT CHATTANOOGA. 



171 



Thomas his proper share of the duty and the glory, 
and to show that his troops were admirably handled, 
and were eminently successful. Doubtless in the life 
of Grant, of this series, and in those of Hooker and 
Sherman, Chattanooga will receive careful attention. 

While Bragg was thoroughly disconcerted by the 
ingenious skill of the Union commanders, and was 
in doubt what new step to take, he found he had 
committed a great error in complying with Long- 
street's suggestion to detach his corps and direct it 
upon Knoxville, there to attack Burnside. It may 
be here premised that this did not so weaken Bragg's 
center as to warrant his feeble resistance against 
the coming attack. It was, however, with a knowl- 
edge of this detachment that Grant conceived his 
plan of a triple movement — Sherman on the left. 
Hooker to come up on the right, and Thomas in 
the center, to make a direct attack upon Missionary 
Ridge, thus simultaneously assaulting both flanks 
and the center of Bragg. With regard to Burnside, 
who had been clamoring for succor at Knoxville, 
Grant was not foolish enough to imitate Bragg and 
weaken his force, but Burnside was ordered to hold 
out at all hazards, partly on account of the impor- 
tance of the place, but also to keep Longstreet there 
and away from Bragg's army. Whatever the physical 
effect may have been, the moral effect of detaching 
Longstreet was obvious. 

To carry out the plan thus prepared, Sherman, 



72 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



who after varied adventures had marched from 
Bridgeport by way of Whitesides and crossed the 
river at Brown's Ferry, had by daylight of the 24th 
eight thousand men on the south side of the river. 
The rest of his command, crossing upon the pontoon 
bridge, was in position that day near the northern 
end of Missionary Ridge, on a detached hill. It ap- 
pears that at first this was to be the main attack, 
and Thomas had sent all of Howard's force to join 
Sherman in the operations of the next day, Novem- 
ber 25th. They were not, however, needed. It will 
be readily understood that in making this triple move- 
ment, the parts of which were in such close relation 
to each other, troops were frequently and rapidly 
moved from one position to another as they seemed 
to be needed, each attack depending for its raison 
aitre upon the other two. Thus it was that troops 
were shifted from center to flank and back again, as 
the exigencies of the conflict seemed to require. 

The historians have divided the operations at 
Chattanooga into two parts ; the first they call 
*' The Siege," and the second "The Battle." At 
this point all was in readiness to end the siege with 
a battle. 

On the same day (November 24th) Thomas or- 
dered Hooker to put his corps in motion, to carry 
the Confederate intrenchments on the nose of Look- 
out Mountain, to cross the Chattanooga Creek, and, 
passing through Rossville, to attack the left of the 



THOMAS AT CHATTANOOGA. 



173 



enemy's line on the southern end of Missionary- 
Ridge. The troops thus forming the right wing in 
the combined attack consisted of Geary's division of 
the Twelfth Corps, a part of the Fourth Corps, and 
Osterhaus's division of the Fifteenth, which had been 
detached from Sherman. 

The attacks on the flanks being thus provided 
for, Thomas was to make the central movement with 
his own Army of the Cumberland. At a given signal 
they were to move forward upon the enemy's rifle 
pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge. They were 
thus arranged from left to right by divisions — Baird, 
T. J. Wood, Sheridan, and R. W. Johnson. The line 
was not quite regular, Wood's division being at first 
a little in front. 

A preliminary reconnoissance had been made by 
General Thomas on Monday, November 23d. Just 
outside of Chattanooga and less than midway be- 
tween it and the Confederate rifle pits, being a part 
of the main fortifications of the city, was an earth- 
work called Fort Wood. Midway between that and 
Missionary Ridge, less than a mile from Fort W^ood, 
was a prominent double hill called Orchard Knob. 

Grant, with Thomas and other generals, stood 
upon the ramparts of Fort Wood superintending the 
first act in the bloody, but splendid, drama about to 
be enacted. Wood's division was moved rapidly for- 
ward to occupy Orchard Knob, and was followed in 
support by Sheridan's division and those of Baird 



174 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



and Johnson, constituting Palmer's corps. This point 
was handsomely carried, a prominent advanced posi- 
tion was thus gained, and an excellent diversion was 
made in favor of Sherman's coming attack on the 
enemy's right. During the night a heavy battery 
was posted on Orchard Knob. 

General Bragg, who had remained in a condition 
of great incertitude, was resolved now to put on a 
mask of boldness to conceal his misgivings. Even 
while the preparations to attack him were nearly 
complete, he sent a letter to General Grant stating 
that, as there might be some noncombatants in Chat- 
tanooga, he deemed it proper to notify Grant that 
prudence would dictate their early withdrawal. Grant 
had thanked him grimly for his consideration, but 
had declined to profit by it. If this was not part of 
the game of bluff and brag, the immediately follow- 
ing days must have opened his eyes to the fact that 
the prey of which he had felt so certain was not 
simply slipping away from his grasp, but would have 
the temerity to attack him in his intrenchments, 
while the noncombatants would abet and applaud. 

He was not long left in doubt ; all was now ready 
at every point. The position of the Confederate 
troops along the ridge was as follows : Hardee held 
their right opposite to Sherman with five divisions, 
and Breckinridge was on their left with four. Al- 
though Sherman's attack had been originally in- 
tended as the main one, it evidently was not deliv- 



THOMAS AT CHATTANOOGA. 175 

ered in such a manner as to carry out this idea, and 
it now became manifest that it would be subordinate 
to Thomas's movement from the center. Most of 
the troops which had been sent him by Thomas were 
not employed at all. Portions of two brigades only 
were seriously engaged. Few if any troops were de- 
tached from the Confederate center to resist him. It 
was not known until afterward that the great bulk 
of the enemy was in Thomas's front. Thus matters 
were merging to a crisis. 

All that was waited for was the appearance of 
Hooker on the right. His troops were shut out from 
the view of the army on the plain by a dense mist, 
which had settled low upon the crest and sides of 
Lookout Mountain. Thomas could only guess how 
the fight was going, and was in suspense as to the 
result, until a stiff breeze springing up tore asunder 
the cloudy curtain and disclosed, as if in a colossal 
amphitheater, looking upward, his triumphant march 
against and over the Confederate intrenchments. 
This was the famous "battle above the clouds," 
which really presented one of the most picturesque 
features of that famous field. It should be added 
that, some impulsive and enthusiastic volunteers, 
with a happy instinct but without orders, climbed 
to the top of the mountain and there unfurled the 
American flag. This was at daylight on the 25th. 
Thus the announcement was made that Lookout 
Mountain was in Union hands. On the morning of 



176 GENERAL THOMAS. 

the same day Hooker moved to carry out the pro- 
gramme. Leaving a small force on the nose of 
Lookout Mountain, he marched into the valley of the 
Chattanooga River. He was momentarily appalled 
to find that the bridge across the river had been 
broken ; but his men worked like bees to repair it, 
and the Twenty-seventh Missouri ran across on the 
stringers, as soon as they were laid, without waiting 
for the flooring. Hooker then moved by Rossville 
Gap up to the crest of Missionary Ridge. We may 
anticipate by saying that his attack upon his enemy's 
left flank chimed in successfully with the other parts 
of the great programme. 

To return to Thomas. His immediate command 
was realizing Shakespeare's description of the Eng- 
lish troops : They stood 

" Like greyhounds in the slips, straining upon the start.*' 

It was manifest that when the word should be given 
their impetuosity would know no bounds. At last 
the signal came ; at twenty minutes to four o'clock 
six guns were fired as if in a complimentary salute. 
The brazen note of number six had scarcely sounded 
when the whole field was alive with motion. There 
was no more fiery charge in the annals of the war. 
The Union guns from Orchard Knob were trained 
over the heads of the attacking party upon the crest 
of Missionary Ridge. The assaulting column on the 
front line, when the signal for the assault was given 



THOMAS AT CHATTANOOGA. ^nj 

and all moving simultaneously at the firing of the 
sixth gun, was arranged with Wood and Sheridan in 
the center and Baird and Johnson on the flanks. 
The enemy's rifle pits at the foot of the ridge were 
handsomely charged and easily captured. 

That was as far as Grant intended they should 
go, but it is difficult to see why. They could not 
stay there ; the simplest instinct prompted them 
either to retreat or advance. They had no orders to 
go beyond, but they were in no condition to wait for 
orders. They only halted long enough to readjust 
their lines, and were about to breast the terrible 
storm when there was a conflict of judgment. Some 
one, it is said, shouted at the top of his voice, 
" Take the ridge if you can " ; but whether there was 
such a voice or not is very little matter. It certainly 
was not an official voice. To the astonishment of 
the commander in chief, they rushed up the slope at 
a double quick. Singularly enough, the divisions 
were formed in wedge-like shapes, with the colors in 
the angle of each. The guns from Orchard Knob 
swept the crest almost until the attacking column 
was upon it. Fortunately much of the enemy's fire 
was too high to do great damage. The Union color- 
bearers appeared to be running a race each in order 
to be the first to plant the Stars and Stripes upon the 
enemy's works. The palm in this contest has never 
been awarded. In point of fact, the enemy's line was 
struck at six points and very nearly at the same time. 



lyS GENERAL THOMAS. 

General Grant's anxiety at this movement with- 
out orders was quickly set at rest by the magnificent 
result, and he thus summarily disposes of the con- 
troversy in his official report : 

"These troops moved forward and drove the 
enemy from the rifle pits at the base of the ridge 
like bees from a hive ; stopped for a moment until 
the whole were in line, and commenced the ascent 
of the mountain from right to left, almost simultane- 
ously following closely the retreating enemy with 
out further orders." This does not state the case 
with sufficient clearness or with justice to the men. 
Van Home describes it very pithily and more cor- 
rectly : "The situation," he says, "offered them the 
opportunity to stand still and die, to go forward 
without orders, to stop the destructive fire to which 
they were exposed, or to retreat on the same condi- 
tion to avoid it. The men in the ranks and their 
immediate commanders chose to go forward, and they 
speedily executed one of the most brilliant assaults 
known to martial history" (Life of Thomas, p. 192). 

The scene must have formed one of the most 
remarkable pictures in battle history — the grand 
natural features, the splendid confusion of the battle 
in sights and sounds, the panorama gilded by the 
slanting rays of the autumnal sun as he sank below 
the western horizon and carried the tidings into 
other lands! The enemy's guns were turned upon 
them as they fled down the mountain-side. Many of 



THOMAS AT CHATTANOOGA. 



179 



their regiments threw down their arms. Night put 
an end to the fighting, but the victory was complete. 
By twelve o'clock all the Confederate positions 
around Chattanooga were abandoned, and their dis- 
heartened army was in rapid motion to Ringgold 
and thence to Dalton. It was, up to that time, the 
greatest and most complete victory of the war. 

The most advanced Union troops were scarcely 
on the crest of the ridge before Grant and Thomas 
were there in person. The latter did not chide them 
for their splendid disobedience of orders. He rode 
along their lines amid tumultuous cheering, and his 
biographer discloses a bit of grim humor in his ad- 
dress to one of the regiments. He told them they 
had made a fine race up the hill. One of the soldiers, 
who was as gaunt as a trained runner by reason of 
want of food for weeks before, cried out, " Yes, gen- 
eral, you have been training us for this race." 

Just then a steamer could be plainly seen upon 
the river, in the distance, under full head of steam, 
and Thomas, pointing to it, answered : " That is so ; 
but there come full rations, and in future the Army 
of the Cumberland shall have plenty to eat." 

In the meantime Burnside was sorely beleaguer- 
ed at Knoxville, and, fearing he could not hold out, 
was clamoring for support. The great success at 
Chattanooga enabled Grant to send Sherman to 
his relief, and thus to complete the bisection of the 
Confederate line between the North and the South. 
13 



l8o GENERAL THOMAS. 

The immediate pursuit of the enemy by Thomas 
was chiefly with Hooker's corps, as far as Ringgold ; 
but it was determined then to withdraw the troops 
to Chattanooga and set about careful preparation 
for the future campaign. Military men will know 
how much there was to be done before the army 
which had been engaged at Chattanooga could be 
supplied, recruited, and rested, to be ready to move 
down upon the enemy. 

In order fairly to estimate the high character of 
the services of Thomas in this eventful campaign, 
the siege and battle of Chattanooga are not to be 
considered as separated from the actions out of 
which they sprang. His work must be regarded as 
a whole, however, made up of brilliant parts, from 
the beginning of Rosecrans's movement to the field 
of Chickamauga down to the rout of the enemy on 
Missionary Ridge. Without for a moment intending 
to depreciate the merit of Grant at Chattanooga, 
without underestimating the value of the additional 
force which he ordered there, and certainly without 
undervaluing the brilliant services of subordinate 
commanders, it must be asserted that the fame of 
Thomas, already established at Chickamauga, shines 
out with added luster as the hero of the entire cam- 
paign. It has been seen that the army would have 
been lost but for him at Chickamauga. A less heroic 
commander than he would have abandoned Chatta- 
nooga as the alternative of starvation ; one with less 



THOiMAS AT CHATTANOOGA. igl 

clearness of head and forecast would have lost that 
confidence in himself which made him sure in ad- 
vance that he would win. 

On March 12, 1864, Sherman was promoted to 
the command of the Military Division of the Missis- 
sippi, Grant having been created lieutenant general 
and called to Washington. Thomas retained his 
position as chief of the Army of the Cumberland, 
and the command of the Army of the Tennessee was 
given to General James B. McPherson, a rising 
young officer of the greatest promise. 

The strained relations of Bragg with many of 
his generals, his barren victory at Chickamauga, 
and his entire defeat at Chattanooga, had caused 
him to be relieved from the command of the Con- 
federate army. It was conferred upon General 
Joseph E. Johnston, one of the finest soldiers the 
United States army had produced, and already 
greatly distinguished in the Confederate ranks. It 
must be allowed that he had a Herculean task before 
him in the regeneration of an army so thoroughly 
beaten, if not demoralized, as that of Bragg's, and in 
the potent fact that he was to fight with large odds 
against him. 

In the Southern movements which were soon to 
follow, Thomas was to play a subordinate part as 
long as he was under- Sherman's command. We 
shall see that his conduct was marked always by 
exact obedience of orders, frequently by more than 



1 82 GENERAL THOMAS. 

a subordinate's aid to the commanding general, and 
often also by flashes of striking skill in movement 
and in battle. 

Oflicers of distinction who served with Sherman 
and Thomas at this time described the great differ- 
ence and entire contrast between these two distin- 
guished men. The former was impetuous in action 
and excited in manner, while the latter was always 
dignified, quiet, and equable, regarding even sud- 
den and great emergencies with a coolness that was 
apparently apathetic, and yet rising slowly but fully 
to the "height of the great argument." Sherman 
called him his wheel horse^ by which he meant his 
strong reliance in case of emergency. . When the 
great car of battle was either in danger of being 
stalled on the uphill road, or, as was oftener the case, 
when it required the strong hold-back on the down 
hill, it was Thomas who did both. 

There was a nickname by which he was known 
at that time, which, however, had an earlier origin 
and had followed him in his army career. When he 
was instructor of cavalry and artillery at West 
Point, the cadets, who were hard riders, and the 
horses, which understood the drill just as well as the 
cadets, wanted to gallop and charge ; so when the 
command to trot was given they expected it to be 
followed by that to gallop. Then the deep and 
sonorous voice of Thomas would check their ardor 
with the order " Slow trot ! " So he was called, at 



THOMAS AT CHATTANOOGA. 183 

West Point, " Old Slow Trot," and the name followed 
him through the civil war. 

Still another endearing name was given to him. 
His pride in his command, his paternal care of his 
soldiers, and a somewhat grave and fatherly air, 
caused them to call him '' Pap Thomas " — a name 
which, connected with the command of men, speaks 
volumes. It is echoed to-day by the survivors of 
his army whenever they meet on festal occasion, 
and recall with pride and sadness their beloved old 
commander. 

General Sherman, after the victory of Chatta- 
nooga, advanced, as has been said, without a mo- 
ment's delay with the Army of the Tennessee to the 
relief of Burnside at Knoxville. He drove Long- 
street's corps away from its front, and then pro- 
ceeded to Memphis and Vicksburg. With a large 
force of twenty thousand men he was engaged at 
and around Meridian in breaking up the railroads 
which supplied the enemy. Thence, without rest, 
he repaired to Nashville to organize a force of a 
hundred thousand men with which to return and 
make the famous Atlanta campaign. His conduct 
deserves unqualified praise. 

Thomas, with the Army of the Cumberland, was 
to accompany him as far as Atlanta, and to take a 
prominent part in the curious strategy and numerous 
and bloody battles of the campaign. As the details 
of this movement upon Atlanta will be found in a 



1 84 GENERAL THOMAS. 

corresponding life of General Sherman, only so much 
of it need be repeated here as refers to the actions of 
Thomas and the movements of his army. And yet, 
as will be seen from our short sketch, the skill, valor, 
and constancy of Thomas were never more severely 
taxed than in that memorable campaign. 

For the benefit of those readers who desire a more 
detailed account, in Thomas's own words, we append 
the following : 

Extracts from General Thomas'' s Report of ChicJzamauga. 

*' September i8th. — At 4 p. m. the whole corps 
moved to the left along Chickamauga Creek to 
Crawfish Springs. On arriving at that place, received 
orders to move on the crossroad leading by Widow 
Glenn's house to the Chattanooga and Lafayette 
road, connecting with Crittenden on my right at 
Gordon's Mill. The head of the column reached 
Kelley's farm about daylight on the 19th, Baird's 
division in front, and took up a position at the forks 
of the road facing toward Reid's and Alexander's 
bridges over the Chickamauga. Colonel Wilder, 
commanding the mounted brigade of Reynolds's di- 
vision, informed me that the enemy had crossed the 
Chickamauga in force at those two bridges the evening 
before and driven his brigade across the State road, 
at Chattanooga and Lafayette road, to the heights 
east of the Widow Glenn's house. Kelley's house is 
situated in an opening about three fourths of a mile 
long and one fourth of a mile wide, on the east side 
of the State road, and stretches along that road in a 
northerly direction, with a small field of perhaps 



THOMAS AT CHATTANOOGA. 185 

twenty acres on the west side of the road, directly 
opposite the house. From thence to the Chicka- 
mauga the surface of the country is undulating, and 
covered with original forest timber interspersed with 
undergrowth, in many places so dense that it is dif- 
ficult to see fifty paces ahead. There is a cleared 
field near Jay's Mill, and cleared land in the vicinity 
of Reid's and Alexander's bridges, A narrow field 
commences at a point about a fourth of a mile south 
of Kelley's house, on the east side of the State road, 
and extends perhaps for a mile along the road to- 
ward Gordon's Mill. Between the State road and 
the foot of Missionary Ridge there is a skirt of timber 
stretching from the vicinity of Widow Glenn's house, 
south of the forks of the road, to McDaniel's house, 
three fourths of a mile north of Kelley's. The eastern 
slope of Missionary Ridge between Glenn's and Mc- 
Daniel's is cleared and mostly under cultivation. The 
position of Baird's threw my right in close proximity 
to Wilder's brigade ; the interval I intended to fill 
up with the two remaining brigades of Reynolds's 
division on their arrival. General Brannan, closely 
following Baird's division, was placed in position on 
his left, on the two roads leading from the State 
road to Reid's and Alexander's bridges. Colonel 
Dan McCook, commanding a brigade of the reserve 
corps, met me at General Baird's headquarters and 
reported to me that he had been stationed the pre- 
vious night on the road leading to Reid's bridge, and 
that he could discover no force of the enemy except 
one brigade which had crossed to the west side of 
Chickamauga at Reid's bridge the day before; and 
he believed it could be cut off, because after he had 
crossed he had destroyed the bridge, the enemy hav- 



1 86 GENERAL THOMAS. 

ing retired toward Alexander's bridge. Upon this 
information I directed General Brannan to post a 
brigade within supporting distance of Baird on the 
road to Alexander's bridge, and with his other two 
brigades to reconnoiter the road leading to Reid's 
bridge to see if he could locate the brigade reported 
by Colonel McCook, and, if a favorable opportunity 
occurred, to capture it. His dispositions were made 
according to instructions by 9 a. m. General Baird 
was nearly in line with Brannan, but to watch well 
on his right flank. Soon after this disposition of 
these two divisions a portion of Palmer's division, 
of Crittenden's corps, took position to the right of 
General Baird's division. About ten o'clock Crox- 
ton's brigade, of Brannan's division, posted on the 
road leading to Alexander's bridge, became engaged 
with the enemy, and I rode forward to his position 
to ascertain the character of the attack. Colonel 
Croxton reported to me that he had driven the enemy 
nearly half a mile, but that he was then meeting with 
obstinate resistance. I then rode back to Baird's 
position and directed him to advance to Croxton's 
support, which he did with his whole division. Stark- 
weather's brigade in reserve, and drove the enemy 
steadily before him for some distance, taking many 
prisoners. Croxton's brigade, which had been heavi- 
ly engaged for over an hour with greatly superior 
numbers of the enemy and being nearly exhausted 
of ammunition, was then moved to the rear to en- 
able the men to fill up their boxes; and Baird and 
Brannan, having united their forces, drove the enemy 
from their immediate front. General Baird then 
halted for the purpose of readjusting his line, and 
learning from prisoners that the enemy were in heavy 



THOMAS AT CHATTANOOGA. jg/ 

force on his immediate right, he threw back his 
right wing in order to be ready for an attack from 
that quarter. Before his dispositions could be com- 
pleted the enemy in overwhelming numbers furiously 
assaulted Scribner's and King's brigades and drove 
them in disorder. Fortunately, at this time John- 
son's division, of McCook's corps, and Reynolds's 
division, of my corps, arrived and were immediately 
placed in position ; Johnson preceding Reynolds, 
his left connecting with Baird's right, and Palmer 
being immediately on Johnson's right, Reynolds was 
placed on the right of Palmer, with one brigade of 
his division in reserve. As soon as formed, they ad- 
vanced upon the enemy, attacking him in flank and 
driving him in great confusion for a mile and a half, 
while Brannan's troops met them in front as they 
were pursuing Baird's retiring brigades, drivmg the 
head of his column back and retaking the artillery 
which had been temporarily lost by Baird's brigades, 
the Ninth Ohio recovering Battery H, Fifth United 
States Artillery, at the point of the bayonet. The 
enemy, at this time being hardly pressed by Johnson, 
Palmer, and Reynolds in flank, fell back in confusion 
upon his reserves, posted in a strong position on the 
west side of Chickamauga Creek, between Reid's 
and Alexander's bridges. Brannan and Baird were 
then ordered to reorganize their commands and 
take position on commanding ground on the road 
from McDaniel's to Reid's bridge, and hold it to 
the last extremity, as I expected the next effort 
of the enemy would be to gain that road and our 
rear. This was about 2 p. m. After a lull of about 
one hour a furious attack was made upon Reynolds's 
right, and he having called upon me for re-enforce- 



1 88 GENERAL THOMAS. 

ments, I directed Brannan's division to move to his 
support, leaving King's brigade, of Baird's division, 
to hold the position at which Baird and Brannan had 
been posted, the balance of Baird's division closing 
up to the right of Johnson's division. It will be 
seen by General Reynolds's report that Croxton's bri- 
gade, of Brannan's division, reached his right just in 
time to defeat the enemy's effort to turn Reynolds's 
right and rear. About 5 p. m., my lines being at that 
time very much extended pursuing the enemy, I de- 
termined to concentrate them on more commanding 
ground, as I felt confident that we should have a 
renewal of the battle the next morning. I rode for- 
ward to General Johnson's position and designated 
to him where to place his division ; also to General 
Baird, who was present with Johnson. I then rode 
back to the crossroads to locate Palmer and Rey- 
nolds on Johnson's right, and on the crest of the 
ridge, about five hundred yards east of the State 
road. Soon after. Palmer and Reynolds got their 
positions; and while Brannan was getting his, on 
the ridge to the west of the State road, near Dyer's 
house, to the rear and right of Reynolds, where I had 
ordered him as a reserve, the enemy assaulted first 
Johnson and then Baird in a most furious manner, 
producing some confusion ; but order was soon re- 
stored and the enemy repulsed in fine style, after 
which these two divisions took up the positions as- 
signed to them for the night. Before adjusting the 
line satisfactorily I received an order to report to 
department headquarters immediately, and was ab- 
sent from my command until near midnight. After 
my return from department headquarters, and about 
2 A.M. on the 20th, I received a report from Gen- 



THOMAS AT CHATTANOOGA. 189 

eral Baird that the left of his division did not rest 
on the Reid's bridge road, as I had intended, and 
that he could not reach it without weakening his 
line too much. I immediately addressed a note to 
the general commanding, requesting that General 
Negley be sent me to take position on General 
Baird's left and rear, and thus secure our left from 
assault. During the night the troops threw up tem- 
porary breastworks of logs and prepared for the en- 
counter which all anticipated would come off the 
next day. Although informed by note from General 
Rosecrans's headquarters that Negley's division 
would be sent immediately to take post on my left, 
it had not arrived at 7 a. m. on the 20th, and I sent 
Captain Willard, of my staff, to General Negley to 
urge him forward as rapidly as possible, and to point 
out his position to him. General Negley, in his 
official report, mentions that he received this order 
through Captain Willard at 8 a. m. on the 20th, and 
that he immediately commenced withdrawing his 
division for that purpose, when the enemy was re- 
ported to be massing a heavy force in his front, 
sharply engaging his skirmishers, and that he was 
directed by General Rosecrans to hold his position 
until relieved by some other command. General 
Beatty's brigade, however, was sent under guidance 
of Captain Willard, who took it to its position, and 
it went into action immediately. The enemy at that 
time commenced a furious assault on Baird's left, 
and partially succeeded in gaining his rear. Beatty, 
meeting with superior numbers, was compelled to 
fall back until relieved by the fire of several regi- 
ments of Palmer's reserve, which I had ordered to 
the support of the left, being placed in position by 



90 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



General Baircl, and which regiments, with the co-op- 
eration of Van Deveer's brigade, of Brannan's divi- 
sion, and a portion of Stanley's brigade, of Negley's 
division, drove the enemy entirely from Baird's left 
and rear. General Baird being still hardly pressed 
in front, I ordered General Wood, who had just re- 
ported to me in person, to send one of the brigades 
of his division to General Baird. He replied that 
his division had been ordered by General Rosecrans 
to support Reynolds's right, but that if I would take 
the responsibility of changing his orders he would 
cheerfully obey them, and sent Barnes's brigades, 
the head of which had just reached my position. 
General Wood then left me to rejoin the remainder 
of his division, which was still coming up. To pre- 
vent a repetition of this attack on the part of the 
enemy, I directed Captain Gaw, chief topographical 
officer of my staff, to go to the commanding officer 
of the troops on the left and rear of Baird's and di- 
rect him to mass as much artillery on the slopes 
of Missionary Ridge west of the State road as he 
could conveniently spare from his lines, supported 
strongly by infantry, so as to sweep the ground to 
the left and rear of Baird's position. This order 
General Negley in his official report mentions having 
received through Captain Gaw, but, from his descrip- 
tion of the position he assumed, he must have mis- 
understood my order, and, instead of massing the ar- 
tillery near Baird's left, it was posted on the right of 
Brannan's division, nearly in rear of Reynolds's right. 
At the time the assault just described was made on 
Baird the enemy attacked Johnson, Palmer, and Rey- 
nolds with equal fierceness, which was continued at 
least two hours, making assault after assault with fresh 



THOMAS AT CHATTANOOGA. i^j 

troops, which were met by our troops with a most 
determined coolness and deliberation. The enemy 
having exhausted his utmost energies to dislodge us, 
he apparently fell back entirely from our front, and 
we were not disturbed again until near night, after 
the withdrawal of the troops to Rossville had com- 
menced. Just before the repulse of the enemy on 
our left General Beatty came to me for fresh troops 
in person, stating that most of those I had sent to 
him had gone back to the rear and right, and he was 
anxious to get at least another brigade before they 
attacked him again. I immediately sent Captain 
Kellogg to hurry up General Sheridan, whose division, 

1 had been informed, would be sent to me. About 

2 p. M., hearing heavy firing to my right and rear 
through the woods, very soon after Captain Kellogg 
left me, I turned in that direction and was riding to 
the slope of the hill in my rear to ascertain the cause. 
Just as I passed out of the woods bordering the 
State road I met Captain Kellogg returning, who 
reported to me that in attempting to reach General 
Sheridan he had met a large force in an open corn- 
field to the rear of Reynolds's position, advancing 
cautiously, with a strong line of skirmishers thrown 
out to their front, and that they had fired on him and 
forced him to return. He had reported this to 
Colonel Harker, commanding a brigade of Wood's 
division, posted on a ridge a short distance to the 
rear of Reynolds's position, who also saw this force 
advancing, but, with Captain Kellogg, was of the 
opinion that they might be Sheridan's troops coming 
to our assistance. I rode forward to Colonel 
Harker's position and told him that, although I was 
expecting Sheridan from that direction, if these 



192 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



troops fired on him, seeing his flags, he must return 
their fire and resist their further advance. He im- 
mediately ordered his skirmishers to commence 
firing, and took up a position with his brigade on 
the crest of a hill a short distance to his right and 
rear, placing his right in connection with Brannan's 
division and portions of Beatty's and Stanley's bri- 
gades, of Negley's division, which had been retired to 
that point from the left, as circumstantially narrated 
in the report of General John Beatty and Colonel 
Stanley. I then rode to the east of the hill referred 
to above. On my way I met General Wood, who 
confirmed me in the opinion that the troops ad- 
vancing upon us were the enemy, although we were 
not then aware of the disaster to the right and 
center of our army. I then directed them to place 
his division on the prolongation of Brannan's, who, 
I had ascertained from Hood, was on the top of the 
hill above referred to, and to resist the further ad- 
vance of the enemy as long as possible. I sent my 
aid. Captain Kellogg, to notify General Reynolds 
that our right had been turned and that the enemy 
was in his rear and in force. General Wood barely 
had time to dispose his troops on the left of Bran- 
nan before another of those fierce assaults, similar 
to those made in the morning on my lines, was made 
on him and Brannan combined, and kept up by the 
enemy throwing in fresh troops as fast as those in 
their front were driven back until nightfall. About 
the time that Wood took up his position Gen- 
eral Gordon Granger appeared on my left flank 
at the head of Steedman's division of his corps. 
I immediately dispatched a staff officer — Captain 
Johnson, Second Indiana Cavalry, of Negley's 



THOMAS AT CHATTANOOGA. 103 

division — to him with orders to push forward and 
take position on Brannan's right, which order was 
complied with with the greatest promptness and 
alacrity, Steedman moving his division into posi- 
tion with almost as much precision as if on drill, 
and fighting his way to the crest of the hill on 
Brannan's right, moved forward his artillery and 
drove the enemy down the southern slope, inflicting 
on him a most terrible loss in killed and wounded. 
This opportune arrival of fresh troops revived the 
flagging spirits of our men on the right and inspired 
them with new ardor for the contest. Every assault 
of the enemy from that time until nightfall was re- 
pulsed in the most gallant style by the whole line. 
By this time the ammunition in the boxes of the men 
was reduced on an average to two or three rounds 
per man, and my ammunition trains having been 
unfortunately ordered to the rear by some unauthor- 
ized person, we should have been entirely without 
ammunition in a very short time had not a small 
supply come up with General Steedman's command. 
This being distributed among the troops gave them 
about ten rounds per man. General Garfield, chief 
of staff of General Rosecrans, reached this position 
about 4 p. M., in company with Lieutenant-Colonel 
Thruston, of McCook's staff, and Captains Gaw and 
Barker, of my staff, who had been sent to the rear to 
bring back the ammunition if possible. General 
Garfield gave me the first reliable information that 
the right and center of our own army had been 
driven, and of its condition at that time. I soon 
after received a dispatch from General Rosecrans 
directing me to assume command of all forces, and 
with Crittenden and McCook take a strong position 



194 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



and assume a threatening attitude at Rossville, send- 
ing the unorganized forces to Chattanooga for reor- 
ganization, stating that he would examine the ground 
at Chattanooga and then join me; also that he had 
sent out rations and ammunition to meet me at 
Rossville. I determined to hold the position until 
nightfall if possible, in the meantime sending Cap- 
tains Barker and Kellogg to distribute the ammuni- 
tion, Major Lawrence, my chief of artillery, having 
been previously sent to notify the different com- 
manders that ammunition would be supplied them 
shortly. As soon as they reported the distribution 
of the ammunition I directed Captain Willard to in- 
form the division commanders to prepare to with- 
draw their commands as soon as they received or- 
ders. At 5.30 p. M. Captain Barker, commanding 
my escort, was sent to notify General Reynolds to 
commence the movement, and I left the position be- 
hind General Wood's command to meet Reynolds 
and point out to him the position where I wished 
him to form line to cover the retirement of the other 
troops on the left. In passing through an open 
woods bordering on the State road, and between my 
last and Reynolds's position, I was cautioned by a 
couple of soldiers, who had been to hunt water, 
that there was a large rebel force in these woods 
drawn up in line and advancing toward me. Just at 
this time I saw the head of Reynolds's column ap- 
proaching, and calling to the general himself, di- 
rected him to form line perpendicular to the State 
road, changing the head of his column to the left 
with his right resting on that road, and to charge 
the enemy who were then in his immediate front. 
This movement was made with the utmost prompti- 



THOMAS AT CHATTANOOGA. 



95 



tude, and, facing to the right while on the march, 
Turchin threw his brigade upon the rebel force, 
routing them and driving them in utter confusion, 
entirely beyond Baird's left. In this splendid ad- 
vance more than two hundred prisoners were cap- 
tured and sent to the rear. Colonel Robinson, com- 
manding the Twentieth Brigade, Reynolds's division, 
followed closely upon Turchin, and I posted him on 
the road leading through the ridge, to hold the 
ground while the troops on our right and left passed 
by. In a few moments General Willich, command- 
ing a brigade of Johnson's division, reported to me 
that his brigade was in position on a commanding 
piece of ground to the right of the ridge road. I 
directed him to report to General Reynolds and as- 
sist in covering the retirement of the troops. Tur- 
chin's brigade, after driving the enemy a mile and a 
half, was reassembled, and took its position on the 
ridge road with Robinson and Willich. These dis- 
positions being made, I sent orders to Generals Wood, 
Brannan, and Granger to withdraw from their posi- 
tions. Johnson's and Baird's divisions were at- 
tacked at the moment of retiring, but, by being pre- 
pared, retired without confusion or any serious 
losses. General Palmer was also attacked while re- 
tiring. Gross's brigade was thrown into some con- 
fusion, but Cruft's brigade came off in good style, 
both, however, with little loss. I then proceeded to 
Rossville, accompanied by General Garfield and 
Gordon Granger, and immediately prepared to place 
the troops in position at that point. One brigade 
of Negley's division was posted in the gap on the 
Ringgold road, and two brigades on the top of the 
ridge, to the right of the road, adjoining the bri- 
14 



196 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



gade in the road ; Reynolds's division on the right of 
Negley's and reaching to the Dry Valley road ; 
Brannan's division in the rear of Reynolds's right as 
a reserve; McCook's corps on the right of the Dry 
Valley road and stretching toward the west, his 
right reaching nearly to Chattanooga Creek. Crit- 
tenden's entire corps was posted on the heights to 
the left of the Ringgold road, with Steedman's divi- 
sion, of Granger's corps, in reserve behind his left, 
Baird's division in reserve and in supporting dis- 
tance of the brigade in the gap. McCook's brigade, 
of Granger's corps, was also posted as a reserve to 
the brigade of Negley's on the top of the ridge, to the 
right of the road. Minty's brigade of cavalry was 
on the Ringgold road about one mile and a half in 
advance of the gap. About 10 a. m. on the 21st re- 
ceived a message from Minty that the enemy were 
advancing on him with a strong force of cavalry 
and infantry. I directed him to retire through the 
gap and post his command on our left flank, and 
throw out strong reconnoitering parties across the 
ridge to observe and report any movements of the 
enemy on our left front. From information received 
from citizens, I was convinced that the position was 
untenable in the face of the odds we had opposed to 
us, as the enemy could easily concentrate upon our 
right flank, which, if driven, would expose our center 
and left to be cut entirely off from our communica- 
tions. I therefore advised the commanding general 
to concentrate the troops at Chattanooga. About 
the time I made the suggestion to withdraw, the 
enemy made a demonstration in the direct road, but 
were soon repulsed. In anticipation of this order to 
concentrate at Chattanooga, I sent for the corps 



THOMAS AT CHATTANOOGA. 



197 



commanders and gave such general instructions as 
would enable them to prepare their commands for 
making the movement without confusion. All wag- 
ons, ambulances, and surplus artillery carriages were 
sent to the rear before night. The order for the 
withdrawal being received about 6 p. m., the move- 
ment commenced at 9 p. m. in the following order: 
Strong skirmish lines, under the direction of judi- 
cious officers, were thrown out to the front of each 
division to cover this movement, with directions to 
retire at daylight, deployed and in supporting dis- 
tance, the whole to be supported by the First Divi- 
sion, Fourteenth Army Corps, under the superintend- 
ence of Major-General Rousseau, assisted by Minty's 
brigade of cavalry, which was to follow after the 
skirmishers. Crittenden's corps was to move from 
the mills to the left of the road at 9 a. m., followed 
by Steedman's division. Next, Negley's division was 
to withdraw at 10 p. m., then Reynolds's, McCook's 
corps, by divisions from left to right, moving within 
supporting distance one after the other. Brannan's 
was posted at 6 p. m. on the road about half way 
between Rossville and Chattanooga to cover the 
movement. The troops were withdrawn in a quiet, 
orderly manner, without the loss of a single man, 
and by 7 a. m. on the 22d were in their positions in 
front of Chattanooga, which had been assigned to 
them previous to their arrival and which they now 
occupied, covered by strong intrenchments thrown 
up on the day of our arrival and strengthened from 
day to day until they were considered sufficiently 
strong for all defensive purposes. I respectfully re- 
fer you to the reports of division, brigade, and regi- 
mental commanders for the names of those of their 



igS GENERAL THOMAS. 

respective commands who distinguished themselves. 
Among them I am much gratified to find the names 
of Colonel F. Van Deveer, Thirty-fifth Ohio, com- 
manding Third Brigade, and Colonel John T. Crox- 
ton. Fourth Kentucky, commanding Second Bri- 
gade, Brannan's division, both of whom I saw on Sat- 
urday, and can confirm the reports given of them by 
their division commander. Colonel B. F. Scribner, 
Thirty-eighth Indiana, commanding First Brigade, 
Baird's division, was on the right of that division on 
Saturday morning, when it was attacked in flank by 
an overwhelming force of the enemy and driven 
back ; yet Colonel Scribner was enabled to rally and 
reorganize it without the least difficulty as soon as 
supported by Johnson's division." 



CHAPTER X. 

THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 

Shemian moves troops from Vicksburg and Memphis — The Merid- 
ian campaign — Destruction of railroads — Forward to Atlanta 
— The turning of Dalton — Advance upon Resaca — The Eto- 
wah — The Allatoona Pass — Dallas — New Hope Church — 
Kenesaw Mountain — Turning and capture of Marietta — Peach 
Tree Creek — Lme of the Chattahoochee abandoned — Siege 
and battles of Atlanta — Johnston superseded by Hood — Mc- 
Pherson killed — Howard takes his place — Battle of Jonesboro 
— Atlanta abandoned and occupied — Sherman destroys it and 
drives out its inhabitants — The general order of Thomas. 

After a partial pursuit of the enemy as far as 
Ringgold, Thomas had returned to Chattanooga 
and had set about the task of preparing the Army of 
the Cumberland and getting it into perfect con- 
dition to take the field, molding it into what it in- 
deed became — one of the thunderbolts of the war. 
It comprised fifty-four thousand infantry, six thou- 
sand cavalry, and a hundred and thirty guns. 
These, with the other contingents of Sherman's 
command, formed a force of ninety-nine thousand 
men with which to open the new campaign. To 
put these into perfect condition and to strengthen 
the communications had required six months; they 



200 GENERAL THOMAS. 

were in readiness on the ist of May, 1864. During 
this time portions of Thomas's army were employed 
on divers duties in East Tennessee. From the date 
of the battle of Chattanooga until the month of 
May there was thus constant activity throughout 
the division of the Mississippi in preparation for the 
great spring movement, the plan of which was being 
excogitated by the authorities under the advice of 
Grant, who was now in Virginia, and made his head- 
quarters with the Army of the Potomac. Prelimi- 
nary to that plan it was essential to keep open and 
unobstructed the course of the Mississippi River, 
and by destroying the enemy's communications to 
interfere with his Eastern movements. The main 
forces with which these objects would be accom- 
plished were McPherson's Seventeenth Corps, then 
at Vicksburg, and Hurlburt's Sixteenth, which was 
at Memphis. Very little more need be said of the 
famous " Meridian Raid " — the details of which will 
be elsewhere given — than is necessary to understand 
its bearings upon the Atlanta campaign soon to be 
entered upon. 

Leaving things in and around Chattanooga 
under the control of General Thomas, Sherman, 
having had a conference with Grant, went to Mem- 
phis and Vicksburg, and after careful preparation 
started on the 3d of February from the latter place, 
with about ten thousand men from the two corps 
just mentioned and a large contingent of cavalry 



THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 201 

under General William Sooy Smith. The objective 
point was Meridian, a railroad center of vital im- 
portance to the Confederates. The Mobile and 
Ohio Railroad and the Southern Mississippi Rail- 
road intersect each other there. Overcoming all 
obstructions which had been put in his path, he 
captured the town and destroyed it entirely, with all 
the engines, running stock, mills, and workshops. 
For a considerable distance in every direction the 
railroad tracks and bridges were destroyed. It was 
rapid and complete desolation. In seventeen days 
he had broken up a hundred and fifty miles of track, 
and ten days later he was back at Vicksburg. 

It should be observed, in passing, that one object 
at least of Banks's disastrous Red River expedition 
was to make a diversion in Sherman's favor, while 
Farragut's threatening aspect toward Mobile, which 
issued in its capture during the following summer, 
satisfied both Grant and Sherman that the new and 
far-reaching movement he was about to enter upon 
would not be imperiled from those directions. He 
would have but one army to fight, and that in his 
immediate front. In the meantime large quantities 
of provisions, munitions, and other stores had been 
collected at Chattanooga, and all the troops des- 
tined for the new campaign were ordered to con- 
centrate there on April 27th. By May 6th they 
were all in position and ready to march southward, 
Atlanta being the objective point. The work being 



202 GENERAL THOMAS. 

thus in complete readiness, Sherman went to Nash- 
ville to meet and confer with General Grant, and 
thence he proceeded to Chattanooga. His army 
was thus disposed, and the following was its exact 
composition : The Fourth Corps, General Howard ; 
the Fourteenth, General John M. Palmer ; the Twen- 
tieth, General Hooker. The division commanders 
of the Fourth were Stanley, Newton, and T. J. 
Wood; of the Fourteenth, R, W. Johnson, J. C. 
Davis, and A. Baird ; of the Twentieth, Alpheus 
Williams, J. W. Geary, and Daniel Butterfield. The 
Army of the Tennessee, under General McPher- 
son, was near Lee and Gordon's Mills. It con- 
tained twenty-four thousand men and ninety-six 
guns. The Army of the Ohio, under General 
Schofield, was near Red Clay ; it numbered thirteen 
thousand men and twenty-eight guns. The Army of 
the Cumberland, under General Thomas, was sta- 
tioned near Ringgold ; it was, as has been said, 
sixty thousand strong, with a hundred and thirty 
guns and a large cavalry force. Thus it will be 
seen that General Sherman was about to move south 
with a force of ninety-nine thousand men and two 
hundre4 and fifty guns.* 

* The enemy's force upon which Sherman was to move, 
which would block his pathway at every point and resist his 
advance, consisted of forty thousand men, divided into three coi-ps, 
under Hardee, Hood, and Polk, with about four thousand cavalty 
under Wheeler. General Johnston had been urgent for re-en- 
forcements with which to take the initiative, but they did not 



THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 203 

The first strong point which threatened their ad- 
vance was Dalton. It was now to be seen whether 
the new rebel commander, General Joseph E. John- 
ston, would content himself with the defensive, or 
would have the temerity of attempting to retake 
Chattanooga. In order to unveil the enemy's pur- 
pose, Thomas, acting under instructions from Sher- 
man, had made a demonstration in force upon 
Rocky Face, which is split in two by Buzzard's 
Roost Gap. As the railroad line passed through the 
gap it seemed to open a gateway to Dalton, but it 
was found so strongly fortified that a direct assault 
would be very injudicious, and the troops were with- 
drawn. Then began that system of turnings which 
forms the principal feature of the Atlanta campaign. 

McPherson was ordered to move by Ship's Gap 
and Villanow and thence through Snake Creek Gap, 
and to threaten Resaca, Thus Dalton w^ould be 
taken in rear, and its garrison must either retreat or 
be cut off. With regard to the movement by Snake 
Creek Gap, it should be clearly observed that Gen- 
eral Thomas saw the situation better than General 
Sherman. When the feint was made upon Buzzard's 
Roost and it was determined to move through Snake 

come. His sole recourse during the entire campaign seems to 
have been a masterly and skillful retreat^a sad necessity, for an 
army that is always fighting in retreat forgets how to advance. 
Let it be said, however, just here, that, in the opinion of military 
men, Johnston displayed in that protracted retreat the finest 
qualities of a soldier and a general. 



204 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



Creek Gap, the propositions of Thomas were, first, 
to be permitted to move with his larger corps which 
would have assured success, or, secondly, to re- 
enforce McPherson by Hooker's corps. Neither of 
these suggestions was accepted by Sherman, and 
consequently the movement made by McPherson's 
weaker force was not successful ; but Sherman, who 
repaired his errors quite as rapidly as he made them, 
then sent his whole army through Snake Creek Gap 
and accomplished the turning movement which might 
have been made by a single corps, leaving the rest 
to march directly down upon the enemy. 

To be a little more precise, the turning of Dalton 
was on this wise : On the loth of May General Scho- 
field marched directly from the North upon the de- 
fenses of the town. Thomas again made a strong 
demonstration upon Buzzard's Roost Gap, while 
McPherson was threatening the Southern gaps. The 
result was immediate. Johnston abandoned Dalton 
and fell back upon Resaca, and so the keynote was 
struck for the rest of the campaign. We anticipate 
in saying that all the Confederate positions were 
turned, one after another, not without severe fight- 
ing, however, until Atlanta was captured. 

On the 14th of May Johnston was strongly 
fortified at Resaca. Here the process was repeated. 
A pontoon bridge was laid at Lay's Ferry to the 
west and in rear of Resaca, by which the Oostenaula 
River could be crossed and the railroad cut in rear 



THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 



205 



of Resaca, at Calhoun, only five miles distant. An 
attack was made in front on the same day by 
McPherson, which was unsuccessful, and Johnston 
now made a counter attack with great vigor against 
Thomas and Schofield, who formed the left of 
Sherman's army. The battle was fierce from three 
o'clock until ten that night. The losses in the 
Union army during these two days were nearly five 
thousand men, while those of the enemy, fighting 
for the most part under cover, were twenty-five 
hundred. After a final and unsuccessful attempt to 
turn Sherman's left, Johnston was obliged to retreat 
again on the 15th, and, crossing the Oostenaula, he 
moved rapidly to the passage of the Etowah River, 
over which the railroad passes, at a town of the 
same name — Etowah. This was a practical aban- 
donment also of Rome and Kingston. 

Th(5 Union army marched relentlessly down at 
his very heels, giving him no rest — Thomas by the 
direct road, McPherson by Lay's Ferry, and Scho- 
field by roads to the left. But he frequently turned 
upon his pursuers. There was incessant fighting in 
retreat through Cassville and Kingston, at the latter 
of which was the main body of Johnston's force, 
posted to the west to oppose these turning move- 
ments. Kingston was selected as ground where he 
could advantageously give battle and defend the 
line of the Etowah. Every step farther south ren- 
dered the fate of Atlanta more doubtful. 



2o6 GENERAL THOMAS. 

What Johnston might have accomphshed had 
there been concord and harmony in his ranks it is 
difficult to say; but, handicapped as he already was, 
there now appeared an enemy in his camp as dan- 
gerous and more insidious than the Union army ; 
the dissensions among his generals approached in- 
subordination. Plood and Polk received his instruc- 
tions so coldly, and executed them so reluctantly, 
that his best schemes fell to the ground. 

If he selected a field for battle, he was met with 
the words, "This is no place to make a stand." If 
he ordered a concerted movement, he saw that it 
would fail for want of concert, and so, reluctantly, 
he abandoned his own purposes, because he saw that 
without concord and harmony they could not suc- 
ceed. When he found that he must give up the 
scheme of fighting at Kingston, a ground which 
certainly presented great advantages to his con- 
centrated force, he sadly issued orders for the cross- 
ing of the Etowah River, burned his stores at Car- 
tersville, on the railroad just north of Etowah, and 
again concentrated his forces at Allatoona Pass, five 
miles to the south. It will be kept in mind that his 
line of march had been along the railroad which 
runs through Kingston, Cartersville, and Allatoona 
Pass to Marietta. There had been conflicts, some 
of them quite severe, in different parts of this thea- 
ter by detached forces, but Johnston's main body 
awaited Sherman at Allatoona Pass, while a consid- 



THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 



207 



arable detachment proceeded to fortify New Hope 
Church and Dallas, which lie among hilly knobs 
about ten miles west of Marietta.* Sherman's strat- 
egy continued the same ; he was to resort again to 
the turning process, and Johnston did his best to 
block his way. The Union division of Jefferson C. 
Davis had as a precautionary measure occupied 
Rome, capturing the forts, mills, and heavy guns. 
From the inception of the movement down to this 
time there had been incessant fighting. All portions 
of Sherman's army had been engaged. He now 
gave them a needed rest of a few days before ad- 
vancing upon New Hope Church, where Hood with 
a very large force was strongly fortified. 

The relative numbers of the two opposing armies 
were as two to one — the three armies commanded 
by Sherman numbering about a hundred thousand 
men. But the disparity was somewhat neutralized 
by the fact that Johnston was not only on the inte- 
rior line, but that he had the choice of positions in 
his efforts to obstruct Sherman's Southern move- 
ments and resist his attacks. 

It was therefore the policy of the Union general 

* On the 25th of May Thomas marched his corps by four 
roads converging upon Dallas, and so timely were his movements 
that, when Geary's advance was strongly resisted, abundant re- 
enforcements were at hand. We may pause to observe that, so 
severe had been the fighting in the Army of the Cumberland, that 
during the month of May alone it had lost over a thousand killed 
and nearly seven thousand wounded. 



2o8 GENERAL THOMAS. 

to turn his positions, and as far as possible to force 
him to attack if he declined to retreat. Both of the 
generals performed their allotted tasks remarkably 
well. 

We thus reach the next great step in the cam- 
paign, which was the turning of the Allatoona Pass. 
The same tactics were employed as before : strongly 
threatening the enemy in front while making a cir- 
cuit still more strongly to the right. On the 12th of 
May, in pursuance of this plan, McPherson moved 
directly upon Resaca. The army of Thomas fol- 
lowed him, but was soon deflected to the Confeder- 
ate left; and following the Dalton and Calhoun road, 
they came up to connect on McPherson's right. 
Schofield with the Army of the Ohio moved still far- 
ther to the right and came into line on Thomas's 
right. The operations of Johnston were just the 
converse. He made a desperate effort to turn the 
left of Schofield. For a brief space it seemed as if 
his attack on Williams's division would be success- 
ful; but it failed. And so on the night of the 15th 
of May Johnston abandoned Resaca, which was oc- 
cupied the next morning by Thomas with the Army 
of the Cumberland. 

Not a minute was lost. On the 17th Thomas 
moved forward with the divisions of Palmer and 
Hooker; the Army of the Tennessee marched on his 
right in echelon, the Army of the Ohio on the left 
moving in full force upon Kingston and threatening 



THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 209 

the railroad. Never was a general more beset and 
hampered than Johnston. He would have given 
battle at Cassville, and Hardee was in favor of doing 
so, but Polk and Hood both opposed it, and John- 
ston therefore abandoned the idea, crossed the Eto- 
wah River, and fell back upon AUatoona Pass. 
There at least the Confederate generals agreed in 
their councils. They would defend Dallas to the 
last extremity. 

On the 25th of May the Union army moved, 
Thomas in advance. They marched by four roads, 
and their celerity was such that they saved the 
bridge over Pumpkin Vine Creek. Pushing on to 
New Hope Church, they found the enemy very 
strongly intrenched both there and at Dallas, Har- 
dee on their left, Hood on the right, and Polk in the 
center. At the church was fought one of the most 
terrible battles of the war. The aim of the enemy 
was to turn the Union left, and so the troops were 
rapidly moved to re-enforce that portion of the field. 
For a time Cleburne almost succeeded in turning 
Wood's division on the left. The battle raged with 
apparently doubtful results, but, under cover of a 
fierce evening attack on McPherson, Johnston, fear- 
ing lest the railroad should be struck, again retired, 
and so AUatoona Pass was turned. 

It was indeed high time to give the troops a little 
additional rest, at least from actual fighting. It was 
now the 5th of June, and no movement was made 



2IO GENERAL THOMAS. 

until the loth. The railroad was repaired ; the 
bridge over the Etowah was rebuilt; AUatoona Pass 
was fortified and made a temporary base of supplies. 
Additional comfort as well as strength was afforded 
by the arrival of General Blair, on the 9th of June, 
with nine thousand additional men. 

But notwithstanding the success thkt had attend- 
ed the Union arms thus far, a more difficult struggle 
was awaiting them not far distant. Johnston occu- 
pied a very strong position in front of Marietta. 
The ridge of the Kenesaw Mountains is made up of 
connected conical peaks with outlying spurs. The 
chief of these latter are Pine and Lost Mountains. 
The position is one of the most difficult to assault 
which can be conceived. There were continuous 
high fortifications on Pine and Lost Mountains, 
and Gilgath Church on the railroad was also 
strongly fortified. The terrain was intersected by 
ravines, rendering approach to the fortifications 
particularly difficult ; but Sherman was not intimi- 
dated by them. Thomas moved directly to the 
front, while McPherson attempted to turn Kenesaw. 
Again a severe contest took place, for Johnston had 
contracted his line and met the advance of Thomas 
with a very strong force. The fighting was desper- 
ate on both sides. Newton and Wood brought their 
divisions very near to the enemy's works. At 3 p. m. 
Hood made an attack in triple line, his troops loudly 
shouting as they advanced. It was repulsed by a 



THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 211 

tremendous artillery fire from the Union line ; but 
the carnage was great. It was then that Thomas, 
with his usual sagacity, suggested that McPherson 
should advance at once to the attack of Marietta, 
which was covered by these strong fortifications. 

On the 14th of June, General Polk was killed 
while inspecting his troops on the front line. It was 
by the second shot fired from a rifled section of the 
Fifth Indiana Battery, which exploded in a group 
of Confederate officers. Our signal men deciphered 
at once the signal made from Pine Mountain to 
Marietta. — " Send our ambulance for General Polk's 
body." General Johnston thereupon abandoned Lost 
Mountain and contracted his lines. There was un- 
ceasing fire on the picket line, notwithstanding the 
incessant rain. Sherman now determined to assault 
Kenesaw Mountain. But the objection of Thomas, 
" to butting against breastworks twelve feet thick, 
strengthened by abatis," proved to be sound judg- 
ment, for the attack on Kenesaw failed signally, and 
once more resort was had to the turning process. 
That was successful as before. 

On the 3d of July Johnston abandoned Kenesaw 
and left Marietta to be occupied by the Union troops. 
At 8 A. M. on the 3d of July Thomas was in Marietta, 
and rapid preparations were made for a combined 
movement against the enemy at Atlanta. 

The Chattahoochee River flows in front of At- 
lanta, four or five miles distant. A very strong fete-de- 
15 



212 GENERAL THOMAS. 

pont covers the railroad crossing on that stream near 
Peach Tree Creek. The main stream and this tribu- 
tary form, therefore, a very strong line protecting the 
railroad. 

It Vv^ill be kept in mind that the constant object of 
Johnston was to neutralize the superior numbers of 
Sherman, vi^hile the purpose of the latter was to over- 
whelm his adversary by these greater numbers ; and 
this was best done by the tactics already so success- 
fully employed. This time the first step in the turn- 
ing process was by the Union left. Schofield crossed 
the river above Peach Tree Creek and made a strong 
demonstration on Johnston's right flank, the result 
of which was inevitable. The Confederate general 
abandoned the Chattahoochee and fell back upon 
Atlanta. 

Dire was the consternation in that devoted city 
and throughout the South. The inhabitants of At- 
lanta had fondly hoped that, whatever other defenses 
might fail, the Chattahoochee was a magic line which 
could not be passed. But the circle of the hunt was 
being reduced to its center. Sherman crossed the 
river in two places. Schofield was at Decatur, fol- 
lowed closely by McPherson, and Thomas had passed 
the boasted line of Peach Tree Creek. 

This last Confederate disaster exhausted the pa- 
tience of their authorities. It was at this critical 
moment that Mr. Davis resolved upon what proved 
to be a fatal change of commanders. By order of 



THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 213 

July 17th Johnston was relieved of the command, and 
Hood was put in his place. 

Apart from the application of the Western prov- 
erb, " It's no time to think of swapping horses," the 
change was in itself a mistaken one, Johnston was 
a model soldier and an excellent general. Hood was 
a fine solder too, but a very poor general. Johnston 
was expected to perform impossibilities, and when he 
failed Mr. Davis turned in desperation to the fiercest 
fighting man in that army. Thus it was that Hood's 
dashing valor was an element of weakness. I only 
express my own honest judgment. I am aware that 
there are many who think that the change was wise, 
and that the choice of Hood, with an active aggres- 
sive policy, presented the only chance left the Con- 
federacy. Hood certainly failed in part because his 
battalions were not heavy enough, as well as from 
rashness and the want of proper support from his 
lieutenants. 

The military student looks in vain to find faults 
and mistakes in the masterly retreat of Johnston. 
He will find many in the foolhardy assaults of Hood. 
The change, however, presented to the citizens of 
Atlanta a new chance and a new hope. By a less 
Fabian policy than that of Johnston, the task of 
Hood was to save that city, with the forty-one thou- 
sand infantry and ten thousand cavalry turned over 
to him by Johnston. Hood lost no time, but went to 
work in fierce warrior style to accomplish this task. 



214 GENERAL THOMAS. 

The Union army was gradually but surely marching 
down upon him — Thomas on the right, Schofield in 
the center, and McPherson on the left. In order to 
stay them. Hood made two successive attacks, each 
a rapid and somewhat unexpected blow. On the 
i8th of July, Thomas having crossed the creek, 
Hood approached, for some distance concealed from 
view ; Hardee fiercely attacked the divisions of New- 
ton and Geary in turn, but some artillery which had 
been prudently posted by Thomas checked them and 
caused them to retire. For a time he had partial 
success in both, but he was finally driven back dis- 
comfited. General Johnston had considered the 
Union position on Peach Tree Creek as practically 
unassailable, but regarded the most opportune mo- 
ment for attack to be when Sherman was crossing 
the river and the creek. It would have been better 
had Hood adopted his views, for when he had failed 
in his attack he was obliged to fall back, leaving his 
dead and wounded upon the field — nearly five thou- 
sand in number. The fierceness of the battle may 
be known from the fact that Thomas's Army of the 
Cumberland alone lost sixteen hundred men. Thus 
it was that Hood was beaten, principally by Thomas, 
at Peach Tree Creek. 

In order to give some practical idea of the work 
done by the Army of the Cumberland, the following 
order of Thomas is inserted, bearing date of July 
25, 1864: 



1 



THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 215 

" The major general commanding congratulates 
the troops upon the brilliant success which has at- 
tended the Union arms in the late battles, and which 
has been officially reported as follows : 

^' In the battle of the 20th inst., in which the 
Twentieth Corps, one division of the Fourth Corps, 
and part of the Fourteenth Corps was engaged — total 
Union loss, killed, wounded, and missing, seventeen 
hundred and thirty-three. In front of the Twenti- 
eth Corps there were put out of the fight six thou- 
sand rebels. Five hundred and sixty-three of the 
enemy were buried by our own troops, and the rebels 
were permitted to bury two hundred and fifty addi- 
tional themselves. The second division of the 
Fourth Corps repulsed seven assaults of the enemy, 
with slight loss to themselves, which must swell the 
rebel loss much beyond six thousand. Prisoners 
captured, three hundred, and seven stand of colors. 
No report has yet been received of the part taken in 
this battle by the Fourteenth Army Corps. 

"In the battle of the 22d the total Union loss 
in killed, wounded, and missing, thirty-five hundred, 
and ten pieces of artillery. Rebel loss — prisoners 
captured, thirty-two hundred. Known dead of the 
enemy in front of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Corps 
and one division of the Seventeenth Corps, twenty- 
one hundred and forty-two. The other division of 
the Seventeenth Corps repulsed six assaults of the 
enemy before it fell back, which will swell the rebel 



2i6 GENERAL THOMAS. 

loss in killed to at least three thousand. There were 
captured from the enemy in this battle eighteen 
stand of colors and five thousand stand of arms." 

The Battle of Peach Tree Creek. — As this, more 
than perhaps any other battle in the open field, had 
displayed the great generalship and splendid valor 
of Thomas, who with a portion of his army — four 
divisions and one brigade — had resisted and hurled 
back the furious assault of the entire Confederate 
force, impelled by the spirit of their new com- 
mander. Hood, it will be well to dwell a little more 
at length upon it. 

Peach Tree Creek is a considerable stream, the 
north and south forks of which mingle their waters 
about two miles and a half from the point where the 
creek thus formed empties into the Chattahoochee 
River in front of Bolton. It forms one of the natu- 
ral out-lying defenses of Atlanta. The creek is wide 
and muddy, and it was necessary in crossing it that 
the Union army should be concentrated, for fear 
that the enemy would attack the force crossing the 
creek in detail, while the other portions of the army 
were too far distant to co-operate. This, it will 
be seen, is just what happened. Sherman's order 
of the day, directing the convergence of the troops 
marching upon Atlanta, found Schofield and McPher- 
son in the neighborhood of Decatur, while Thomas 
was making preparations to cross the creek, his army 
being on the right branch between the railroad and 



THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 217 

Buckhead. Hood, who at this juncture had suc- 
ceeded Johnston, on the i8th of July, was quick to 
see his opportunity and to avail himself of it. 

Sherman, not awake to the critical character of the 
situation, nor suspecting Hood's purpose, had, how- 
ever, directed the left to oblique to the right and the 
right to the left, in order to decrease the separation. 
The result was that certain of Thomas's troops, in 
obedience to this order, were detached from his army 
to the left. With his main body, however, he crossed 
the creek on the 19th, and so increased the gap be- 
tween the right and left wings. On the morning of 
the 20th his whole force was across ; but, while in 
readiness to resist or to attack, it seems certain that 
neither Thomas nor Sherman expected a battle 
there. Sherman's order of the day, already referred 
to, simply directing the whole of his army to move 
on Atlanta, indeed shows this, for that indicates that 
he expected the corps to converge toward each 
other. But he had miscalculated distances. Scho- 
field, with the Army of the Ohio, was not able to 
join the left of Thomas at once; and Stanley's and 
Wood's divisions of Thomas's army, while moving to 
the left, found themselves separated from Newton's 
by nearly three miles of distance, which left New- 
ton's flank exposed, while they in point of fact had 
joined Schofield. 

Thus Thomas was left with seven divisions, while 
Schofield had eleven ; and, worse than that, it placed 



2i8 GENERAL THOMAS. 

the left of Thomas in the air just as Hood was pre- 
paring to assault him in front and on the left flank. 
It was in this complication of untoward circum- 
stances that the Union general became fully aware 
of Hood's purpose, and that everything seemed to 
conspire in Hood's favor. He formed his line of 
battle just south of Peach Tree Creek, with Stewart 
on his left, Hardee in the center, and Cheatham on 
his right. He ordered Cheatham to post his batteries 
so as to sweep the intervening ground and make it 
impossible for McPherson and Schofield to join on 
to Thomas; then, with the two other corps he pur- 
posed to crush Thomas, and, swooping to the right, 
he would penetrate into the gap between Thomas 
and the other two before they could unite. 

Sherman had been taken at a disadvantage, and 
the plan of Hood was eminently well digested. But 
by this time Thomas had become thoroughly in- 
formed of his purpose. A very short time before 
the fury of Hood's onset Thomas had directed New- 
ton to ascend a hill just in his front. In doing so 
Newton thoughtfully placed two guns on that hill, 
saying, as he did so, " It is well to have a reserve." 
He then moved forward, followed by Geary and 
Williams. This was about three o'clock in the after- 
noon. These .three divisions received the first as- 
sault of the enemy and gallantly repulsed it. Rid- 
ing rapidly to the front, Thomas directed the action 
from the rear of Newton's line. Seeing the emer- 



THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 219 

gency, he hastily ordered two batteries into posi- 
tion at a jump, accelerating their speed, it is said, by 
using the flat of his sword. These opened upon the 
enemy double-shotted, repulsed his attack, and drove 
him from the field, leaving the ground heaped with 
his dead and wounded. Quickness of thought and 
splendid valor in action caused the battle of Peach 
Tree Creek to be another of the great victories of 
Thomas, and led him to say that with the Army of 
the Cumberland alone he could have beaten all the 
troops that Hood had in the field. The gap, how- 
ever, had not been filled, and two days later Hood 
made a new trial of his strength against the Army of 
the Tennessee. 

Nothing, however, could resist the advance of 
the Union troops. The enemy made but one more 
determined effort, the failure of which immediately 
preceded the fall of Atlanta. 

Jonesboro. — A strong force of the Union army 
was now intrenched very near the enemy in Atlanta. 
Sherman's instructions to his generals were that 
they should seek to find weak points in the in- 
trenched line which they could break through. In re- 
sponding to these directions, Thomas said that while 
he would certainly look for such points, it was clearly 
manifest to him that it would be impossible to break 
the strong intrenchments in front of Atlanta. He 
declared that the city must be turned by its left 
flank, and that when the communications by the 



220 GENERAL THOMAS. 

Macon road were cut Hood would be obliged to 
evacuate Atlanta. General Sherman still hoped to 
make a direct attack, but was at last obliged to ac- 
cept the turning proposition. As he moved around 
the town, the enemy fortified in front of him at 
every point — at Eastpoint, Rough and Ready, and 
particularly with strong intrenchments at Jonesboro. 
From the latter place Hood attacked Howard's 
Army of the Tennessee on the 31st of August, hop- 
ing with two corps to drive him across the Flint 
River. He was repulsed. On the same evening 
Sherman ordered an attack by the Fourteenth Corps 
upon Hardee in his intrenchments at Jonesboro, ex- 
pecting the co-operation of the Army of the Tennes- 
see upon Hardee's flank. This attack was eminent- 
ly successful. He drove the enemy out of their in- 
trenchments, and took a thousand prisoners and 
eight guns. But the expected co-operation of the 
Army of the Tennessee was not made. Had it been, 
and had it been followed up, it might have been fol- 
lowed by the capture of Hardee's entire corps and 
the severance of the Southern communications of 
the enemy. Hood's last hope of saving the city 
had expired. He evacuated Atlanta and gave up 
the struggle. 

While Sherman moved relentlessly down, draw- 
ing closer round Atlanta by his right, Thomas ap- 
proaching from the northeast, Schofield directly 
from the front, and McPherson from Decatur, 



THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 221 

Hood's tactics were to assail the Union left and, if 
possible, gain its rear. In this for a short space he 
succeeded. There was a weak point there which 
Hood seized and took in flank ; and when McPher- 
son moved rapidly to set the line in order and pro- 
tect the left, he rode with a single orderly directly 
into the Confederate line. He was killed by a shot 
from the skirmishers, and in the terrible battle 
which followed his body was for some time in their 
hands.* Re-enforcements were rapidly brought up, 
however, and the Confederates were driven back. 
This was on the 226. of July. It may here be stated 
that, although the temporary command fell to Gen- 
eral Logan, the permanent command of the Army of 
the Tennessee, vacated by the lamentable death of 
McPherson, was given to General O. O. Howard — 
much to the dissatisfaction of General Hooker, who 
considered himself overslaughed and ill-treated, 
and who threw up the command of the Fourth 
Corps, to which General Stanley was at once pro- 
moted. 

The details of the maneuvers around Atlanta 
are numerous and complicated. Their philosophy is 

* General McPherson was regarded as one of the very best 
Union generals. He graduated at the head of his class at West 
Point in 1853, and among his classmates were Sheridan, Scho- 
field, and Hood. At the time of his death he was only thirty-five 
years old. Grant expressed " the highest reverence for his patriot- 
ism, his zeal, his great, almost unequaled, ability, and all the 
manly virtues that can adorn a commander." 



222 GENERAL THOMAS. 

very simple and clear. With a superior army in his 
front, should his Southern communications be also 
threatened, General Hood must either fight or 
evacuate Atlanta. 

To present these alternatives in order, Sherman 
sent, on the 27th, a large cavalry force under Stone- 
man and Garrard to cut the Macon road. The 
threat had its influence, but the raid was a failure. 
Garrard came back cutting his way through two of 
the enemy's divisions, while Stoneman, with one 
division, was captured by a small force of militia. 
In spite, however, of these partial embarrassments, 
the Union army was closing in upon the devoted 
city, met and barred at every point by the Confed- 
erate commander. There was a very severe fight at 
Ezra Church, just outside the city, and it was evi- 
dent to Sherman that with the very strong fortifica- 
tions and heavy guns it was proof against assault, 
and must either be taken by regular approaches or 
else he must have recourse to his former tactics and 
turn the position. He chose the latter, and raised 
the siege in front of the town. Once more he em- 
ployed the cavalry to cut the communications to 
the south, and moved his main body below Procter's 
Creek. The Twentieth Corps he sent back to the 
Chattahoochee, and thus deceived Hood into think- 
ing that he was about to retreat. The illusion, how- 
ever, was only momentary, for he soon found 
Thomas's army moving to the southeast upon 



, 



THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 223 

Jonesboro, and Schofield around Eastpoint to 
Rough and Ready. As soon as he saw these move- 
ments Plood moved the two corps of Lee and 
Hardee to Jonesboro, leaving but one corps in 
Atlanta. On the 31st of July he made a fierce 
attack upon Howard's corps near Jonesboro, which 
was easily repulsed, while Schofield struck the rail- 
road and destroyed it. The critical moment had now 
arrived when Hood must either fight or go. One 
more counter movement, however, he would try. 
While Sherman was cutting the railroad to the south 
of Atlanta, Hood sent Wheeler with ten thousand 
cavalry to cut Sherman's Northern communications. 
He moved rapidly to Dalton, and north of it, but 
the Union general could afford to permit this raid 
in consideration of the great prize that lay almost 
within his grasp. Sherman's forces were now con- 
centrated principally at Jonesboro. From Atlanta 
to Jonesboro the railroad runs on the ridge between 
the Flint and Ocmulgee Rivers — a good position, but 
not unassailable. In spite of the desperate efforts 
of Hood, he now saw that Atlanta was untenable. 
Vigorously shelled in front by Thomas, and with its 
chief Southern communication cut, Hood destroyed 
stores, shops, and factories, blew up eighty car-loads 
of ammunition, and evacuated the city, and the 
Union troops entered it on the 3d of September. 
Its loss to the enemy and its gain to the Union 
cause were both incalculable. Several railroads con- 



224 GENERAL THOMAS. 

verged there, and it was the principal manufacturing 
center of the South. 

What to do with it was a pregnant question. 
Sherman decided to destroy it, and expel its in- 
habitants. A bitter and acrimonious correspond- 
ence took place on the subject between Sherman on 
the one hand and the mayor of the city and General 
Hood on the other. We need not further refer to 
it. Sherman stood firm, and Atlanta was strength- 
ened and made a military base for the Union arms 
and a magazine of supplies. Although temporarily 
dependent for supplies on a single track from Nash- 
ville, and although feeble attempts were made to cut 
our communications, in the form of attacks on 
Allatoona and Resaca, the fortunes of the Union 
army proved brighter and brighter every day, and 
permitted Sherman to conceive the idea of leaving 
Hood behind and marching through Georgia to the 
sea. Our history leaves him substantially at this 
point, but it may be confidently asserted that the 
Atlanta campaign, ending in his capture of that 
stronghold, presents a larger claim to military dis- 
tinction than the famous march to the sea. 

In the rapid and complicated movements of that 
campaign it is difficult always to discern the exact 
part taken by a subordinate commander, but the 
Army of the Cumberland, under its heroic leader, 
played no secondary part, and had become so inured 
to war as to promise great successes in the future. 



THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 225 

The news of the capture of Atlanta was received 
throughout the land with the greatest enthusiasm. 
Under date of September 3d and 4th, " the applause 
and thanks of the nation " were telegraphed by 
President Lincoln and General Grant to all en- 
gaged in it, and salutes were fired in all the princi- 
pal cities. On the loth of January a resolution of 
Congress was passed to the same effect. 

For a very succinct epitome of what had been 
accomplished by this army, the order of General 
Thomas dated September 9, 1864, and written in 
Atlanta, is given : 

'^ Soldiers of the Army of the Cumber- 
land : The major general commanding, with pride 
and pleasure congratulates you upon the fact that 
your achievements during the campaign which has 
just closed, in connection with those of the armies 
of the Tennessee and Ohio, have received such dis- 
tinguished marks of appreciation as the thanks of 
the President of the United States and of the major 
general commanding the Military Division of the 
Mississippi. 

"Your commander now desires to add his own 
thanks to those you have already received, for the 
tenacity of purpose, unmurmuring endurance, cheer- 
ful obedience, brilliant heroism, and all those high 
qualities which you have displayed to an eminent 
degree in attacking and defeating the cohorts of 
treason, driving them from position after position, 
each of their own choosing, cutting their communi- 
cations, and in harassing their flanks and rear, dur- 



226 GENERAL THOMAS. 

ing the many marches, battles, and sieges of this 
long and eventful campaign. 

" It is impossible, within the limits of an order 
like this, to enumerate the many instances in which 
your gallantry has been conspicuous, but among 
them may be mentioned the actions of Rocky Face 
Mountain and before Dalton, fought between the 
8th and 13th of May ; of Resaca, on the 14th and 
15th; of Adairsville, on the 17th; of New Hope 
Church, on the 25th of the same month ; of Gulp's 
Farm, June 22d; Peach Tree Creek, July 20th; and 
the crowning one of Jonesboro, fought September 
ist, which secured the capture of the city of Atlanta, 
the goal for which we set out more than four months 
ago, and furnished a brilliant termination to your 
struggles for that long period. 

" Let these successes encourage you to the con- 
tinued exercise of those same high qualities, and to 
renewed exertions in the cause of our country and 
humanity, when you shall again be called upon to 
meet the foe ; and be assured the time is not far dis- 
tant when your prowess will conquer what territory 
now remains within the circumscribed limits of the re- 
bellion. A few more fields like those whose names 
now crowd your standards, and we can dictate the 
terms of a peace alike honorable to yourselves and 
our country. You can then retire to your homes 
amid the plaudits of your friends, and with the proud 
consciousness that you have deserved well of the 
country. Our rejoicings are not unmixed with a 
proud regret for our brave comrades who have fallen. 
Their graves mark the spots where they went down 
amid the din and roar of battle, dotting every field 
and hillside, or lying beneath the spreading boughs 



THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 



227 



of the forest along our route; they will in future 
days serve like finger-boards to point out to the trav- 
eler the march of your victorious columns. Those 
silent mounds appeal to us to remain true to our- 
selves and the country, and so to discharge the high 
duty devolving upon us that their lives, which they 
so freely offered up, may not prove a useless sacrifice. 
"By command of Major-General Thomas. 
"William D. Whipple, 

" Assistant Adjutant General.'* 

A few words may be aptly quoted to complete 
the modest recital. In the opinion of Van Home: 
" In this campaign General Thomas approved of no 
movement which was- a failure ; he disapproved of 
none which was a success ; and whenever his advice 
was rejected, the outcome proved that his plan would 
have met with every condition of success." 

By an order of General Sherman dated May 4th, 
measures were taken without loss of time to circum- 
vent the enemy in his manifest intention to force 
Sherman out of Georgia by falling upon his commu- 
nications, and by a counter movement to run a race 
with him to the line of the Ohio. Thomas was di- 
rected to occupy Chattanooga with the Army of the 
Cumberland, while the armies of the Ohio and the 
Tennessee were directed to move in concert and 
cover his rear. 

Whatever plans were now to be proposed, one 
thing was certain, and that was, that although Atlanta 
was in the hands of the Union troops, the Confeder- 
16 



228 GENERAL THOxMAS. 

ate army was still in existence, active and defiant, 
under a dashing leader, to whom success was an ab- 
solute necessity, without which he would join the list 
of superseded generals who had been unable to stem 
the tide of Federal invasion. 

It is curious to observe at this time that while 
Hood thought Sherman to be in retreat, Sherman 
believed Hood to be retiring. He was soon unde- 
ceived, however. On the 20th of September Hood 
moved from Lovejoy Station, following on the heels 
of Thomas, and on the 29th he crossed the Chatta- 
hoochee. It almost seemed that Thomas was run- 
ning away from him ; the two armies were traversing 
the same ground as in the Atlanta campaign, but in 
inverse order. This was permitted by Sherman, how- 
ever, while he was perfecting his plans for again 
marching southward. Two points he must hold in- 
tact — Atlanta and Chattanooga. 

It must be conceded that at this time Hood ex- 
hibited his best skill as a general, but his success was 
extremely evanescent. He was indeed operating be- 
tween Sherman and his base, and captured a number 
of towns between these two cities, among which the \ 
most important was Dalton. At this time his great 
need was men, and his main hope was that he might 
receive large re-enforcements from the trans-Missis- 
sippi, with which he could make a successful invasion 
of Tennessee and Kentucky. This hope was not 
destined to be realized, although it constantly lured 



THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 



229 



him on, even to the wildly rash attack upon Thomas 
at Nashville. 

It is not within the scope of this work to dwell 
upon the great diversity of operations on this field 
during the month of October, 1864. On the 27th 
Hood laid siege to Decatur, but so terrible was the 
artillery fire of the Union garrison and so vigorous 
the resistance that he abandoned the attempt on the 
29th. He seems up to ^this time to have been en- 
tirely ignorant of the scheme which was ripening in 
the brain of Sherman, and he thought that by a rapid 
movement he could turn the Union flank and move 
successfully northward. 

When Sherman was about to start on his famous 
march, and Thomas had received his instructions to 
fall back rapidly toward Nashville and there put 
himself in condition for a new advance, Hood deter- 
mined to leave Sherman and abandon Georgia, not, 
however, dreaming of the march to the sea; and to 
follow Thomas at top speed, constantly threatening 
his flank and rear, to overtake his army, compel it to 
fight, and destroy it. This done, he could march tri- 
umphantly to the line of the Ohio, and, being largely 
re-enforced by an enthusiastic uprising on his line of 
march, he would threaten and perhaps accomplish a 
Northern invasion which would give essential aid to 
General Lee in his defense of Richmond, and put an 
entirely new face upon the whole theater of war. It 
should also be observed as of practical importance 



230 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



that the task of Hood was made easier by the un- 
commonly low water in the Tennessee, which pre- 
vented the gunboats from doing their share of the 
great work. 

These general remarks will prepare us to enter 
upon the brilliant double campaign which was now 
imminent. Indeed, up to this very moment when 
Hood was between Sherman and Thomas, and be- 
fore the scheme which had been excogitated had 
been made patent to the world, accordmg to the 
simile of Napoleon, " the chess board was very much 
befogged." 

Hood's manifest difficulty would be the want of 
numbers; and although Jefferson Davis, after ac- 
knowledging that he had depleted the other armies 
to the greatest extent, still hoped that recruits would ^ 
gather in his train, every day proved that it would 
be a vain hope. 

On the other hand, while it may be doubted 
whether Sherman gave Thomas his fair proportion 
of that army for the work which lay before him, and 
while even that proportion was to some extent hy- , 
pothetical, made up of garrisons and small detach- ^ 
ments all over the ground on which he moved, and 
while still further it must be acknowledged that 
everything was to be experimental, yet it soon be- 
came clear that Thomas's force would increase ■ 
rapidly as he retired and outnumber Hood when he 
should make^his grand stand and deliver battle. 



THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 23 1 

Just before we reach the time when the division 
between the two Union commanders was to be made 
it may be well to stop and cast a glance upon the 
position and composition of the Union forces under 
Thomas. He had the Fourth Corps of the Army of 
the Cumberland, two divisions of the Sixteenth Corps 
of the Army of the Tennessee, the Army of the Ohio, 
and the Twenty-third Corps. With these should be 
enumerated the widely scattered forces of recruits 
and convalescents which Sherman had left behind 
for him to gather up, and such forces as might join 
him from the North. The Fourth Corps was com- 
manded by General Stanley, the Twenty-third by 
General Schofield, the divisions of the Sixteenth by 
General Andrew J, Smith, and all the cavalry by 
General James H. Wilson. 

All this looked very well on paper, but the dif- 
ferent commands were scattered, and it would re- 
quire time and assiduity to unite them. Van Home 
says — and he speaks for General Thomas — that had 
the Fourteenth Corps been given to Thomas instead 
of the Twenty-third, he would have had five thousand 
more men, and the unpleasant questions with regard 
to rank as between Schofield and Stanley would 
have been avoided. 

It seems now that Sherman could have treated 
Thomas a little more generously. He set him a Her- 
culean task to perform, and scarcely force enough 
with which to do it. Thus it is that the reader of 



23: 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



the campaign of Nashville should be prepared be- 
forehand to understand the difficulties in the way of 
Thomas, his inadequate numbers, his scattered divi- 
sions, the heterogeneous nature of his troops, his un- 
mounted cavalry, his solicitude as to supplies, and 
the very grave character of the issues dependent upon 
his action. And with this foreknowledge he will 
not limit his judgment of Thomas's great merits to 
the splendid sortie at Nashville, but will observe his 
careful, difficult, and excellent dispositions in spite 
of numerous obstacles from the moment his com- 
munications were cut with General Sherman, and he 
found himself for the first time since Mill Springs, 
and on a far grander field, an entirely independent 
commander. 

We may pause for a moment to catch a glimpse 
of his personality at this time. The following anec- 
dote is told by Sherman : He saw one of his men 
roasting ears of corn, and stopped to talk to him. 
"What are you doing?" he said. "Why, general, 
I am laying in a supply of provisions." Thomas, 
always anxious about supplies, rejoined, "That is 
right, my man, but don't waste your provisions." As 
he turned away the man murmured, " There goes the 
old man, economizing as usual." 



CHAPTER XI. 

ON TO NASHVILLE. FRANKLIN. 

Doubts as to the movement of Hood — Sherman's march to the 
sea — Who first proposed this scheme ? — Thomas and Hood 
compared — Hood's hopes of re-enforcement vain — Without it 
his movement very rash — Opinions of Sherman and Grant — 
Thomas's force increases to about fifty thousand — Hood's 
about the same — Nashville the objective point for both — Co- 
lumbia and Spring Hill — Schofield at Franklin — The battle 
— Opdycke's gallant charge — Schofield eludes Hood and joins 
Thomas — Hood's criticism of Franklin — He invests Nashville 
on December 2d — Description of the field — Urgency from 
Washington — Halleck, Grant, Stanton — Thomas will not 
move until ready. 

Dispatches from General Grant at this time 
show his concern at first on account of the erratic 
but brilliant movements of Hood, which did not yet 
disclose his final purpose, because that depended to 
some extent on the Federal plans and movements not 
yet made manifest. This concern was shared by the 
entire North. It seemed still doubtful what Hood 
meant, and it was feared that large numbers would 
flock to his standard, re-enforcing him so greatly 
that he could afford to let Sherman go and rush 
torrent-like upon Tennessee. It was very soon after 
the capture of Atlanta that the new scheme had been 



234 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



devised — to which all movements now were tending 
— for dividing the army of Sherman, one part of which 
was to be employed in the famous march through 
Georgia to the sea, while the other should take care 
of Tennessee and Kentucky and the line of the Ohio : 
and this was to be confided to Thomas. Between the 
two, with the choice which he would attack and im- 
pede, was Hood, but without regard to his decision 
the Union plan was in process of arrangement, in 
consonance with the campaign of Grant in Virginia, 
and indeed with all parts of the great field. 

Thus, on the grand chessboard of the war Grant 
would hold Lee in check at Richmond, and either 
capture him there or force his evacuation of that 
capital, with the certainty of capturing him or de- 
stroying him afterward ; Sherman with a large army 
would march through Georgia and strike for the sea- 
coast ; while Thomas, placed in temporary command 
of the Military Division of the Mississippi, in succes- 
sion to Sherman, with the remnant of the force left 
by Sherman, consisting at first of the Fourth Corps 
and the surrounding garrisons, but afterward re- 
enforced by the Twenty-third Corps under Schofield, 
and the cavalry, mounted and dismounted, under Wil- 
son, would hasten to Nashville to defend the frontier 
of Kentucky, and there await the coming of the ene- 
my if he should be rash enough to follow him; and 
put an end at once to his schemes and his hopes. 

It seems unwise and unnecessary to moot the 



ON TO NASHVILLE. 



235 



question who conceived this plan. There is no such 
great originality and merit about the conception, 
in our judgment, as to make it worth the contro- 
versy. The champions of Grant ascribe it to him, 
at least in first suggestion. Those of Sherman de- 
clare that he was the originator of the scheme, and 
had been turning it over in his mind long before it 
was accepted and arranged. Sherman says in refer- 
ence to a letter of Thomas, written October 17, 1864, 
"At that date neither General Grant nor General 
Thomas favored any proposed plan of campaign." 
The admirers of General Thomas have also given 
him credit for this proposed arrangement of the 
campaign, at least in the rough plan. This he never 
claimed, however. In the striking of balances Sher- 
man probably deserves the credit of proposing the 
scheme, which is at once merged into his greater 
achievement ; and, after all, it would seem patent 
enough to suggest itself to most minds. It was 
manifest that Sherman must either join Grant or 
debouche somewhere on the coast. Grant did not 
want him. The Confederate army under Hood did 
not need so large a force as Sherman's entire army 
to oppose it. His conclusion as to the exact route 
was logical from these premises. His march to the 
South would demonstrate the true condition of things 
in the Southeast, already suspected : the lack of troops 
and resources, the waning enthusiasm — " the begin- 
ning of the end." 



236 GENERAL THOMAS. 

What Hood would do was, as we have seen, for 
some time a question. Would he seek to cut Sher- 
man's Northern communications ? Sherman was 
already planning to abandon them, holding on, how- 
ever, to Chattanooga and Atlanta. Would he try to 
impede his march southward ? Sherman could beat 
him at that game with excess of numbers; and, if he 
did try it, General Thomas was on his flank, a real 
thorn in his side. 

It was soon evident that, considering Thomas the 
easier prey, he would leave Sherman and march after 
Thomas at once, follow close on his tracks, bring 
him to bay before he could reach Nashville or con- 
centrate his forces, gain his rear, scatter his army, 
press at once across Kentucky into Ohio, and thus 
make a tremendous diversion in favor of Lee at 
Richmond while Sherman was marching southward 
and could render no assistance. 

Let Sherman take Savannah if he could ; there 
was a splendid chance for the Confederacy. If Hood 
could only turn the tables and annihilate Thomas, 
it would be giving a Roland for an Oliver. One 
thing is certain: as late as November ist Grant was 
still in doubt even as to the propriety of the move- 
ment. He could not indeed know the situation as 
well as Sherman, who was on the ground, but he 
wrote to Sherman at that date : " If you can see the 
chance for destroying Hood's army, attend to that 
first, and make your other movements secondary." 



ON TO NASHVILLE. 237 

The answer of Sherman was prompt and enthusi- 
astic : "We have now ample supplies at Chatta- 
nooga and at Atlanta to stand a month's interrup- 
tion to our communications, and I don't believe the 
Confederate army can reach our lines save by 
cavalry raids; and Wilson will have cavalry enough 
to checkmate that. I am clearly of the opinion that 
the best results will follow me in my contemplated 
movement through Georgia." The next day Grant 
gave his permission. 

We have spoken of the destitution, in a military 
point of view, of the country through which Sherman 
was to march. It was one of Hood's blunders to 
permit such a disclosure ; he does not seem to have 
thought of it, and we now wonder that the Confed- 
erate authorities did not direct him to obstruct Sher- 
man's march to the utmost. The destitution was 
chiefly in troops; Sherman seems to have found 
abundance of supplies. 

The following order issued by General Sherman 
on the 26th of October, 1864, clearly sets forth the 
powers of General Thomas after his separation from 
Sherman : 

" Headquarters, Military Division of the Mississippi, 
"In the Field, Gaylesville, Ala., October 26, 1864. 

" In the event of military movements or the 
accidents of war separating the general in command 
from his military division, Major-General George H. 
Thomas, commanding the Department of the Cum- 



238 GENERAL THOMAS. 

berland, will exercise command over all troops and 
garrisons not absolutely in the presence of the gen- 
eral in chief. The commanding generals of the de- 
partments and armies of the Ohio and Tennessee, will 
forthwith send abstracts of their returns to General 
Thomas at Nashville, in order that he may under- 
stand the position and distribution of troops ; and 
General Thomas may call for such further reports 
as he may require, disturbing the actual condition 
of affairs and mixing up the troops of separate de- 
partments as little as possible, consistent with the 
interests of the service." 

We may pause for a moment just here to con- 
sider the two men now to be pitted against each 
other — Thomas and Hood. They were both splen- 
did soldiers, but were, however, otherwise in great 
and striking contrast. Thomas, characterized by 
Sherman as " the man best qualified to manage the 
affairs of Tennessee and North Mississippi," was 
cool-headed, cautious, careful, valiant, and tenacious 
of purpose, when once his purpose was settled; 
forecasting and considering everything, leaving 
nothing to chance, as far as it was possible to 
eliminate chance from military operations. 

Hood was a graduate of West Point in McPher- 
son's class, large of frame, full of vigor and impulse, 
a manly and dashing soldier, industrious and ener- 
getic, a soldier by intuition as well as by profession ; 
enthusiastic and impulsive ; brave to a fault ; having 
lost an arm and leg in the forefront of battle, the 



ON TO NASHVILLE. 239 

one at Gettysburg and the other at Chickamauga ; 
inconsiderate, ready to risk all his other members 
and his life on similar conditions. 

Sanguine by temperament, and trusting his sub- 
ordinates, sometimes foolishly, he hoped to recruit 
his rather inadequate force by an enthusiastic rising 
of the people at hi^ call as he marched. They 
would certainly rally to his standard if they shared 
his hopes. In this he was to be sadly mistaken. 
The Confederate enthusiasm was now rapidly wan- 
ing. The people did not join him in what now 
really appeared to be the losing cause. The region 
of the farther South was itself clamoring for troops. 
Like boasting Glendower in the drama, the Confed- 
erate Government could " call spirits from the vasty 
deep," but they would no longer come. 

When his eyes were opened to this state of 
things Hood had already cast all upon the hazard 
of the die, and it was no time for him to change his 
purpose. His great, his last hope was, by forced 
marches to get in rear of Thomas before he could 
reach Nashville, to bring him to a stand, and to 
rout his army. " These convictions," he says, 
*' counterbalanced my regret that Sherman was per- 
mitted to traverse Georgia unopposed, as he himself 
admits." And again, " Had I not made the move- 
ment, I am fully persuaded that Sherman would 
have been upon General Lee's communications in 
October instead of at this time." 



240 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



While Thomas was gathering together the dis- 
jecta membra of his command, we shall see that from 
first to last Hood's great difficulty was to be want 
of numbers; he lacked weight ; but he still hoped 
against hope. 

All this seems logical enough, but the military 
critic dissents from his judgmuent ; and that this is 
not an opinion after the facts is proved by the con- 
current views of Sherman and Grant, both of whom 
were disposed to do justice to his real merits. Sher- 
man's opinion of these movements is not very flatter- 
ing to Hood. In speaking generally of his rashness, 
and prior to his final movement, he says: "I did not 
suppose that General Hood, though rash, would ven- 
ture to attack fortified places like Allatoona, Resaca, 
Decatur, and Nashville ; but he did so, and in so 
doing played into our hands perfectly." General 
Grant is equally outspoken, and more directly to the 
point at issue. He says : " Hood, instead of fol- 
lowing Sherman, continued his move northward, 
which seemed to me to be leading to his certain 
doom. At all events, had I had the power to com- 
mand both armies, I should not have changed the 
orders under which he seemed to be acting." 

It is worthy of consideration whether, if Hood 
had followed Sherman and constantly harassed his 
rear, while Hardee, with his fifteen or twenty thou- 
sand men, had come rapidly up to meet him and 
thus retard his advance, and then if there had been 



ON TO NASHVILLE. 24I 

a rising in Hood's favor, the result might have been 
different, not in the long run but for the time being. 

So much in brief as to Sherman and his plans. 

It now rested with Thomas, the separation hav- 
ing been made, to demonstrate the justness of these 
views by retiring slowly, gathering his command 
together, resisting Hood's advance, luring him on to 
Nashville, and, when perfectly ready, turning upon 
him and driving his beaten army scattered through 
the Southern territory, never to be again consoli- 
dated into a fighting force of any importance. 
Could he do these things? On November 12, 1864, 
the last link of telegraphic communication between 
Sherman and Thomas was broken. It was the first 
and only time since Mill Springs that the latter 
found himself in supreme control at the head of an 
army, albeit the parts of it were widely scattered ; it 
was his grand opportunity, and he seized it with 
great discretion and skill. His first thought was 
duty ; his second, his reputation as a general. 

Thomas's command now consisted of the Fourth 
Corps, comprising three divisions, commanded at 
first by General Stanley and afterward, when Stan- 
ley was disabled, by General Thomas J. Wood ; the 
Twenty-third Corps, under Schofield, which was to 
join him at once ; and, more fortunate than Hood, 
he was to receive large re-enforcements from various 
points. Among them was a force, under General 
Washburne, of forty-five hundred troops, new regi- 



242 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



merits sent forward to replace the old whose term 
of service had expired, and of men who had gone 
North to vote. On October 13th Halleck had in- 
formed him that two old regiments and several 
new ones were to report to him at Nashville. 
General A. J. Smith joined him later with a large 
detachment from the Army of the Tennessee, con- 
sisting of three divisions under Generals John Mc- 
Arthur and Kenner Garrard and Colonel Jonathan B. 
Moore; and there were several thousand convales- 
cents fit for garrison duty who would occupy the 
lines at Nashville and leave the well troops free to 
act. There was also a force of twelve thousand 
cavalry under General James H. Wilson, with com- 
petent division commanders ; but most of them were 
yet unprovided with horses, having become dis- 
mounted by the hard and destructive service in 
which they were engaged. These made in all, but 
not yet concentrated, about fifty-six thousand men. 
He had discharged fifteen thousand unfit for service 
or whose time had expired. 

Hood, as we have seen, had not received the re- 
enforcements he expected ; and, with his army not 
much larger than that of Thomas, it might have 
seemed rash for him to follow Thomas to Nashville, 
and even risk the chance of being turned upon before 
reaching it; but at that time Thomas's forces were 
yet too widely scattered to make it as dangerous as 
it at first sight appeared. Had Hood moved earlier, 



ON TO NASHVILLE. 243 

his chances of success would have been greater ; 
but he was delayed more than a month, waiting for. 
necessary supplies. 

The army of Hood was arranged in three corps, 
commanded respectively by Generals Lee, Cheatham, 
and Stewart, each containing three divisions. It 
numbered from forty thousand to forty-five thou- 
sand infantry, to which must be added a cavalry 
corps of from ten thousand to fifteen thousand men, 
all in excellent condition, the latter commanded by 
General Forrest, one of the most brilliant cavalry 
generals developed on either side during the war. 
It was evident that Hood's policy was to beat 
Thomas's force by detachments and before they 
could be united into a strong whole. 

The strategy of the campaign was simple in the 
extreme, but the grand tactics were changing and 
kaleidoscopic to a remarkable degree. 

Nashville was the supremely important point for 
both armies. For Thomas, Nashville was a place 
already occupied and strongly fortified in order to 
protect the line of the Ohio ; in which to recruit, re- 
organize, and plan, and from which to attack the 
advancing enemy. It constituted his strong base of 
operations. For Hood it was the Union stronghold 
to be captured after cutting Thomas's re-enforce- 
ments off from his line of retreat ; and if he could 
destroy the Federal army and occupy Nashville, it 
was to be a point from which to invade the North 
17 



244 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



and make a grand diversion in favor of General Lee 
at Richmond. 

Thomas had marched with a portion of the 
Fourth Corps, and had entered Nashville on Octo- 
ber 3, 1864; and from that as a point of observation 
he took command of all the troops and operations 
in Tennessee. His first thought had been to de- 
fend the line of Duck Eiver and the Chattanooga 
and Nashville Railroad, but the enemy was so close 
at his heels that the scheme was abandoned, and the 
determination made to strengthen the intrenchments 
at Nashville, which were already strong, and await 
Hood's arrival. The preliminary movements had 
now begun. Hood had crossed the Chattahoochee 
on the 5th of October, and was waiting for supplies 
and preparing to manifest his purpose ; and on the 
29th of October he made a feint toward Decatur, 
and crossed the Tennessee with a portion of his 
army. In the meantime, after Hood began his 
movement, everything was done by the Union army 
to hinder his advance. The roads were obstructed 
by felled timber, and his march was impeded by par- 
tial attacks, mainly by the cavalry, and thus, notwith- 
standing the apparent vigor of his movements, his 
whole force was not across until November 9th, and 
the concerted movement made; he took eleven days 
to accomplish what might have been done in three. 
On October 30th the Twenty-third Corps had be- 
gun its march to join Thomas at Nashville, and 



ON TO NASHVILLE. 



245 



Hood followed in what proved to be a very rapid 
pursuit, with the purpose of cutting that corps off 
from Columbia. The Union troops had been scat- 
tered throughout that region, but were soon collect- 
ed together under Schofield, and were directed to 
fall back, until Thomas could unite A. J. Smith's 
corps with Steedman and Granger, and push them to 
the front. Smith's delay and General Hood's rapid 
advance were the cause of the stop at Franklin, and 
the ultimate concentration, as we shall presently see, 
at Nashville. 

When Schofield arrived at Franklin he stopped to 
await the instructions of Thomas, who would either 
largely re-enforce him and fight there, or order him 
to fall back upon Nashville. Thomas was, as has 
been said, already settled in the latter plan, while 
Grant from City Point was urging him to move for- 
ward and meet Hood. This was due to a want of 
knowledge of the situation. The route was along 
the railroad by Columbia and Spring Hill to Frank- 
lin. It does not fall within the scope of this work to 
give in detail the maneuvers and partial actions in- 
cluded in this movement toward Nashville. The 
danger was becoming greater every moment that 
Schofield with the Twenty-third Corps, and a few ad- 
ditional troops, would have his communications with 
Nashville cut. 

The peril, which might have been avoided by 
greater promptitude, was indeed extreme, and was 



246 GENERAL THOMAS. 

only averted by good fortune and the bad general- 
ship of Hood's lieutenants. General Hatch made 
a partial diversion at Lexington, but the Confed- 
erate advance could not be checked there. Stan- 
ley, by a rapid march, reached Columbia, where he 
was engaged by the enemy, and although intrench- 
ments were thrown up, it was not thought possible 
to hold the line of Duck River, as the enemy's in- 
tention to turn the position became manifest, and his 
superior numbers made it appear feasible. Perhaps 
the delay of twenty-four hours at Columbia, which 
now seems to have been unfortunate, imperiled the 
army, and made the escape from Spring Hill and the 
desperate fighting at Franklin necessary. 

After three days' stay at Columbia, while Hood's 
column was crossing Duck River above him, Scho- 
field marched to Spring Hill, the enemy relentlessly 
following. It was a race to Spring Hill, Stanley 
arriving only two hours before Hood. Here the 
purpose of Hood was again manifest — to envelop 
and destroy the Federal army at that point. 
Through want of energy and clear intelligence on 
the part of General Cheatham, Hood's opportunity 
was there lost. That general failed, to throw his 
corps across the turnpike, facing south, which he had 
ample time to do before the head of Schofield's col- 
umn arrived there, and when an attack would have 
been entirely disastrous to Schofield's force. Mak- 
ing a show of resistance, Schofield availed himself 



ON TO NASHVILLE. 247 

of the darkness and withdrew to Franklin, under 
the very guns and within sound of the voices of the 
enemy. He reached it with the head of the column 
before dawn. " Never," says Van Home, " has an 
army escaped so easily from a peril so threatening." 
The situation at Franklin was not the most desir- 
able, but it was all that Schofield could make it. 
With both flanks posted on the Harpeth River, Scho- 
field's forces occupied the old intrenchments there, 
under the personal supervision of General J. D. Cox, 
and batteries were well posted on both sides of the 
river to repel the assaults in front and flank. There 
he received orders from Thomas to fall back. It 
was now evidently the object to retard Hood's 
march while Thomas was making his plans, organ- 
izing his re-enforcements, and strengthening his in- 
trenchments at Nashville. Franklin is twenty-seven 
miles from Columbia, but only eighteen miles from 
Nashville. The opportune moment for Hood had 
passed when Schofield had been permitted to pass 
by Spring Hill without being attacked. He hoped 
to find another chance at Franklin, for it was a 
doubtful question whether Schofield could with- 
draw from Franklin ; certainly not without fighting. 
Franklin is a small town on the southern bank of the 
Harpeth, lying in abend of the river, and forming a 
station of the Nashville and Decatur Railroad. 
Schofield had about seventeen thousand men, includ- 
ing six thousand cavalry under Wilson. Hood had 



248 GENERAL THOMAS. 

followed so closely that Schofield could not at once 
get all his troops across, which was his first inten- 
tion. He was obliged, therefore, to face the enemy 
and repel him. He repaired the railroad bridge and 
constructed a foot bridge, and awaited, not without 
great concern, the attack of Hood, which he must re- 
ceive and paralyze before he could retreat. He had 
sent the Third Division of the Fourth Corps (Wood) 
across the river, on the right, to watch the attempt 
of the enemy to cross and turn the flank, but was 
unable to withdraw the remainder of the force in 
immediate following, so closely was he pressed by 
Hood, whom he must hold at bay. The Twenty- 
third Corps was on the left and center, and the First 
Brigade of the Second Division of the Fourth Corps 
was behind it. Wilson's cavalry was on the north 
side of the Harpeth above Franklin, watching the 
fords, and one brigade was below watching the cross- 
ings on that flank. The remaining disposition was 
as follows: The First Division of the Fourth was 
on the right abutting on the Harpeth River ; and, 
whether by design or overlooked in the rush of af- 
fairs, the Second and Third Brigades of the Second 
Division of the Fourth were considerably advanced 
in front of the center. This was a great mistake, 
as the result shows. Upon them fell the brunt of 
the attack. At four o'clock that afternoon Hood 
launched his columns — two entire corps — upon the 
divisions advanced in front of the Federal left and 



ON TO NASHVILLE. 249 

center with such impetuosity that they were driven 
back in confusion, with the loss of one thousand men 
and several guns, while he suffered very little. For- 
rest's cavalry was kept in check by General Wilson, 
or matters would have been in a worse condition 
still. In this imminent peril order was restored by 
the great gallantry of Colonel Opdycke, of Stanley's 
corps, and of Stanley himself, both of whom rushed 
to the breach and re-established the line. It is 
worthy of note that Stanley wrote that day to Gen- 
eral Thomas that Opdycke's timely movement saved 
the army from a ruinous defeat. 

Stanley was in conference with Schofield when 
the loud sound of the firing reached him. He at 
once galloped to the front, and would have ordered 
Opdycke to charge, had he not seen that that gallant 
officer needed no order, but was already in rapid 
career with his brigade. Stanley's report throws 
light upon the entire action. According to that, 
when Wagner's division was driven back, Opdycke 
was in reserve on the Columbia pike. At the critical 
moment, he says : 

"Could the enemy hold that part of the line, 
he was nearer our two bridges than the extremi- 
ties of our line. Colonel Opdycke's brigade was 
lying down about one hundred yards in rear of 
the works. I rode quickly to the left regiment and 
called to them to charge ; at the same time I saw 
Colonel Opdycke near the center of his line, urging 



2^0 GENERAL THOMAS. 

his men forward. I gave the colonel no order, as I 
saw him engaged in doing the very thing to save 
us— namely, to get possession of the line again." 
Colonel Opdycke added luster to reputation already 
established on many fields, and which was to be fur- 
ther enhanced by his gallantry at Nashville. He was 
distinguished at Pittsburg Landing, Chickamauga, 
Chattanooga, and in the Atlanta campaign. He de- 
serves special recognition here, because, in the opin- 
ion of Thomas and Stanley, his charge at Franklin 
without orders saved the army. 

The tables were entirely turned. Opdycke re- 
captured many of the guns, took several hundred 
prisoners and battle flags, and re-established the line. 
Hood's desperate attacks failed chiefly for want of 
weight in his columns. His first assault seemed to 
be overpowering, but he could not keep it up. "A 
few thousand more men," says a competent critic, 
"would have enabled him to win the battle." 

Never was more distinguished valor displayed 
than by both armies on that occasion. The Con- 
federates made four attacks on that position, all of 
which failed, but the character of which may be 
judged of by the fact that they lost five generals 
killed, among whom was the intrepid Cleburne, six 
wounded, and one a prisoner of war. General Stan- 
ley himself, one of the most gallant soldiers of the 
war, was severely wounded on that occasion, and 
General T. J. Wood took command temporarily of 



ON TO NASHVILLE. 25 1 

his Fourth Corps. The failure of these Confederate 
attacks so paralyzed their army that Schofield was 
enabled to do what he had intended — to cross the 
Harpeth and retreat in good order by a night march 
and to join Thomas at Nashville. But for the defeat 
of Forrest by Wilson at the same time, it is extreme- 
ly doubtful whether Schofield could have retreated. 
It should further be observed that, while the battle 
of Franklin was being fought, A. J. Smith's corps 
was just reaching Thomas at Nashville. 

Thus far Hood had been altogether baffled in his 
purposes; he followed Schofield to Nashville, and as 
that general entered the intrenched line Hood made 
a defiant parade in front of the city, trumpets blow- 
ing, drums beating, colors flying, and bands playing 
Dixie. It was indeed a great and most hazardous 
stake for which he was playing at Nashville, and he 
announced it in this boasting manner. Should he 
succeed, the end of the war would have been put off 
for some time. We can hardly think he expected to 
succeed, but he was thus keeping up the courage of 
his men and cherishing a "forlorn hope." 

It will be well to pause for a moment and look 
back a little more in detail at the Confederate move- 
ments up to this point in the campaign, taking for 
our guide Hood's own account ; this by way of 
recapitulation and a thorough intelligence of the 
situation, which, indeed, is the most important in 
the military history of Thomas. 



252 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



When, after some delay, he had started from 
Tuscumbia and Florence to move upon the Union 
troops in their retreat to Nashville, he had, as has 
been stated, the purpose to thrust his army be- 
tween that town and Schofield's force, at Columbia 
or Spring Hill or Franklin, and to cut off the Union 
retreat, and he had apparently a good chance of 
succeeding. This he had tried to do at Columbia 
and had failed. His orders were then very explicit, 
that a more vigorous attempt should be made at 
Spring Hill, where he would either bring Schofield 
to battle and beat him by superiority of numbers, or 
cut his communication with Nashville if he declined 
to fight. Here he might have entirely succeeded, 
for his plans were well laid. This project failed, 
however, through the want of proper energy or at- 
tention on the part of General Cheatham, who, it is 
said, did not receive the lucid instructions of Hood, 
because he was absent from the camp, and therefore 
made no demonstration against Schofield's line, as 
he marched rapidly northward ; but he was allowed 
to escape and intrench himself strongly at Franklin. 
There was still an apparent chance left for Hood 
to cut his line between Franklin and Nashville, 
but it soon melted into thin air, because Wilson's 
cavalry barred his way and guarded the line of 
retreat. By a rapid forced march at night Scho- 
field passed the astonished Hood and took his 
place in front of Nashville, where Thomas had 



ON TO NASHVILLE. 253 

been gathering his forces and strengthening his in- 
trenchments. 

Most battles have so much in common that their 
description becomes monotonous. Of its class and 
kind, however, the battle of Franklin was extraor- 
dinary, and evoked the unqualified admiration even 
of the gallant enemy. 

The vigorous fighting at Franklin, especially that 
of Opdycke and Stanley, enabled the Union force 
to withdraw in good order to the intrenchments at 
Nashville. It chimed in with Thomas's larger plan. 
"The important result," says General Thomas, "of 
this signal victory [at Franklin] can not be too 
highly appreciated, for it not only seriously checked 
the enemy's advance and gave General Schofield 
time to move his troops and all his property to 
Nashville, but it also caused deep depression among 
the men of Hood's army. . . . Not willing to risk a 
renewal of the battle on the morrow, and having ac- 
complished the object of the day's operations — viz., 
to cover the withdrawal of his trains — General Scho- 
field, by my advice and direction, fell back during 
the night to Nashville." Doubtless this " advice 
and direction " were given because General Andrew 



* The writer heard a lieutenant general of the Confederate 
army who was at Franklin, at a dinner of the Aztec Club, and in 
presence of General Schofield, declare that the fighting and the 
retreat at Franklin were among the most brilliant specimens of 
military skill and valor in the records of the war. 



254 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



J. Smith could not reach Frankhn in time to make 
its tenure certain. 

Not diverted from his purpose, however, by his 
want of success at Franklin, Hood determined to 
move without a moment's delay upon Nashville — 
"to beard the lion in his den." He had given up 
almost entirely the hope of re-enforcements from 
Texas, while he constantly heard of accessions to 
the army of General Thomas. From day to day his 
task became more difficult; the disparity of numbers 
was disappearing, but he would still attempt its ac- 
complishment. 

If it be true that " those whom the gods wish to 
destroy they first render mad," it really seems that 
Hood was now inspired by a Berserker fury akin 
to madness, in venturing to attack an army com- 
posed in part of veteran troops, strongly intrenched, 
at least equal if not superior in numbers to his own, 
and with more to fight for than had been presented 
to any general in any battle of the war. Such 
prominence does Nashville assume at this juncture. 
Thomas was to be accused of being too slow, but the 
tremendous issues of the conflict demanded his cau- 
tion. Hood, playing indeed for as desperate a stake, 
was certainly too fast. What he calls "the unfor- 
tunate affair at Spring Hill, the short duration of 
daylight at Franklin, and, finally and most important 
of all, the nonarrival of expected re-enforcements 
from the trans-Mississippi department of the Con- 



ON TO NASHVILLE. 255 

federacy," should have warned him to pause and 
deliberate before arraying himself in front of the 
breastworks and guns of Nashville. 

And thus we come to that partial siege and the 
great battle which was still, however, delayed by cir- 
cumstances. Hood began to establish his line to the 
south of Nashville on the 2d of December, and there 
would either await Thomas's attack, which he w^as 
ready to meet with a riposte^ or boldly assault the 
intrenchments, and endeavor to capture the town. 
In order to understand the subsequent movements 
we must now pause for a moment to take a view of 
the field of battle. 

Nashville is situated on the south bank of the 
Cumberland River, and near the center of the town 
the Louisville and Nashville Railroad crosses the 
bridge, running southwest to Johnsonville. The rail- 
roads to Murfreesboro and to Franklin, respectively 
running southeast and south, both cross Brown's 
Creek, a small tributary emptying into the Cumber- 
land east of the city. The principal turnpike roads 
from the Federal left to the right, by which Hood 
had arrived and which were of chief importance in 
the coming action, were the Lebanon road, the Mur- 
freesboro pike, the Nolensville pike, the Franklin 
pike, the Granny White, the Hillsboro, the Hardin, 
and the Charlotte pikes. Thomas had established 
two lines of intrenchments, enveloping the city from 
river bank to river bank, and along these lines were 



256 GENERAL THOMAS. 

earthen redoubts, the principal of which were called 
Fort Gillem, Fort Donaldson, Fort Houston, Fort 
Casino, and Fort Martin. These were strong points 
in the line and supported each other. It had re- 
quired time and industry to construct these ; and 
the intervening lines had employed Thomas with- 
out a moment's rest until Hood arrived, and even 
after the Confederates had established themselves. 
Thomas was obliged to delay still longer, however, 
because Wilson's cavalry, which had joined him, was 
as yet to a great extent unmounted and destitute of 
equipments. Convalescent horses, and those gath- 
ered in a random way, were coming in but slowly. 
Thus, with a force including Steedman's command of 
five thousand men, consisting of detachments which 
had for a time been left behind at Chattanooga and 
which reached him December ist, and A. J. Smith's 
corps from Missouri, he had an army which at the 
last numbered in all about fifty-two thousand in- 
fantry, to which the cavalry and quartermaster's men 
must be added ; in all, from sixty-five thousand to 
seventy thousand. Hood's army, which was in posi- 
tion in front of Nashville on December 3d, was thus 
disposed around the city in the nature of an invest- 
ment ; Cheatham's corps was on his right, Lee's in 
the center, and Stewart's on the left. Montgomery 
Hill and Overton Hill are prominent irregular eleva- 
tions of the Brentford range, which were occupied on 
December 4th, and fortified by the Confederates. 



ON TO NASHVILLE. 



257 



Thus posted, Hood awaited the sortie of Thomas 
with impatience ; it would help to develop his own 
plans. On the same day (the 4th) Hood made a 
diversion away from this field by ordering an attack 
on Murfreesboro, without, however, dislodging its 
garrison ; and also by an unsuccessful assault on a 
blockhouse erected on Overall Creek. 

And now everything seemed in readiness in the 
Union army at Nashville. What was the cause of 
the further delay ? Certainly it was more painful to 
Thomas than to any one else. He had expected to 
fight on December 7th ; but he found his cavalry not 
in condition nor ready to move until the 9th, notwith- 
standing the most strenuous efforts to mount and 
equip them. Military men know how difficult it is 
to organize cavalry, and how impossible it is for an 
army to operate without cavalry. The task accom- 
plished by Wilson in a few days was the ordinary 
labor of months. 

Then, when everything was in readiness, there set 
in a storm of sleet and freezing weather which made 
it impossible for either army to move. The ground 
was a verglas, or sheet of ice, so slippery that men 
and horses could not stand. This state of things 
was not relieved, but continued for six days, until 
December 14th. The elements seemed to conspire 
against Thomas. 

On the evening of that day Thomas called for his 
generals and gave them detailed instructions for the 



258 GENERAL THOMAS. 

next day. He informed them that at a given signal 
at six o'clock the next morning he would move out 
and attack the enemy according to these instructions, 
with such modifications as circumstances might ren- 
der necessary. 

Meanwhile there had been the greatest impa- 
tience at Washington. " Why does he not move ? " 
The correspondence at this period, both in its impa- 
tience and its utter disregard of military propriety, 
forms a sad page in the history, and one of which 
its participants should have been greatly ashamed. 
They seemed to remain willfully ignorant of the im- 
provised character of Thomas's force — the three 
corps from distinct military departments, and men 
drawn in small detachments from many organiza- 
tions — scanty in numbers at first, and with a lack of 
cavalry, even for the ordinary needs of learning the 
enemy's positions and plans. 

And now was heard from the Government au- 
thorities — the President, Mr. Stanton, Secretary of 
War, and General Halleck, at Washington, and Gen- 
eral Grant at City Point — such a jargon of grum- 
bling, scolding voices, such howls of impatience, such 
vulgar innuendoes as never before beset a poor gen- 
eral, who knew his duty and was trying his utmost 
to do it, feeling sure, besides, that the fault-finders 
did not know anything about it. They were the 
blunderers, not Thomas. 

" This looks," telegraphed Mr. Stanton, with a 



ON TO NASHVILLE. 259 

fling at patriotic men who had only failed by reason 
of circumstances, " this looks like the McClellan 
and Rosecrans strategy of do nothing and let the 
enemy raid the country." Grant's opinion, less in- 
sulting but equally unreasonable, was that Thomas 
should attack at once, and, indeed, should have gone 
out and attacked immediately after the battle of 
Franklin. On December 6th he wrote : " Attack 
Hood at once, and wait no longer for a remount for 
your cavalry." 

Thomas read this telegram to the army and corps 
commanders, requiring him to move. General Scho- 
field and the rest sustained him in his decision to 
wait until he was ready ; but the latter part of the 
telegram was not shown, which presented the alter- 
native that he would be superseded if he did not move. 

This is the more astonishing as General Grant 
knew as well as any man the absolute necessity of 
cavalry in such a conflict, especially to prevent Hood 
from passing around Nashville to invade Tennessee. 
And Wilson's splendid use of that arm when the 
time came thoroughly vindicates Thomas's judg- 
ment. With regard to his attacking Hood at or just 
after Franklin, Thomas had telegraphed from Nash- 
ville under date of December 2d : "I had at this 
place (Nashville) but about five thousand men of 
General A. J. Smith's command, which, added to the 
force under General Schofield, would not have given 

me more than twenty-five thousand men." It would 
18 



26o GENERAL THOMAS. 

certainly have been madness to attempt such a thing 
at that time. 

The following dispatch from Mr. Stanton to 
General Grant is a disgrace to military correspond- 
ence. Under date of December 7th he telegraphed : 
"Thomas seems to be unwilling to attack because 
it is hazardous. If he waits for Wilson to get ready, 
Gabriel will be blowing his last horn." To these 
and other urgent messages, which we are sure the 
reader will be glad to be spared, Thomas could only 
reply that he could not move sooner, notwithstand- 
ing his best efforts. On the 9th, the day when he 
was ready to move but for the storm of sleet and 
rain, the following general order was actually issued 
at Washington, but was suspended for a short time 
longer. The order was, "that Major-General Scho- 
field relieve at once General G. H. Thomas in com- 
mand of the Department and Army of the Cumber- 
land." Several other generals were also proposed 
to supersede him. On the 13th an order was issued 
by General Grant from City Point, couched in these 
words : " Major-General John A. Logan . . . will 
proceed immediately to Nashville, Tennessee, re- 
porting by telegraph to the lieutenant general his 
arrival at Louisville, and also at Nashville." What 
Logan was to do at Nashville was not an open se- 
cret. Unless by special assignment, had Logan gone 
to Nashville, Schofield, who ranked him, would still 
have been in command. 



ON TO NASHVILLE. 26 1 

On the 15th, the very day of the battle, General 
Grant left City Point for Washington e7t route to 
Nashville, to take temporary command in person, 
and perhaps permanently supersede Thomas. It was 
then he heard of the first day's success, and returned 
to City Point. 

On the 9th, Thomas had telegraphed to Halleck : 
" I feel conscious that I have done everything in my 
power to prepare, and that the troops could not have 
been gotten ready before this. If General Grant 
shall order me to be relieved, I will submit without 
a murmur. A terrible storm of freezing rain has 
come on since daylight, which will render an attack 
impossible till it breaks." Was ever man so beset ? 

It is some alleviation of this treatment to feel 
reasonably sure that the great President Lincoln did 
not share these sentiments. In the Life of Lincoln, 
by Nicolay and Hay — which, as these gentlemen 
were near his person, may be considered as giving 
the President's views — we are pleased to find the 
following statement (X, 28) : " Thomas nowhere ap- 
pears to greater advantage, not even on the hills of 
Chickamauga, opposing his indomitable spirit to the 
surging tide of disaster and defeat, than he does 
during this week, opposing his sense of duty to the 
will of his omnipotent superior, and refusing to 
move one hour before he thought the interests of 
the country permitted it, even under threat of re- 
moval and disgrace." And in the opinion of Gen- 



262 GENERAL THOMAS. 

erals Sherman, William F. Smith, James H. Wilson, 
and Robert N. Scott, he had at this time acquired 
a greater knowledge of strategy than any of the 
generals or officials by whom he was surrounded. 

We need not multiply these dispatches and opin- 
ions. There are many more of them, and we find in 
the answers of Thomas the firm stand of an intelli- 
gent and well-informed will — of one man against 
the clamorous cabal of persons in authority hun- 
dreds of miles away, some of them in blissful igno- 
rance of the first principles of the military art; like 
the war-horse, but with other purpose, " smelling 
the battle from afar." A weaker man than Thomas 
would have yielded to the importunity and attacked 
before he was ready. Indeed, there seemed little 
discretion in the matter. He was ordered to attack 
at once. If he obeyed, the best interests of the 
country were endangered. If he did not, he was 
liable to the charge of "disobedience of orders." 
The firmness of General Thomas, therefore, assumes 
the proportions of a martyr's faith ; he would die 
for the cause, for the honor of the profession of 
arms, and for his own spotless character, rather than 
obey the orders. 

Comparisons are frequently odious, but sometimes 
necessary. Why did not the Administration, on sev- 
eral occasions of a lull in the war around Richmond, 
urge Grant with great insistency to hurry and take 
the Confederate capital ? Simply because he had 



ON TO NASHVILLE. 263 

the confidence of the Administration, and even Mr. 
Stanton did not dare to gainsay his words or actions. 
Grant, it is known, was a pushing and a tenacious 
man — so much so that on several occasions he sac- 
rificed men to experiment. But still he went on, re- 
gardless of his partial failures. On the other hand, 
Thomas was cold, quiet, careful in his movements, a 
nice calculator of chances, but always intending to 
win all that could be won. The men were unlike, to 
some extent antagonistic, and Grant could not un- 
derstand the steady and logical scheme of Thomas, 
who, from the time he left Sherman, had been col- 
lecting his scattered forces, and in the short period 
of two months had fully accomplished what he had 
purposed for the good of the country, while he had 
been stormed at and humiliated by the military au- 
thorities at Washington. 

Among the splendid deeds of Thomas in our 
great war, I consider his masterly delay and his fail- 
ure to obey urgent but vague, and what the French 
call ''impossible," orders at Nashville. If this be 
called negative merit, it demonstrated a powerful 
will, a greatness of soul, a tenacity of purpose, plac- 
ing him in the immortal category of the Roman 
poet's hero — Justum et tenacem p7'opositi virum. 



CHAPTER XII. 

THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE AND RESULTS. 

Union line — A. J. Smith — T. J. Wood — Steedman — Twenty-third 
Corps first in reserve, and then to extreme right — J. H. Wil- 
son — The gunboats — Steedman's attack — Smith and Wilson 
dislodge the enemy — McArthur's brilliant charge— Second 
day — Thomas inspects the v^'hole line — Wood's attacks — The 
right in concert — The enemy breaks — Pursuit — Hood retires 
from command — Changed tone of Washington dispatches — 
Thomas, Major-General, United States Army — Peace and 
reconstruction. 

To the cool and philosophical mind of Thomas 
there was not the urgent necessity of haste thus 
ejaculated from Washington. Every day increased 
the danger to Hood, while it improved the condition 
of the Union army. Why take desperate chances 
while a reasonable delay would render the issue cer- 
tain and successful ? Nothing was lost, much was 
gained, by delay. We return now to the projected 
attack of Thomas on the morning of the 15th of De- 
cember. By the 14th the ice had melted and the 
movement became feasible. The troops were in 
position at six o'clock in the morning, but were still 
further retarded by a dense mist, which did not clear 
off until about nine. The followins: was the forma- 



THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE AND RESULTS. 265 

tion, which had been communicated to the principal 
generals verbally, and also put in the form of an or- 
der of the day : 

General A. J. Smith's corps, flanked and sup- 
ported on the right by Hatch's division of Wilson's 
cavalry, which held ground from the Nolensville 
pike to the Cumberland River, formed the right ; 
General T. J. Wood, who had been in command of 
the Fourth Corps since Stanley was wounded, was 
in the center, across the Hillsboro pike ; and Gen- 
eral Steedman's troops formed the extreme left of 
the Federal line. Admiral Lee, of the navy, directed 
the patrolling of the river above and below the city 
by gunboats under Lieutenant -Commander Leroy 
Fitch. General Schofield's Twenty-third Corps was 
at first held in reserve in rear of Smith and Wood, 
but was soon, however, to move through his line, 
and by a detour take post in front of Smith on his 
right. Hammond, with the First Brigade of Knipe's 
cavalry division, was temporarily detached to Gal- 
latin to watch and impede any attempts of Hood to 
cross the river in that direction. The troops in and 
immediately around the city of Nashville occupied 
the nearest intrenchments as they were vacated by 
the advancing columns. 

There were during these six days of ice and sleet, 
which beset Hood as well as Thomas, grave doubts 
and speculations in Hood's camp. So complete were 
Thomas's preparations to receive him that he dared 



266 GENERAL THOMAS. 

not attempt a direct attack, and he began even to 
question his plan of going past Nashville into Ken- 
tucky. His further speculations were rendered un- 
necessary, however, by the shock of the Union at- 
tack, which was now imminent. 

Concealed by the undulating nature of the ground, 
the Federal attack was made before Hood had any 
accurate knowledge of its intention. A demonstra- 
tion was made by Steedman's troops against the 
Confederate right lying on Brown's Creek, beyond 
the Nolensville pike. This was of the nature of a 
feint, and had the desired effect, causing Hood to 
re-enforce his right in great haste. When this was 
accomplished. General Smith, with Wilson's cavalry, 
marched rapidly on the Hardin pike, and made a 
partial wheel to the left to confront the enemy's 
lines on the Hillsboro pike, at one point of which a 
heavy stone wall had been used by the Confederates 
as a rifle pit. 

The enemy was struck and dislodged from this 
position, a portion of Smith's command and Wilson's 
cavalry dismounted, the latter leading, taking two 
redoubts, one after the other, with guns and pris- 
oners. It was then that Thomas ordered Schofield, 
with the Twenty-third Corps, which had been in re- 
serve, to take post on Smith's right to strengthen 
that flank, and permit Wilson, by giving him very 
prompt and vigorous support, to endeavor to strike 
the enemy's rear with his cavalry. Under these cir- 



THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE AND RESULTS. 267 

cumstances the Fourth Corps, under General Wood, 
with the Third, Second, and First Divisions in line 
from left to right, made a direct attack in front upon 
Montgomery Hill, the strong salient of Hood's po- 
sition. This was entirely successful. It was now 
manifest to Hood that the purpose of Thomas was 
to turn his left flank. He had been driven out of 
his original line, and had fallen back to the base of 
Harpeth Hill, his line of retreat being still secure by 
the Granny White pike. 

As the Twenty-third Corps had not yet fully or- 
ganized for attack — and there was a consequent 
delay in its movements — General McArthur, com- 
manding Smith's first division, asked permission to 
attack a salient point in front of Schofield's com- 
mand. As there had been unexplained delay in the 
movements of the Twenty-third Corps, Thomas, who 
was in rear of the left center, rode rapidly to the right 
to learn the reason. When McArthur's request was 
preferred to him by A. J. Smith, he refused the per- 
mission, on the ground that it was due to the Twenty- 
third Corps to let it make the attack in its front. 
While he was talking to Schofield, McArthur, having 
received no answer to his request, took silence for 
consent, carried the point, drove back the enemy, 
and thus gave a rapid conclusion to the fortunes of 
the day, without the immediate co-operation of the 
Twenty-third. The efficiency of McArthur's charge 
by successive brigades — the front brigade being half- 



268 GENERAL THOMAS. 

way up the hill when the second and third were put 
in motion — with Wilson's dash with his dismounted 
cavalry, was recognized by Hood as a serious blow, 
the forerunner of imminent disaster soon to fall upon 
hmi. *' Our line," he says, " thus pierced, gave way ; 
soon thereafter it broke at all points." 

No advance of the infantry on the right was made 
until after three o'clock in the afternoon. Wilson's 
cavalry had been working on the left and rear of 
Hood's main line from ten o'clock until that hour, 
and after many urgent requests to Thomas to seize 
the opportune moment by the advance of the in- 
fantry, Wilson went in person and pointed out por- 
tions of his command entering the rebel works, and 
only needing re-enforcements to roll back and double 
up Hood's left. It was then that Thomas ordered 
Schofield to advance. But the work had been already 
done. This turning movement of the cavalry, en- 
veloping the enemy's left and rear for a mile or 
more, drove Hood to seek safety for his communica- 
tions by rapidly retiring. 

The enemy attempted a riposte^ but by this time 
General D. N. Couch, of Schofield's corps, threw for- 
ward one brigade after another and drove them 
back with great loss. When night fell the main body 
of Thomas's troops lay along the Hillsboro pike, al- 
most at right angles to their original position, hav- 
ing crowded the left flank of the enemy back upon its 
center. The dismounted cavalry was placed in force 



THE- BATTLE OF NASHVILLE AND RESULTS. 269 

upon the extreme right of the Union army on the 
Hillsboro pike. It was now manifest that Thomas 
would attempt to turn both flanks, or, by threaten- 
ing their right, make the attack easier on the left. 

Thus ended the first day of the battle of Nashville, 
Hood having been driven back to seek a new line 
at the Harpeth Hills, which he strongly intrenched 
during the night. That night Thomas telegraphed : 
" Attacked enemy's left this morning ; drove it from 
the river below the city very nearly to Franklin pike — 
distance about eight miles." The good news spread 
on lightning wing throughout the country, North and 
South. This was not a moment too soon for Thom- 
as's welfare, for Grant, having determined to super- 
sede him, was, as we have seen, en route to carry out 
that purpose. While on his way he received the 
above dispatch, which so relieved his concern that 
he turned back, leaving General Thomas to com- 
plete his great victory. 

It was a cold and dark December night that fol- 
lowed that first day of battle, and the troops of both 
armies spent it mainly in busy preparation for the 
next morning. The Union troops were elated by 
their success and confident for the morrow, while 
the Confederates had much to repair — indeed, to re- 
organize, and but little hope of carrying out their 
purpose. If they could neither beat Thomas nor 
flank him and go into Kentucky, they would at least 
retire with sullen dignity. Alas for them ! They were 



2;o GENERAL THOMAS. 

not to be permitted to do this. Then Hood's second 
thought, if he must abandon the plan of capturing 
Nashville, was to hold the line of Duck River, repair 
damages, and make ready for a new advance ; but 
that was also to be impossible. The Union army- 
was organized for advance, battle, and pursuit. He 
had not a moment's rest. 

At an early hour on the i6th of December Thomas 
rode along the line, the order of which from left to 
right was Steedman, Wood, Smith, the Twenty-third 
Corps, drawn up in a semicircle concave to the ene- 
my. The cavalry was on the left flank and rear of 
the enemy's position. To meet the new line of the 
Federal advance. Hood now withdrew Cheatham's 
corps from the extreme right to the left flank. This 
left the ground in front of Wood's Fourth Corps 
comparatively unoccupied ; and so that general 
pushed forward, with General Steedman, to cover 
his left flank. 

The Union army was thus in a very compact 
order — Schofield on the right toward the enemy's 
left flank and almost at right angles to Smith; Wood 
in contact with Smith, and Steedman on the left. A 
portion of Wilson's cavalry had now gained Hood's 
rear, across the Granny White pike. The enemy, 
during the night of the 15th, had occupied Overton's 
Hill and fortified it strongly ; it constituted their 
right point, while their left was on the hills border- 
ing the Granny White pike. The Union line was 



THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE AND RESULTS. 



271 



now very close to the Confederates at all points. 
Early in the afternoon, and under cover of his bat- 
teries, after a reconnoissance by Colonel P. Sidney 
Post, General Wood ordered an assault upon the 
north slope of Overton's Hill with two brigades 
commanded by Colonel Post. The enemy, in expec- 
tation of this, had re-enforced that point ; and the 
assailing party met with such a withering fire as they 
advanced that they were obliged to fall back and 
reform for a new attack. Colonel Post was severely 
wounded. Schofield and A. J. Smith then made the 
grandest diversion in his favor by a most vigorous 
attack in their fronts ; they carried all the enemy's 
positions, drove him back pell-mell, captured all his 
artillery, took thousands of prisoners, among whom 
were four general officers, and all this with very little 
loss. The panic flight of the enemy's left was expe- 
dited by an attack of Wilson's dismounted men on 
his extreme left, which had already threatened to 
cut him off from his retreat. It was then that Hood 
sent word to General Chalmers "that unless they 
could be driven from his left and rear all was 
lost." By this time Wood was ready to renew his 
attack on Overton's Hill on their right, where the 
Confederates were still in great strength. He was 
received with a terrible fire, and for a time held in 
check ; but nothing could resist the impetuosity of 
his charge. The enemy swarmed out of his intrench- 
ments to the rear and fled in disorder, and, as soon 



2/2 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



as their line broke, the Fourth Corps advanced at 
once in rapid pursuit of them. The supreme mo- 
ment had now arrived. All the pikes were in requi- 
sition. Wilson's cavalry pursued along the Granny- 
White pike, encountering the Confederate cavalry 
under Chalmers one mile in rear of the line of battle, 
which it scattered in every direction, and then con- 
tinued the pursuit until midnight, making large cap- 
tures. The Fourth Corps pressed forward by the 
Franklin road, in pursuit, as far as the Harpeth 
River, where, the bridges being destroyed, new ones 
were improvised. Hood crossed that stream on the 
i8th. The pursuit was then continued to Duck 
River, the cavalry pressing close upon their rear 
and bringing them frequently to bay ; the line was 
promptly abandoned, and on the 27th the discom- 
fited Confederates crossed the Tennessee and fell 
back as far as Tupelo, on the Mississippi. The last 
stand was made at Sugar Creek, and then the pur- 
suit was also abandoned. This was on the 26th of 
December. It is difficult to estimate the enormous 
losses with accuracy. There were two thousand de- 
serters, and to these must be added the large number 
who fell in the fierce battle. 

We should not fail to notice the perfect symme- 
try of the battle of Nashville ; the admirable dispo- 
sitions of Thomas, leaving no weak point in the 
entire line ; his constant supervision of all parts of 
the field ; the splendid energy of his subordinates of 



THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE AND RESULTS. 273 

all grades, inspired with his spirit and fighting under 
his eye. A single partial repulse, magnificently re- 
versed by a splendid charge ; a pursuit on the morn- 
ing of the third day, without a moment's delay ; 
supplies, rations, ammunitions, everything being in 
readiness by reason of that admirable forecast and 
" delay " which was thus vindicated in the eyes of 
all at that time, and has passed into history in spite 
of the scoffs and cavils of the wirepullers at Wash- 
ington. General Thomas says : " During the two 
days of the battle the Federal army took four thou- 
sand four hundred and sixty-two prisoners, two hun- 
dred and eighty-seven officers, including one major 
general and three brigadiers, fifty-three guns and 
twenty-five flags, and many thousand small arms, 
with a large number of wagons." 

The enemy's losses in the two days' battle of 
Nashville were so great, and the means of calcu- 
lating them so uncertain, that there can be no ex- 
act statement made. By an estimate of those scat- 
tering in all directions and by capture, there were 
thirteen thousand one hundred and eighty-nine, in- 
cluding seven generals, seventy-two guns, and sev- 
enty standards. Those of Thomas were three thou- 
sand and fifty-seven, all told, at Nashville, and in 
the whole campaign, from the time that he cut loose 
from Sherman, not more than ten thousand. 

Thomas intended to put his army into winter 
quarters — " for lack of argument " ; they had noth- 



274 GENERAL THOMAS. 

ing to oppose them. The Fourth Corps took post at 
Huntsville and Athens, the Twenty-third at Dalton ; 
A. J. Smith's force went to Eastport, and Wilson's 
cavalry were at Huntsville, and moved thence to 
Eastport and Gravelly Springs. But this arrange- 
ment was not agreed to by General Grant. That 
general was guarded in his congratulations on the 
great victory, but retained his opinion that Thomas 
had been too slow before the battle. He therefore 
was indisposed to give Thomas much power for the 
future, but employed his forces in various partial 
expeditions under subordinate commanders. The 
truth remains, however, that up to that time Nash- 
ville was the only battle of the war, except perhaps 
the Vicksburg campaign, in which the Union army 
had defeated, dissipated, routed, and destroyed a 
Confederate army in logical sequence from the be- 
ginning to the end. 

After the battle and the pursuit Hood had his 
headquarters for a few days at Tuscumbia, and dur- 
ing January his infantry was rallying at Tupelo. 
Forrest was in command of all the cavalry, and for 
his dashing movements he was created, on February 
24th, a lieutenant general. It proved a barren hon- 
or. At Tupelo, a broken man in health and spirits. 
Hood retired from the command, turning it over 
to General Dick Taylor on January 23d. Hood 
was an honest man, and has written, in admirable 
tone, a volume called Advance and Retreat, in his 



THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE AND RESULTS. 275 

own vindication. Much of it is coiitroversial as to 
his relations to J. E. Johnston. In it he is frank 
enough to say : " Our line, thus pierced (by the Fed- 
eral charge), gave way ; soon thereafter it broke at 
all points, and I beheld for the first and only time a 
Confederate army abandon the field in confusion." 
Detailing the difficulties which had beset him, he as- 
sumed the entire responsibility for the defeat, and 
left the command of the army just before the entire 
dissolution of the Confederacy, which was even now 
imminent. From first to last Hood's greatest want 
was men and weight in his columns. 

We have seen how at the first the vexed question 
of loyalty to the Union presented itself to the minds 
of all men of Southern birth in the army when the 
war broke out ; how many excellent and honorable 
men, like Lee and Stonewall Jackson, were swept into 
the Confederate ranks by the whirlwind of passion, 
and the consequent storm of public opinion in the 
States seceded from the Union. Such temptations 
must undoubtedly have presented themselves to the 
mind of Thomas, and we have seen how he nobly 
settled the matter in favor of our whole country. 
We give greater praise to his conduct, or rather we 
are the more thankful for his loyalty, when we see 
how in several great emergencies he may be said to 
have saved the country. The victory of Nashville 
had a magnificent correlation to other great designs 
and events. It utterly destroyed Hood's army as an 
19 



2/6 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



effective whole, so that it was of little further service 
whatever to the Confederacy, while it left the South 
at the mercy of the Union troops. It inaugurated 
" the beginning of the end." It left but one consid- 
erable Confederate army in the entire field, which, 
so closely was it beleaguered in and around Rich- 
mond, it was manifest must soon lay down its arms. 
In so doing it prevented a Northern invasion, which 
might have prolonged the war. It chimed with Sher- 
man's successful expectation, which captured Savan- 
nah, and it led to the capitulation of Johnston in 
North Carolina. It dashed the last hopes of Lee in 
Virginia, and hastened the surrender at Appomattox 
Court House. In a word, it stands alone as a 
unique, thorough, magnificent, and far-reaching vic- 
tory, achieved by the skill and firmness of one man, 
who had acquired the confidence of his officers and 
men, so that they fought for him as well as for the 
cause. Among the many actual defeats or drawn 
battles which the Union army had suffered, and the 
humiliation of which was emphasized and contrasted 
with the success at Nashville, it stands without a rival. 
Had Thomas fought at Franklin, unprepared as 
he was, and met with only partial success, the strug- 
gle would have been prolonged ; the enemy would 
have had time to recruit, and perhaps be re-enforced. 
We contend that the plan of fighting at Nashville, 
and when ready, was the best ; at least it settled the 
question at one vigorous blow. One other thought 



I 



THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE AND RESULTS. 



277 



may be permitted in this connection. Let us suppose 
that the decision of Thomas, at the breaking out of 
the war, had been otherwise ; that he had espoused 
the Confederate cause ; that he had attacked instead 
of defendi?ig the fearful position at Chickamauga ; 
that he, instead of Hood^ had conducted the Confed- 
erate campaign into Tennessee. The results, we may 
readily conceive, would have been widely and disas- 
trously different. Thus it is not by what he accom- 
plished alone, but by what might have reasonably 
been, in case of his defection, that his character as a 
man and a patriot and his skill as a general shine 
with double luster. It was well that the last impor- 
tant action of his military life should have such sig- 
nificance as this ; that he was commander in chief, 
and without interferences, once at least ; that by this 
signal victory, all his own, he should manifest his 
greatness, and set the seal to his splendid and con- 
sistent career. Providence had been good to him in 
this respect. 

It will throw further light upon this great battle 
if we present a part of the General Order No. 169, 
issued by General Thomas to his army, and dated — 

" Pulaski, December sg, 1864. 
" Soldiers : The major general commanding an- 
nounces to you that the rear guard of the flying and 
dispirited enemy was driven across the Tennessee 
River on the night of the 27th instant. The impass- 
able state of the roads, and consequent impossi- 



278 GENERAL THOMAS. 

bility to supply the army, compels a closing of the 
campaign for the present. 

" Although short, it has been brilliant in its 
achievements, and unsurpassed in its results by any 
other of this war, and is one of which all who par- 
ticipated therein may be justly proud. That veteran 
army which, though driven from position to posi- 
tion, opposed a stubborn resistance to much superior 
numbers during the whole of the Atlanta campaign, 
taking advantage of the absence of the largest por- 
tion of the army which had been opposed to it in 
Georgia, invaded Tennessee, buoyant with hope, ex- 
pecting Nashville, Murfreesboro, and the whole of 
Tennessee and Kentucky to fall into its power an 
easy prey, and scarcely fixing a limit to its con- 
quests. After having received at Franklin the most 
terrible check that army has met with during this 
war, and later at Murfreesboro, in its attempt to 
capture that place, it was finally attacked at Nash- 
ville, and, although your forces were inferior to it 
in numbers, was hurled back from the coveted prize 
on which it had been permitted to look from a dis- 
tance, and finally sent flying, dismayed and disor- 
dered, whence it came, impelled by the instinct of 
self-preservation, and thinking only how it could re- 
lieve itself for short intervals from your persistent 
and harassing pursuit, by burning the bridges over 
the swollen streams as it passed them, until finally 
it had placed the broad waters of the Tennessee 
River between you and its shattered, diminished, and 
dfscomfited columns, leaving its artillery and battle- 
flags in your victorious hands — lasting trophies of 
your noble daring, and lasting monuments of the 
enemy's disgrace and defeat. 



THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE AND RESULTS. 279 

" You have diminished the forces of the rebel 
army since it crossed the Tennessee River to invade 
the State, at the least estimate, fifteen thousand men, 
among whom were killed, wounded, and captured, 
eighteen general officers. 

"Your captures from the enemy, as far as re- 
ported, amount to sixty-eight pieces of artillery, ten 
thousand prisoners, as many of small arms — several 
thousand of which have been gathered in, and the 
remainder strew the route of the enemy's retreat — 
and between thirty and forty flags, besides compel- 
ling him to destroy much ammunition and abandon 
many wagons." 

To this may be added some extracts from Gen- 
eral Thomas's report of the battle : 

" On the morning of the 15th of December, the 
weather being favorable, the army was formed and 
ready at an early hour to carry out the plan of battle 
promulgated in the special field orders of the 14th. 
The formation of troops was partially concealed 
from the enemy by the broken nature of the ground, 
as also by a fog, which lifted toward noon. . . . 

" Finding General Smith had not taken as much 
distance to the right as I had expected he would 
have done, I directed General Schofield to move his 
command (the Twenty-third Corps) from position in 
reserve, to which it had been assigned, over the right 
of General Smith, enabling the cavalry thereby to 
operate more freely to the enemy's rear. This was 
rapidly accomplished by Schofield, and his troops 
participated in the closing operations of the day. 

"Our line at nightfall was readjusted, running 



28o GENERAL THOMAS. 

parallel to and east of the Hillsboro pike — Scho- 
field's command on the right, Smith's in the center, 
and Wood's on the left, with Wilson's cavalry on the 
right of Scholield ; Steedman held the position he 
had gained early in the morning. The total re- 
sult of the day's operations was the capture of six- 
teen pieces of artillery and twelve hundred prison- 
ers, besides several hundred stands of small arms 
and about forty wagons. The enemy had been 
forced back at all points with heavy loss. Our casu- 
alties were unusually light. The behavior of the 
troops was unsurpassed for steadiness and alacrity 
in every movement, and the original plan of battle, 
with but few alterations, was strictly adhered to. 
The whole command bivouacked in the line of battle 
during the night on the ground occupied at dark, 
while preparations were made to renew the battle 
at an early hour on the morrow. 

" Immediately following the effort of the Fourth 
Corps, Generals Smith's and Schofield's commands 
moved against the enemy's works in their respective 
fronts, carrying all before them, irreparably break- 
ing his lines in a dozen places, and capturing all his 
artillery and thousands of prisoners — among the lat- 
ter four general officers. Our loss was remarkably 
small — scarcely mentionable. All of the enemy that 
did escape were pursued over the tops of Brent- 
wood and Harpeth Hills. General Wilson's cavalry 
dismounted, attacked the enemy simultaneously with 
Schofield and Smith, striking him in reverse, and, 
gaining firm possession of Granny White pike, cut 
off his retreat by that route. Wood's and Steed- 
man's troops, hearing the shouts of victory coming 
from the right, rushed impetuously forward, renew- 



THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE AND RESULTS. 28 1 

ing the assault on Overton's Hill ; and although 
meeting a very heavy fire, the onset was irresistible, 
artillery and many prisoners falling into our hands. 
The enemy, hopelessly broken, fled in confusion 
through Brentwood Pass, the Fourth Corps in close 
pursuit, which was continued for several miles, when 
darkness closed the scene and the troops rested from 
their labors. A portion of Wilson's cavalry continued 
the pursuit till midnight. During the two days' oper- 
ations there were four thousand four hundred and 
sixty-two prisoners captured, including two hundred 
and eighty-seven officers, of all grades from that of 
major general, fifty-three pieces of artillery, and 
thousands of small arms. The enemy abandoned on 
the field all of his dead and wounded." 

The pursuit was for a short time delayed by a 
slight blunder in sending forward the pontoon train. 
A staff officer in directing it wrote by mistake that 
it was to proceed by the Murfreesboro pike instead 
of the Nolensville pike, and it had already traveled 
two miles before the mistake was corrected. 

It is always fortunate for the military biographer 
when he can find his criticisms in the very words of 
the general himself. Thomas was very reticent with 
regard to the conduct of others, but did not spare 
himself. In a familiar lecture on the battle of Nash- 
ville, which he delivered before a scientific club in 
Washington and which was said to be a model of 
clearness and vivid description, he pointed out what 
he called a grave error of judgment, which was in 
not sending at the close of the first day a strong 



282 GENERAL THOMAS. 

force round to the rear of the enemy to cut off his 
retreat and capture his entire army. He was the 
more magnanimous in stating his fault, because, after 
such brilliant results had been achieved, few, if any, 
would have dared to advance such a criticism. 
Knowing the field so thoroughly as he did, he was 
perhaps not prepared /or that panic rout into which 
the enemy was driven, and which so thoroughly sur- 
prised Hood himself. Just before the break it was 
the Confederate purpose to attack that very right 
flank with which Thomas would have made the 
movement, and which Hood declared to be in air. 

The history of the Nashville campaign is indeed 
a triumphant vindication of the policy and conduct 
of Thomas. No further or other answer is needed 
to the antecedent criticisms from Washington. He 
could not have left Nashville to fight at Franklin 
with any propriety, even if A. J. Smith had arrived 
in time. Everything there was in a heterogeneous 
condition. Old troops leaving, new troops and re- 
cruits coming in from many directions ; an army as 
yet unorganized, a large portion of the cavalry with- 
out horses, he was absolutely needed at that point, 
and every moment of his time was employed in an 
organization and assignment of positions and com- 
mands, and getting in readiness for the supreme 
moment which he knew must soon arrive. It is 
passing strange that this was not clear to General 
Grant and the authorities at Washington. 



THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE AND RESULTS. 



283 



Results of the Battle of Nashville, — There was a 
great revolution of sentiment at Washington. As 
soon as the victory was assured, all those who had 
been assailing him with impatient remonstrances 
and almost abusive urgency had suddenly changed 
their note, and were as full of panegyric as they had 
been of reproach. Lincoln wrote : " Please accept 
for yourself, officers, and men, the nation's thanks 
for your work of yesterday. You made a magnifi- 
cent beginning ; a grand consummation is within 
your easy reach." 

Secretary Stanton would hardly be recognized in 
the following dispatch, sent after the result of the 
first day : 

"I rejoice in tendering to you and the gal- 
lant officers and soldiers of your command the 
thanks of this department for the brilliant achieve- 
ment of this day, and hope that it is the harbinger 
of a decisive victory that will crown you and your 
army with honor, and do much toward closing the 
war. We shall give you a hundred guns in the 
morning. 

(Signed) " E. M. Stanton, 

" Secretary of War.'* 

But Thomas was in no humor for accepting this 
flattering unction. We may anticipate by saying that 
the Secretary's former unkind dispatches had made 
such an enduring impression upon General Thomas, 



284 GENERAL THOMAS. 

that when they afterward met in Washington, and 
the Secretary told him, *' I have always had great 
confidence in you," the words were so in contrast to 
his former actions that Thomas answered : " Mr. 
Stanton, I am sorry to hear you make this state- 
ment. I have not been treated as if you had con- 
fidence in me." 

General Grant, while praising him for his victory, 
was still of the opinion, however, that he had been 
slow, and that he might have fought and driven back 
the enemy before he reached Franklin — an opinion 
in which he has not been supported by the just judg- 
ment of the best military critics. In speaking, on the 
15th of January, of the chance that Beauregard would 
collect the fragments of Hood's army and go against 
Sherman, Grant says : " If this be the case, Selma 
and Montgomery can easily be reached. I do not 
believe, though, that General Thomas will get there 
from the North ; he is too ponderous in his prepara- 
tions and equipments to move through a country 
rapidly enough to live off of it." This was severe 
criticism, and deeply did Thomas feel it. He had 
never failed, he had never been beaten, but his pon- 
derous blows had saved the army when many of the 
rapid generals had used their fleetness in the wrong 
direction. 

All things were now conspiring against the 
Confederacy and converging to a crisis. It was 
a foregone conclusion that it was a "lost cause." 



THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE AND RESULTS. 285 

Sherman, in his march to the sea, had demonstrated 
their weakness in that whole region, and was now 
moving through the Atlantic States against J. E. 
Johnston, who had been again — for lack of an abler 
man who could not be found — reluctantly placed in 
command. Thomas had disintegrated the army of 
Hood. Lee was holding on in front of Richmond 
with a grip which was very rapidly being relaxed. 
All the Union armies were closing together or in 
close relations, and it was manifest that the end 
was very near. Jefferson Davis, the Confederate 
President, was about to be captured at Irvinsville 
while escaping in disguise. 

As will be seen by Thomas's order after the 
battle, it was his purpose to occupy commanding 
points in the enemy's territory and let his army 
rest ; but this was not to be, nor can we think it, 
on the whole, the wisest course. On December 
31st Halleck telegraphed him : " Lieutenant-Gen- 
eral Grant does not intend that your army should 
go into winter quarters ; it must be ready for active 
operations in the field." General A. J. Smith, who 
had taken his corps to Eastport, whither Wilson had 
also gone with his cavalry, was then put under the 
orders of General Canby, at New Orleans. Schofield 
was sent with the Twenty-third without delay to join 
Sherman in his upward march through North Caro- 
lina. What remained of Hood's force was divided : 
Cheatham and S. P. Lee marching through Selma 



286 GENERAL THOMAS. 

and Montgomery to harass General Sherman in rear 
and flank, while the remnant joined General Richard 
Taylor at Meridian, and took no part in the later 
movements. 

Whatever was the judgment of his superiors, the 
country at large now accepted Thomas as a model 
chieftain. On the 24th of December, 1864, the Presi- 
dent nominated him as a major general in the army, 
a distinction which he himself thought he had de- 
served much earlier. " I suppose," he said to a 
friend, " it is better late than never, but it is too late 
to be appreciated ; I earned this at Chickamauga " — 
and indeed he had. 

" There is one thing," he said on another occa- 
sion, " about my promotions that is exceedingly 
gratifying : I never received a promotion they dared 
to withhold. After Chickamauga they could not re- 
fuse a commission as brigadier general in the United 
States army, and after Nashville a major general's 
commission." 

On the 3d of March, 1865, by a joint resolution 
of the two Houses, Congress voted its thanks to Gen- 
eral Thomas, his officers and men, for the victory at 
Nashville. On the 2d of November a similar reso- 
lution was passed by the General Assembly of Ten- 
nessee, and a gold medal was presented to him in 
commemoration of the event. 

We may pass over the remaining events of the 
war with the mere mention of the proposed move- 



THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE AND RESULTS. 287 

ment of Canby into Alabama ; the cavalry move- 
ments of Wilson upon Selma and the Southern capi- 
tal, Montgomery ; and Stoneman into Virginia and 
western North Carolina — all to chime with Sheri- 
dan's movement upon Lynchburg in February, 1865, 
The main features of Stoneman's very brilliant 
expedition were as follows : It was under orders 
from General Grant to Thomas that Stoneman was 
directed to move with a force of cavalry ten thou- 
sand strong with the utmost celerity into North 
Carolina and southern Virginia, to make a diversion 
in favor of Sherman's march in that part of these 
States beyond his reach. By the 24th of March he 
had reached Jonesboro, marching without impedi- 
menta ; on the 27th he was at the Watauga River ; 
thence over the Blue Ridge he marched to Salem, 
Virginia. He divided his force for separate raids, re- 
uniting again when the special work was done ; and 
he made such wholesale destruction as belittles for- 
mer similar achievements; supplies of corn, rice, and 
other provisions, guns, small arms, powder, maga- 
zines, stations and depots, long lines of railroads, 
bridges, etc., were destroyed ; the Tennessee and 
Virginia Railroad, that grand artery, was cut at 
many points ; many wagon trains and more than six 
thousand prisoners were captured. He was moving 
on toward Lynchburg, the object of Sheridan's raid 
from the East ; from Salisbury he had proceeded as 
far as Asheville ; there he received the news of Sher- 



288 GENERAL THOMAS. 

man's armistice, which put an end to his expedition. 
Stoneman met with but little opposition, but did in- 
credible injury to the enemy's territory and war 
material. 

We turn to the other and far the more conse- 
quential expedition — that of Wilson. Space is lack- 
ing to give details. As Canby was desired to take 
Mobile, the first purpose of Grant was that General 
Wilson should simply co-operate with him ; to this 
end he was to capture Selma or Montgomery, or 
both, if possible. 

Wilson, a general by intuition and a dashing 
cavalryman, wanted a little larger scope, and this, 
with Grant's sanction, Thomas granted him. If he 
could do what was asked of him, or rather what he 
proposed, he might go farther and do more. The 
expedition traveled light, but had a canvas pontoon 
train of thirty boats, and provisions for forty days. 
Taking only three divisions, because he required the 
horses of the fourth to remount these, he crossed 
the river on the iSth of March, and started on the 
22d from Chickasaw with twelve thousand mounted 
men and fifteen hundred unmounted, through a 
country so denuded of supplies that he was obliged 
to divide his force, in order, while still within sup- 
porting distance, to subsist his troops. Thus sepa- 
rating and uniting, he converged upon Selma. 

On April ist the main body was at Plantersville. 
Selma, an important manufacturing town, is situated 



,.^ 



THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE AND RESULTS. 289 

on the north bank of the Alabama River, one hun- 
dred and fifty miles above Mobile, and is one hun- 
dred feet above the mean water level ; it seemed 
to be adequately defended by Forrest with three 
brigades of Confederate cavalry and a force of 
infantry and militia. The assault upon the town 
was gallantly made by General Long, who was 
wounded, and it was taken. It is recorded that 
where the way of the assailants was barred by 
stockades the men in the rear ran, and, jumping 
upon the backs of the advanced men, crossed the 
stockade and entered the inclosure by a " leap- 
frog " movement. Forrest requested an interview 
with Wilson at Catawba, on April 6th, to effect 
an exchange of prisoners, without result. Selma 
was almost entirely destroyed, with large stores of 
every kind. The captures included thirty-one field- 
pieces, one thirty-pounder, two thousand seven hun- 
dred prisoners, three thousand horses (very much 
needed by Wilson for remounts), and a large quan- 
tity of stores of all kinds. 

On the loth of April, in the exercise of his roving 
commission, Wilson crossed the river and moved 
upon Montgomery, the first Confederate capital, 
being sure that Mobile was already upon Canby's 
list of conquests. Montgomery surrendered on the 
12th, and there again the material supports of the 
Confederacy were destroyed. Nearly one hundred 
thousand bales of cotton were burned ; steamboats, 



290 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



locomotives, and foundries were captured and ruined. 
Thence a detachment moved on West Point, while 
the main part of the cavalry marched to Columbus, 
Georgia, on the east bank of the Chattahoochee, 
where there was more wholesale destruction, in- 
cluding the ram Jackson. Still further unrelenting, 
the force proceeded to Macon, which it reached on 
April 2ist. There Wilson heard of the armistice 
between Johnston and Sherman, but as it did not 
come through what he regarded as a reliable source, 
he discredited it, and captured the city with its gar- 
rison, including Generals Howell Cobb, G. W. Smith, 
and Mackall. On the 21st of April a dispatch .from 
Sherman came through General Thomas announcing 
the truth, and ordering him to desist from further 
hostilities. 

This separate expeditionary campaign of Wilson 
deserves a fuller record ; but the statistics given are 
sufficient to impress the reader with its great merit 
and its potent influence in bringing about the close 
of the war. It has a remarkable correlation with all 
the great events of the period. Sherman's march 
through Georgia had disclosed the rapidly failing 
strength of the Confederacy in men, money, mu- 
nitions, and supplies. The brilliant campaign of 
Nashville under Thomas had disintegrated their last 
considerable army, except that of Lee, in the entire 
field. The bold, independent advance of Wilson ; his 
fierce and successive assaults of fortified places ; the 



THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE AND RESULTS. 29 1 

relentless following up of success ; the capture of the 
*' last ditch " at Macon, and the arrest of the Con- 
federate President in disguise, declared that the Con- 
federacy had really ceased to exist, needing only the 
formal surrender at Appomattox Court House to 
announce the fact to the expectant world. 

Then came in speedy succession the grand return 
march of General Sherman from Savannah to re- 
enforce the Federal army in front of Richmond ; the 
close of the war by the surrender of Lee at Appo- 
mattox Court House; the armistice of Sherman with 
Johnston's troops, and the great controversy there- 
by excited ; and, finally, the capture of Jefferson 
Davis by Wilson's cavalry troops near Irvinsville, 
Georgia, on the nth of May. With all these Thomas 
had only indirect connection and no immediate com- 
mand, and they are treated of in other of these 
biographies. 

At the close of the war Thomas was the junior 
of six major generals in the Union army.* He had 
on the 17th of January, 1865, been assigned by the 
President to the command of the territory occupied 
by the troops of the departments of the Ohio and the 
Cumberland. When the surrender of Johnston was 
announced on the 29th of April, he attempted at 

* Up to and including the rank of colonel in the army the 
promotion is lineal. Generals of eveiy grade are nominated by 
the President without regard to their lineal rank. He may nomi- 
nate a lieutenant to be a general. The assignment to a desired 
command is generally regarded the privilege of relative rank. 
20 



292 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



once to introduce social order into that region. By 
an order from Washington on the 7th of June the 
Military Division of the Tennessee was created, and 
he was assigned to the command. It consisted of 
the five departments of Kentucky, Tennessee, Geor- 
gia, Alabama, and Florida. 

It would be unnecessary and unprofitable to dwell 
upon the part taken by Thomas in the reconstruction 
and restoration of the seceded States. While his 
Southern birth and education may seem to have 
given him a better knowledge of the people and 
their needs, and while his honesty assured that his 
purpose would be carried out without fear or preju- 
dice, he himself seemed to think, and no doubt justly, 
that his efforts in that direction would not be accept- 
able to the Southern people, who still looked with 
some bitterness upon what they considered his defec- 
tion from their cause. It was due to this that he de- 
clmed the detail to New Orleans, and his mind under- 
went certain changes of purpose from the time when 
he left the Department of the Cumberland to assume 
command of the Military Division of the Tennessee. 
This was June 22, 1865. 

In the beginning of 1866 he testified before the 
reconstruction committee in favor of having repre- 
sentatives in Congress from Tennessee, of restrict- 
ing the use of United States troops to service when 
requested by the governors of States, of keeping 
troops in the departments "both for their moral 



THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE AND RESULTS. 293 

effect upon the lawless portion of the community, 
and for assistance to the civil authorities when re- 
quired." He adds, "I can not but admit they are 
of little use where the officers of the civil law do not 
perform their duties." He recognizes and reports 
the various organizations in the South hostile to the 
Government which impeded the progress of peace 
and quiet ; and yet at the same time he says there 
is evidence '' that the mass of the people were very 
happy at the downfall of the rebellion and at the 
prospect of soon getting again under the Constitu- 
tion and Government of the United States." But no 
one recognized more fully the fact that after so ter- 
rible a struggle there must be after-waves, and that, 
while promptness and firmness were necessary in 
dealing with the embittered inhabitants, every effort 
should be made by kindness and tact to win them 
back to their allegiance. The wise policy and tem- 
perate justice of General Thomas, combined with 
firmness, were shown when the rebellion was in its 
last stages, by his action with regard to the Bishop 
of Alabama, in dealing with which he acted with pru- 
dence, firmness, and generosity. When the sergeant- 
at-arms of the Tennessee Legislature asked for the 
aid of Federal soldiers to punish refractory mem- 
bers, Thomas applied to the War Department for 
instructions, and, according to those instructions, he 
declined to interfere in the doings of the State Legis- 
lature. 



294 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



On the 1 2th of June, 1865, the General Assembly 
of Tennessee adopted resolutions expressing their 
sincere pleasure at the appointment of General 
Thomas to command the Military Division of the 
Tennessee. They speak of him as the model soldier. 
They hoped for early peace and quiet, and Union- 
ism to prevail by reason of his appointment. They 
thanked the President and the War Department for 
assigning him to them, and they adopted him as a 
citizen of Tennessee. On the 25th of August, 1866, 
the Legislature of Tennessee passed a resolution to 
purchase a life-size portrait of General Thomas, to 
be placed in the Capitol. 

Rapid changes were made in the constitution 
and territory of his division, and he was, by order, 
on the 26th of August, 1867, and at his own request, 
placed in command of the Department of the Cum- 
berland, comprising Kentucky, Tennessee, and West 
Virginia, with his headquarters at Louisville. On 
the 2ist of February, 1868, President Johnson nomi- 
nated him to the United States Senate for the bre- 
vets of lieutenant general and general. At that time 
Johnson was in the midst of his imbroglio with the 
authorities at Washington, which led to his impeach- 
ment, and it is probable that these nominations were 
intended to precede a blow at General Grant ; but 
that was not the ground upon which Thomas de- 
clined them. "I have done," he said, "no service 
since the war to deserve so high a compliment, and 



THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE AND RESULTS. 295 

it is now too late to be regarded as a compliment if 
conferred for services during the war." 

Efforts were also made at that time to make him 
a candidate for the presidency of the United States. 
Had he become so, there is little doubt that he would 
have swept the country. We can not better present 
his views on the subject than in a few words taken 
from letters written in answer to such a request. In 
one he says : " I have too much regard for my own 
self-respect to voluntarily place myself in a position 
where my personal and private character can be as- 
sailed with impunity by newspaper men and scurril- 
ous political pettifoggers and demagogues." 

On the 8th of March, 1870, when the question 
was again mooted, he writes : " My services are now, 
as they have always been, subject to the call of the 
Government in whatever military capacity I may be 
considered competent and worthy to fill, and will be 
cordially undertaken whenever called upon to ren- 
der them. All civil honors and duties I shall con- 
tinue to decline." 

As to further promotion, it was natural that Han- 
cock, Meade, and Thomas might each have hoped 
to be appointed lieutenant general after Sherman ; 
but Sheridan had equal claims and a very popular 
record, and that question was set at rest by his ap- 
pointment. When he died, all these distinguished 
generals had preceded him into "the silent land." 

It has not been considered necessary to dwell 



296 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



Upon the subject of his later appointments to 
command, complicated sometimes by the ques- 
tions of seniority, character of former services, etc. 
Through the kindness of Major W. H. Lambert the 
following letter, now first printed, opens to the read- 
er a glimpse of the feeling of Thomas when the ques- 
tion of assigning him to the command in New Or- 
leans was first considered. While he manfully gives 
his own reason for declining the assignment, his 
friends really think that the germs of the disorder 
which carried him off were already in his system, 
and that he had great reason for the utmost care, 
although he did not appear to think so. 

[copy.] 

" Louisville, Ky., September 7, 1867. 
" Dear Colonel : . . . I wish to remove any im- 
pression which may have been made on your mind 
regarding the state of my health. Early in the sum- 
mer Dr. Hassen, at my request, gave me medicine as 
an alterative after I had described to him a peculiar 
sensation which I had in my right side. It was dis- 
agreeable, and that is all that can be said of it ; but 
the doctor thought that unless I took blue mass, 
to restore a healthy action of the liver, I might 
eventually be attacked with some disease of the 
liver that would be very disagreeable if not lead to 
worse consequences. The medicine had given me 
great relief, but in the course of time I had to go to 



THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE AND RESULTS. 297 

West Virginia on official business, that State being 
now a part of my command. It so happened that 
while on that trip the President issued his order for 
me to relieve Sheridan. I have heard that Dr. Has- 
sen, as soon as the order reached him, telegraphed 
to the adjutant general that he did not think it right 
to send me to New Orleans in the yellow fever sea- 
son, because of what he knew of my condition. I 
heard of the order in Lewisburg, West Virginia, and 
immediately protested to General Grant against go- 
ing to New Orleans, not on the score of health or 
because the yellow fever was in New Orleans, but 
because of the hostility of the people toward me, 
making it impossible for me to be of any service in 
endeavoring to reconstruct the Southern States. In 
fact, I made the same protest against going to New 
Orleans that I did last May against taking command 
of the Third Military District. I presume, to ease 
off the withdrawal of the order, it was stated that, 
owing to the unfavorable condition of my health, as 
reported by the Medical Director of the Depart- 
ment of the Cumberland, I was released from the 
operation of General Order No. 77, and Hancock 
was detailed to assume command of the Fifth Mili- 
tary District after being relieved by Sheridan. . . . 
Yours truly, 
(Signed) " George H. Thomas. 

" Colonel R. A. Ramsey, Fottsville, Fa" 



CHAPTER XIII. 

LAST SERVICES AND DEATH. 

Eastern military division given to Meade — Thomas goes to the 
Pacific — Health undermined — Death at San Francisco, 1870 
— Apoplexy — Died in harness — Body taken to Troy, N. Y. 
— General sorrow — Committee of Congress — Pall-bearers — 
Monuments — Unveiling of the equestrian statue at "Washing- 
ton — Men of all politics join — Summary of his character — 
High honor — Independence — Refusal of gifts — Self-sacrifice 
— His sensitiveness — Both strategist and tactician — Contro- 
versies dying out — His ever-increasing reputation. 

After the war General Thomas was long de- 
sirous to have command of the Eastern Division of 
the army ; but as it had been promised to General 
Meade, who ranked him as a major general by four 
months, he accepted the command of the Military 
Division of the Pacific, and reached San Francisco 
on the ist of June, 1869. 

It is said that the order assigning Schofield to 
that division had been actually written, but that 
Schofield declined it in favor of Thomas. On the 
point of etiquette, however, it should also be said 
that Thomas claimed that assignment as his right. 
With characteristic system and energy he made a 
thorough inspection of all the posts in the entire 



LAST SERVICES AND DEATH. 



299 



territory of his command, but his labors were ap- 
proaching their end, and that a sudden one. He 
was to be one of a large number of distinguished 
generals who, by reason of their hard lives during 
the war, carried latent within them the seeds of 
premature death, although they presented the ap- 
pearance of general health and vigor. 

On the 28th of March, 1870, he had gone to his 
office in San Francisco, and was sitting in his private 
room, when, shortly after one o'clock, his aid-de- 
camp. Colonel Kellogg, was preparing to go in to 
obtain his signature to certain papers. All the other 
officers having left the building for luncheon. Gen- 
eral Thomas opened the door of the inner office, 
and, falling outward, became unconscious. Calling 
a messenger to aid him, Colonel Kellogg loosened 
his clothing, and then placed him upon a sofa, throw- 
ing the doors and windows open for air. The day 
was murky and disagreeable. The army surgeons 
were sent for — Drs. Murray and McCormick — but 
by reason of a delay in finding them, a young physi- 
cian who was nearer was called in. Slight but tem- 
porary relief was given by the remedies adminis- 
tered, and the general returned for a few minutes 
to consciousness. Mrs. Thomas was prepared for 
the sad news of his illness, and joined him in his 
office before he died. 

The last paper issuing from his pen was an an- 
swer to a letter in the New York Tribune of March 



300 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



12, 1870, unjust in the extreme, and which had given 
him great pain. It was severely criticising the Nash- 
ville campaign in the interests of Schofield. The 
closing words which he had written were blurred and 
somewhat incoherent. The abrupt close of the pa- 
per reads thus : " The necessity existing until the 
army fell back to Nashville gave Schofield the op- 
portunity to fight the battle of Franklin. This was 
a very brilliant battle, most disastrous to the enemy, 
and, as the writer in the Tribune says, no doubt ma- 
terially contributed to the crowning success at Nash- 
ville." "Then follow the blurred and disconnected 
lines attempted while he was suddenly struck by the 
hand of death. 

Soon relapsing into unconsciousness, he died 
shortly after seven o'clock that evening. An au- 
topsy made the next day determined the cause to be 
apoplexy. Two arteries near the heart had been 
somewhat ossified, and were found broken. *' He 
literally died," says his aid-de-camp, " in harness." 
His death occurred and he was laid out in the office 
where he had worked, and he was carried thence to 
the Lick House, where he had lived and where the 
funeral services were held. 

Thence by rail his body was taken across the Con- 
tinent, from the Pacific to the Atlantic, to the fami- 
ly lot at Troy, on the Hudson. There his remains 
arrived in charge of his personal staff on the 7th 
of April, 1870. It may be said that they crossed 



LAST SERVICES AND DEATH. 301 

the Continent amid the mourning and high pane- 
gyric of every State they passed through. Taken 
at once from the station to St. Paul's Church, they 
were visited by thousands, among whom were the 
President of the United States, with members of 
his Cabinet and other high functionaries from all 
parts of the land. General Thomas had died on the 
28th of March. On the 30th a joint resolution was 
passed by Congress declaring the national sorrow 
for his loss. At a meeting held in the hall of the 
Ho-use of Representatives a committee of thirteen 
— six senators and seven representatives — was ap- 
pointed to attend the funeral. 

The public buildings and many others were cov- 
ered with funeral emblems. The pallbearers were 
his most distinguished comrades of the war — Gen- 
erals Meade, Rosecrans, Schofield, Hazen, Granger, 
Newton, McKay, and Hooker. The funeral services 
were conducted by William C. Doane, D. D., Protes- 
tant Episcopal Bishop of Albany, and the remains of 
the splendid soldier and model man were deposited in 
the funeral vault, in waiting for a more blessed im- 
mortality. The monument marking the spot Mrs. 
Thomas* preferred to erect herself in Oakwood 
Cemetery ; it is a sarcophagus, on which are in- 
scribed the dates of his birth and death, and on the 

* This estimable lady, who made her residence in Washington 
city, followed her husband to the grave on December 26, 1890. 
She was found dead in her bed. 



302 GENERAL THOMAS. 

top a granite eagle holding a model of the sword 
with which he achieved his great renown. 

Honors to his Memory. — At the time of his death 
General Thomas was the President of the Society 
of the Army of the Cumberland, which had been 
founded in February, 1868.* His inaugural speech 
at Cincinnati was an admirable exposition of his 
character, and a fine opening for the Society, which 
exists still in pristine vigor. At their first meeting 
after his decease, among other resolutions, the fol- 
lowing was passed: '^ That some fitting monument 
should be erected by his countrymen to mark the 
spot where the remains of our beloved commander 
rest, and that this Society shall take the initiatory 
steps for its erection. And to that end a com- 
mittee of one from each State represented in this 
Society be now appointed to arrange some method 
to procure the necessary funds, and to provide a 
design, specifications, and estimates therefor, and 
to report at the next meeting." As has been seen, 
the spot in Oakwood Cemetery, at Troy, was marked 
by the monument provided by Mrs. Thomas. An 
equestrian statue was proposed. Congress appro- 
priated captured brass guns, and the statue was 

* The badge of the army, which had been formally adopted 
on June 19, 1865, at Nashville, was a five-pointed star, in the 
center of which was a triangle inclosing an acorn ; the ribbon is 
red, white, and blue, and on the pin is engraved " The Army of 
the Cumberland." 



LAST SERVICES AND DEATH. 303 

made by J. Q. A. Ward. It is one of the most suc- 
cessful of the statues of our great soldiers. 

The committee, which had been further appointed 
on the statue to be erected at Washington, met from 
time to time, but nearly ten years had elapsed before 
they reported that the statue had been cast and ac- 
cepted, and the Society in large numbers were ready 
to unveil it on the 20th of November, 1879. The 
time chosen was the eleventh annual convention of 
the Society of the Army of the Cumberland, and it 
brought together a great number of his former com- 
rades of the society and representatives of sister 
societies. There was a general interest, confined to 
no party or military class. Letters from Generals 
Grant and Sheridan and other most distinguished 
military men and statesmen, who were prevented 
from attending in person, were read. It was far 
more than the ordinary nil tiisi bomwi. The memory 
of his worthy deeds and august virtues was still 
abroad throughout the country, and there was a 
general concurrence of high honor to his memory. 
One distinguishing mark of the correspondence was 
the eminent appreciation of Thomas by the old Con- 
federate commanders, who, forgetting and forgiving 
the ancient quarrel, were loud in their praise of the 
man and the soldier. 

Senator Butler, of South Carolina, says : " I 
should have great pleasure in being present at 
your interesting ceremonies, whereby you propose 



304 GENERAL THOMAS. 

to do honor to the memory of one of the ablest of 
American soldiers." Senator Withers, of Virginia, 
who had been a Confederate general, said : " The 
occasion is one of great interest to all who ad- 
mire manliness and courage, unselfish devotion to 
duty, and military genius of the highest order." 
The Governor of Alabama writes : " It was my 
fortune to fight on the other side, but I none the 
less appreciate the devotion and sacrifices of the 
humane soldier, and am none the less proud of his 
splendid deeds of endurance and daring." 

Later, the Confederate Colonel Archer Anderson, 
in an address delivered in Richmond before the 
Army of Northern Virginia, on October 22, 1881, 
highly eulogizes " this distinguished Virginian, 
George H. Thomas, who was at the head of a 
corps," and declares that while "there have been 
times when a Virginian might not be trusted to 
speak impartially of this famous Virginian, sixteen 
years have assuaged the bitterness of civil strife so 
that justice may be done him." General Dabney H. 
Maury eulogizes him, and General David H. Hill 
says that Thomas gave the death blow to the Con- 
federacy at Chickamauga. 

Perhaps the tribute of General Anson G. Mc- 
Cook, the orator of the occasion, was at once the 
most just, splendid, and enthusiastic eulogium that 
found utterance at that time. These are his closing 
words : '* His patriotism was not circumscribed by 



LAST SERVICES AND DEATH. 



305 



the narrow limits of his native State, but it was as 
broad and catholic as his own great nature. Vir- 
ginia, the mother of States and statesmen, has been 
the birthplace of many whose fame and virtues are 
the common heritage of the republic, but the State 
of Washington, of Jefferson, of Madison, of Mar- 
shall, and of Scott never brought forth a nobler 
son, a better citizen, a truer soldier, or a more un- 
selfish patriot than George H. Thomas." 

The bronze statue was erected in the fine open 
space at the intersection of Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island, and Vermont Avenues, and Fourteenth and 
M Streets. The eloquent presentation address was 
made by the Hon. Stanley Matthews, and the statue 
was received for the nation by the President of the 
United States. 

By special invitation of the Society, General Gar- 
field delivered at Cleveland, Ohio, a memorial ad- 
dress on his life and achievements, in which he dwelt 
particularly on the service he knew best, for he was 
with him then at the battle of Chickamauga. Every- 
where his death was regarded as a national calamity. 

The author's task has come to an end. A fuller 
life might have been written, but the purpose of this 
work is not to give details of his actions so much as 
to combine statistics with the object of drawing 
conclusions as to his character and merits. It is 
intended as a miniature of the man. If the great 



3o6 GENERAL THOMAS. 

deeds and high character of General Thomas, as 
attempted to be delineated in this volume, do not 
fully bear out the conclusion just enunciated, the 
fault must be in the author. 

His personality at the opening of the war has 
been already portrayed. He grew with its con- 
tinuance in power, virtue, and excellence. He was 
modest and retiring, but firm and exceedingly inde- 
pendent. Always a man of refinement, he was no 
anchorite, but lived well in his campaigns, having 
perhaps a better appointed train of creature com- 
forts than many of his companion generals ; he 
was not abstinent but temperate, and kept a camp 
establishment such as Marmont prescribes for his 
model general "who fulfills all the conditions of 
command": "He should constantly dispense hos- 
pitality. Never should an officer come to his head- 
quarters on service without receiving due recog- 
nition and kind reception." He kept a good mili- 
tary household, and all who came were made 
comfortable. He had a naturally high temper, 
which he kept under good control. When it did 
explode it was to denounce injustice and unman- 
liness wherever it appeared ; he was at once an ex- 
emplar and a judge. Firm in the Christian faith, 
he did not flourish his opinions before the world, 
but kept them for his own self-communings — a sacred 
secrecy which his biographer must not invade or 
speculate upon. 



LAST SERVICES AND DEATH. 307 

There is little to be added to the record of his 
character and his fame. He scorned the very first 
glimpses of sordidness and greed, and denounced 
them in unmeasured terms. Although not a rich 
man, and although he considered, be the truth what 
it may, that his services had not been properly ap- 
preciated and remunerated, he constantly refused to 
receive presents from any source, although others 
were receiving them, and when it was not con- 
sidered wrong to accept them. Grateful citizens of 
wealth were offering to distinguished defenders of 
the country houses, ready money, and all sorts of 
gifts. He was particularly sensitive on that score. 
Just as the war was coming to a close, a number of 
his admirers found no difficulty in making up a long 
purse to buy him a house in Cincinnati, as houses 
had been bought for distinguished generals in other 
cities. As soon as he heard of the project he nipped 
it in the bud, declaring to those who had it in hand 
that nothing could prevail upon him to accept such 
a present, but that if they wanted to make good use 
of the money they might distribute it to needy wid- 
ows of soldiers who had died during the war. 

When in the month of May, 1869, he was about 
to leave Louisville in order to take command on the 
Pacific coast, another opportunity of showing his 
objection to receiving gifts presented itself. Just 
at the close of the war a considerable number of 
officers of the Union army, who had resigned or 



3o8 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



been mustered out of service, had taken up their 
residence in Tennessee and the Gulf States. During 
the brief but stormy reconstruction period they had 
a hard time, not only being socially ostracized but 
treated with injustice, and even with contumely. 
General Thomas took their part, protected and sup- 
ported them, and made it possible for them to retain 
their residence until the evil days were over. When 
he was about to leave they wished to acknowledge 
his kindness by presenting him with a handsome 
service of silver. It was purchased at Nashville, 
and the pieces were marked with his name. The 
committee, proud of their duty, presented them- 
selves at his office and were about to offer him the 
service. " He firmly declined," says his aid-de-camp, 
Colonel Kellogg, " to accept it, and, as I thought at 
the time, with considerable and unnecessary asper- 
ity ; but the would-be donors, knowing his charac- 
teristic in that particular, did not take offense at it, 
but seemed rather amused that he should even refuse 
to be the recipient of a testimonial from those whom 
he had practically benefited." And so they went 
back with the silver, and nobody knows what be- 
came of it. He used to say quietly but firmly on 
such occasions that he was satisfied with his pay, 
and could live on it. In this respect he was one of 
the few exceptions to the almost universal custom. 

The occasions of self-sacrifice which kept him at 
his post while other officers were taking leaves were 



LAST SERVICES AND DEATH. 309 

very numerous, but he never made a display of 
his devotion to duty. His conduct in this regard 
may be epitomized thus: He never crossed the 
Ohio River to go northward from September, 186 1 
— just before the battle of Mill Springs — until the 
winter of 1865, and during that period he was con- 
stantly with his troops and in the presence of 
the enemy. This is an unparalleled record. He 
never laid his eyes on his wife from August, 186 1 — 
when he saw her for a day or two, before he went 
southward, at New Haven, Conn., where she was 
spending the summer — until he sent his aid-de-camp, 
her nephew, to bring her to him in Nashville, in Oc- 
tober, 1864, while he was preparing for the great 
conflict at that place. Mrs. Thomas remained one 
month with him at Nashville, when he sent her 
North again, while he remained to fight the great 
battle there, which proved him to be second in abil- 
ity to no general the war produced. 

It may give a clew to his views as to the subject 
of slavery that while in Texas, where it was difficult 
to hire a servant, he bought a negro woman to act 
as cook, and felt that he was doing violence to no 
principle in that ; but when the question came up as 
to what he should do with her when he no longer 
needed her service, he could not bring himself to 
sell her again, but made such dispositions for her 
future comfort as were required by the new order of 
things. He evidently felt that as her master, and 



3IO 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



after the war her protector and that of her husband 
and children, he could see that she was treated 
kindly and justly. But to sell her again would have 
risked the chance of her falling into cruel hands, and 
this suffering he would not expose her to. The dis- 
tinction is a nice one and fully accords with the view 
of slavery which he afterward set forth, and which 
men like Randolph of Roanoke and other such lib- 
eral spirits had held for a long time previously, viz. : 
To hold the slaves who had fallen to their inherit- 
ance, to treat them with humanity and kindness, 
never to sell one, and to manumit them at the death 
of the owner. 

A distinguished war correspondent — not, however, 
himself a soldier — has made the following distinction 
between Thomas, Sherman, and Grant : that Thomas 
was a tactician, Sherman a strategist, and Grant was 
both. We must dissent in part from this opinion. 
In the old times strategy meant the skillful direction 
of masses upon objective points. General Grant, 
to whom we have accorded a high place in both 
these characters, once said to a friend: "I don't be- 
lieve in strategy, in the popular understanding of 
the term ; I use it to get up as close to the e?iemy as 
practicable with as little loss as possible'' " And what 
then. General ? " " Then up, guards, and at 'em ! " 

That is the most practical explanation of modern 
strategy, and indeed is the best form which it ever 
assumes. Let us be technical and didactic in mili- 



LAST SERVICES AND DEATH. 311 

tary matters. Grand tactics is the bringing and the 
arrangement of men upon an extended field of bat- 
tle, while tactics proper, or battle tactics, is maneu- 
vering and fighting these men when they are brought 
there. In spite of his disclaimer, it was in strategy 
rather than tactics that Grant excelled. Without 
making odious comparisons, we are impelled to say 
that Thomas was great in all these methods. His 
conception of the campaign of Mill Springs at the 
beginning of the war, which would have been more 
complete if he had been permitted to take his own 
course ; and his movement upon Nashville near its 
close, after leaving Sherman — with the intervening 
and temporizing battle at Franklin, displayed him as 
a strategist of no subordinate rank ; while his match- 
less handling of troops at Stone's River, " where," in 
the words of Garfield, " he was the unmoved and 
immovable pivot around which swung our routed 
right wing," and when, the right having been scat- 
tered, he formed a new center upon which the 
army could rally; and his marvelous dispositions at 
Chickamauga, when he had been left with twenty 
thousand men to bear the repeated hammering as- 
saults of sixty thousand flushed with success, and 
where he stood like a rock and saved the army, 
prove him to have been a master at once of grand 
and battle tactics, for that field was the rarest com- 
bination of both in military annals. 

From his subordinate position in most of the 



312 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



campaigns he had little opportunity except in the 
Nashville campaign to show what he was as a strate- 
gist ; and so his record is that of a superb tactician 
handling troops on the field of battle, promptly 
meeting the enemy's unexpected movements, re- 
fusing his flanks when they were threatened, form- 
ing new lines when the first were untenable — in 
short, being ubiquitous, judicious, and coolly valiant 
in every action in which he was engaged. 

While thus unrivaled as a tactician, he seems to 
have created opportunities which suggest his power 
as a strategist. The man who recast the field of 
Stone's River, who destroyed the scheme of the Con- 
federates at Chickamauga, and conceived the cam- 
paign at Nashville, only needed opportunity to rank 
high in military annals as a strategist. 

Something has been said as to his disappointment 
at being overlooked and held back for the benefit of 
others. It may be that he was a little morbid in this 
respect ; if so, he only magnified to some extent a 
grievance which really existed. He had been looked 
upon with suspicion, and he knew it. He fought his 
way to eminence " without favor or affection " on 
the part of the Government; we leave the question 
of "partiality," unsolved. He told the literal truth 
when he said they gave him promotion which they 
dared not withhold, for he was one of the only 
generals of whom it could be said that he never 
had been defeated. 



'^ 



LAST SERVICES AND DEATH. 313 

The story is told that once an officer said to Gen- 
eral Joe Johnston — as has been said of others — that 
Thomas "did not know when he was whipped." 
Johnston answered, " Rather say he always knew 
very well when he was not whipped." 

Despising politicians and frequently declaring 
that much of what the country was then suffering 
might be attributed to them, he never asked their 
aid in asserting his claims, as others did. It is a 
significant fact that he never saw Mr. Lincoln, for 
he never went to Washington after the war broke 
out until a year after it had come to an end. 

A conqueror upon every battlefield upon which 
he fought, it may be said that he had not the op- 
portunities of showing his highest talent. Every 
military problem thus far presented to him he had 
been able to solve, and behind every one of his 
great deeds there was a surplus of power that showed 
him capable of greater. Other men, full of impulse 
and impetuosity, dashed and failed, and dashed 
again. Thomas, moving more cautiously in order 
to be sure, did not fail. 

In bringing his life to a close we find ourselves 
lingering over his many virtues ; for great as he 
was in soldiership and generalship and in military 
administration of all kinds, we dwell with peculiar 
pleasure upon his self-respect, his clear sense of jus- 
tice, his truth and honor, his modesty and humanity, 
and his moral purity. 



314 GENERAL THOMAS. 

The personal appearance of General Thomas has 
been already described at an earlier period of his 
history. We have claimed for him many of the 
moral characteristics of George Washington. Many 
have shared this opinion. General Jacob D. Cox, 
who was at Franklin and Nashville and who wrote 
a history of the campaign, says : " I have often said 
I looked upon him as the most Washingtonian 
character of our recent history." 

General Garfield, in his memorial address, finds 
coincidences in the character of Thomas with Zach- 
ary Taylor and the Duke of Wellington, and then 
adds : " On the whole, I can not doubt that the most 
fitting parallel to General Thomas is found in our 
greatest American. . . . The personal resemblance 
of General Thomas to Washington was often the 
subject of remark. Even at West Point Rosecrans 
was accustomed to call him ' General Washington.' 
He resembled Washington in the gravity and dignity 
of his character, in the solidity of his judgment, 
in the careful accuracy of all his transactions, in his 
incorruptible integrity, and in his extreme but un- 
affected modesty." Thomas had also another per- 
sonal likeness; a comparison of his portrait with 
that of General Scott in Appletons' Cyclopaedia 
of American Biography can not fail to strike one 
with his resemblance to that great general. It 
is more than a martial likeness or a resemblance 
of distinguished Virginians. In the lines of the 



LAST SERVICES AND DEATH. 315 

face, the stern eyes, and the determined lips are 
found the indexes of a similar character within. 
Thomas Carlyle, in his quaint way, might have 
called him Washington-Scott, and the name would 
have been significant of his character; but his own 
name — George H. Thomas — is his surer passport to 
the temple of fame, in which, as in that ^' House" 
of Chaucer, he will be placed upon a pedestal of the 
finest gold. 

When Professor Mahan, in 1870, announced to a 
section at West Point the death of Thomas, intelli- 
gence of which had just been received, he said that 
an attempt would be made to exalt General Lee by 
comparing him with Washington, but that the man 
of this war who approached nearest and very nearly 
to the character of Washington was George H. 
Thomas. Mahan had taught him as a cadet and 
followed his career with great and detailed interest. 

One word in conclusion. The object of this 
book is to individualize Thomas, to display his 
characteristics, to eulogize his merits, and to present 
a sketch of the man as he stood and lived among 
men — the gallant and courteous gentleman, the cool 
and intrepid soldier, the determined and sagacious 
general, the honest and honorable man ; but in such 
a work he would not wish the author to forget, had 
he the power to speak, the many brave officers and 
men who fought with him and under him and were 
contributors to his renown. Nor should we do so. 



3i6 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



Most of the distinguished ones have gone like him 
to the spirit land. A few remain, and whenever 
memories of Thomas are recalled they stand around 
him in goodly numbers, both proclaiming his glory 
and, by their reciprocal admiration, adding to their 
own. Not one of them but is proud of the dis- 
tinction of having fought with Thomas in the great 
war for the restoration of the Union, and they 
have imparted this spirit to those who come after, 
so that the reputation of Thomas, always great and 
unquestioned from the first, has found a larger area 
from year to year, and at the present time he stands 
in history without an enemy, with increasing hosts 
of friends, and with scarcely a critic of his high 
and honorable career. 

The reader of this work will perceive that the 
controversies of all kinds connected with the career 
of General Thomas have been only referred to^ and 
considered in so far as they concern his character 
and conduct and affect his reputation as a general 
and as a man. 

I have had two reasons for this course. The first 
is that in all wars many conflicting claims are set 
forth, and the claimants are championed according 
to their importance by friends and followers who 
become partisans. To enter into this region is hope- 
less, and the philosophic historian keeps as far as 
possible out of it, only singling and succoring his 
hero and hurrying him through the hurly-burly at 



LAST SERVICES AND DEATH. 31^7 

as fast a pace as is warrantable. The second and 
stronger reason is that the high and noble career of 
George H. Thomas is in itself the best answer to 
all critics and cavilers. 

Since I have undertaken this task I have been 
surprised to find what a universal sentiment there is 
in his favor. Conceding the great fame of Grant, 
there are few now who share his opinions of Thomas. 
The jargon of voices which hounded him at Nash- 
ville has now no supporters, and if we may consider 
Messrs. Nicolay and Hay as echoing the voice of 
Lincoln, it is manifest that that illustrious man did 
not share the opposition to Thomas of Halleck, 
Stanton, et id genus onme. 

Thus, while the opponents are rapidly disappear- 
ing and have long been silent, there cluster around 
the august form of Thomas a splendid body guard of 
champions, not only from the Army of the Cumber- 
land and the Military Division of the Mississippi, but 
from every Union army in the field during the war, 
and from a number of Confederate generals against 
whom he was pitted in battle and are now loud in 
honoring his renown. 

Not among the least of his claims to greatness is 
the stern and uncompromising faith with which he 
kept his own name and fame. While he was slow to 
think any man his enemy, since he gave no reason 
for enmity, when injustice was clearly intended he 
denounced and resented it. 



3l8 GENERAL THOMAS. 

It should be added that he was always punctilious 
with regard to the reputation of others — a fact which 
is clearly to be discerned in all his reports, in which 
those who were his superiors or his subordinates 
were always treated with justice and generosity, the 
orders and instructions of the former being distinct- 
ly mentioned and the heroic actions of the latter 
cordially presented to the authorities who could re- 
ward them. 

While the purpose of a biography should need to 
present the subject of it in his completeness, not only 
as a hero but as a man, the special duty of a military 
biographer is manifestly to analyze his character as 
a soldier and as a general. Even at the risk, there- 
fore, of some repetition, it is deemed proper to sum- 
marize the great actions through which his reputa- 
tion was achieved, to value and weigh his successes, 
to follow his trains of thought and consider his plans 
of action, to note whether the issues were the just 
consequences of his projected purposes, to give just 
weight to his failures and disasters, determining im- 
partially to what extent he was responsible for them; 
finally, to make up and systematize in one clear 
view the completed work of his life. Let us attempt 
this with what conciseness is possible. 

General Thomas was an educated soldier in Gov- 
ernment service ; his loyalty was due to his Govern- 
ment, but he was also a Virginian, and in those 
stormy times many thought his allegiance was due 



LAST SERVICES AND DEATH. 



319 



to Virginia. He remained true to the Government, 
although he was reviled by the South and suspected 
at the North. He bore both forms of injustice 
equably, but he felt them both, and by brooding 
upon them became naturally somewhat morbid,* 

* The following communication from the Hon. Thomas L. 
James was received after the first portion of this work was printed ; 
it has a clear and dramatic interest : *' Returning from Cleveland 
on the train from the dedication of the Garfield Memorial, in May, 
i8go, Mrs. James and myself found ourselves in company with 
General Sherman as a fellow-traveler. During the journey Gen- 
eral Sherman conversed freely of the different commanders whom 
he had known, both on the Union and Confederate side, placing 
Johnston and Longstreet at the head of the Confederates. After 
speaking of Grant, Sheridan, McPherson, and others in the highest 
terms, he said that, after all, in many respects Thomas was a typ- 
ical soldier. ' Old Tom,' he said, ' as we always called him, was a 
classmate of mine at West Point, and was always a thorough gentle- 
man, thoughtful and respectful of other people's feelings, and who 
knew not only how to command but how to obey.' He then told 
us this story of the way Thomas was made a brigadier general. He 
said : ' Mr. Lincoln, in the early part of the war, sent for me to come 
to Washington. While there he did me the honor to consult me 
regarding the names of those he intended to nominate to the 
Senate for brigadier generals. After hearing the proposed list I 
said to him, " Why don't you nominate old Thomas?" His reply 
was that Thomas was born in Virginia, and there were some 
doubts as to his loyalty. In my most earnest manner I protested 
indignantly against this most cruel accusation. I said : " Mr. 
President, Old Tom is as loyal as I am, and as a soldier he is 
superior to all on your list." Mr. Lincoln said, " Will you be re- 
sponsible for him ? " and I unhesitating replied, " With the greatest 
pleasure." The President instantly sent his name among others to 
the Senate. In the afternoon of that day I went to the Senate 
Chamber to see my brother, John Sherman, of Ohio, and he told 
me of the names on the list of brigadier generals that had been 
sent to the Senate, and said they had all been confirmed, Thomas 



320 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



Pursuing the even tenor of his way, he displayed 
from time to time his wonderful military talent, and 
thus slowly disarmed Government opposition. At 
Mill Springs he won the first considerable victory 

with the rest. I then began to recollect that I had not seen 
Thomas for twenty years, and I had become responsible for him. 
It was a hot day, and the thing so worried me that I went to the 
War Department and asked where Colonel Thomas, now brigadier 
general, was to be found. I was told, in Maryland, some eight or 
ten miles from the city. So I ordered a carriage and started at 
once, my anxiety to see him impelling me to urge the driver to 
make as rapid time as he could. When I arrived at the place I 
inquired where Colonel Thomas was ; and the sergeant of the 
guard went with me to Thomas's tent, and found that he was in 
the saddle superintending some movement of the troops. Con- 
trolling my impatience, I waited in no easy frame of mind, that 
sultry day, for his return, and as there is an end to everything, 
Thomas came back at last and we greeted one another heartily. 
" Tom," said I, "you are a brigadier general." " I don't know of 
any one that I would rather hear such news from than you," he 
replied. " But," I said, " Tom, there are some stories about your 
loyalty. How are you going ? " " Billy," he replied, '* I am going 
South." " My God ! " I exclaimed, " Tom, you have put me in an 
awful position ; I have become responsible for your loyalty." " How 
so?" said he ; so I related to him the conversation between Presi- 
dent Lincoln and myself, when he leaned back, and remarked, 
*' Give yourself no trouble, Billy ; I am going South, but at the 
head of my men." And so he did, and no nobler man, no braver, 
better soldier, and no more courteous gentleman ever lived.' 

" General Sherman then gave a very thrilling description of the 
battle of Nashville, which he said itself alone proved Thomas to 
possess all the qualities of a great commander. Mrs. James then 
asked him where he placed Hood as a soldier — if he ranked any- 
where near Johnston and Longstreet. ' No, madam,' energetically 
replied General Sherman, ' I don't ; still he always gave me a 
great deal of trouble and annoyance when he was in front of 
me. For, madam, there is no telling what such a fellow will do.' " 



LAST SERVICES AND DEATH. 



321 



for the Union arms and showed a generalship and a 
spirit which gave new life to the hesitating loyalty 
of Kentucky and Tennessee. Ever constant at the 
post of duty, he did unknown and unnoticed work in 
repairs and expeditions with reference to supplies 
and communications beyond, perhaps, any other gen- 
eral of his rank in the service. Seeking no promo- 
tion, he showed his justice and generosity in declin- 
ing it when it was thrust upon him at the expense of 
his friend and superior. 

At the battle of Perryville he was in a post of 
entire irresponsibility, but at Stone's River he held 
the key of the field and really won the victory as- 
cribed to his commander. 

In the long delay after that battle, while others 
were on leave in a series of rotations, he kept at his 
post, and when the colossal campaign of Chicka- 
mauga was begun he was its controlling genius, the 
star actor in the magnificent drama, the rock which 
hurled the enemy's forces back in evaporating spray. 
In the siege and battle of Chattanooga, although in 
a subordinate position, he was equally distinguished. 
He counseled and conducted his army with great 
judgment and valor in the Atlanta campaign. Hus- 
banding all his resources and resisting all clamorous 
importunities, he fought with resistless valor and 
achieved an unrivaled success at Nashville. Such 
is his favorable record as a general. What is there 
per contra to detract from it ? It is a hard question 



222 GENERAL THOMAS. 

to answer. He was accused by his superiors of 
being too slow. 

While it is easy to conceive of a more dashing 
man, of a light-hussar, Joachim-Murat sort of me- 
teor upon the field, to my mind the possession of 
such qualities would have been injurious to his char- 
acter, would have detracted from his solid merits. I 
can neither conceive of General Thomas other than 
he was, nor desire that he should have been other 
than he was. 

The make-up of two such different kinds of char- 
acter generally results in enormity. For his own 
wise reasons, God never makes perfect men, and so 
we rest satisfied with the great preponderance of ex- 
cellence in our hero. It is a source of regret, but it 
is due to the peculiar character of the man, that the 
biographer is unable to find those incidents and anec- 
dotes which, while they enliven the record, present 
the personality of the subject in a clear, social light. 
Most men have their moods as clearly distinguished 
as the sunshine and the twilight, and the little things 
that they do and say in these moods give great in- 
terest to the story of their lives.* 

* The following letter from General Van Vliet is in answer to 
a request for such details ; it came too late for earlier insertion : 

" Washington, D. C, May lo, 1893. 

" My dear Coppee : I am in receipt of your letter of the 5th 

instant. I do not know that I can aid you much. All who are named 

in Thomas's letter, given on a former page, were classmates, and all 

are dead except myself^Old Van, as I was always called. Sher- 



LAST SERVICES AND DEATH. 323 

It was less so with Thomas than with any of our 
distinguished soldiers. Always serious and dignified, 
we look in vain for racy anecdotes and sparkling 
pleasantries from his lips. I have questioned many 
of those who knew him, but they have no stories to 
tell concerning him. Even where an anecdote seems 



man, George H. Thomas, and I arrived at West Point on the same 
day, and all three were assigned to the same room, on the south 
side of the old south barracks. A warm friendship commenced in 
that room, which continued, without a single break, during our 
lives. We were all three sturdy fellows, which prevented our be- 
ing annoyed by older cadets. They commenced to haze us, as was 
the fashion of those days, but Thomas put a stop to it. One 
evening a cadet came into our room and commenced to give us 
orders. He had said but a few words when Old Tom, as we 
always called him, stepped up to him and said, ' Leave this room 
immediately, or I will throw you through the window.' It is need- 
less to say that the cadet lost no time in getting out of the room. 
There were no more attempts to haze us. When we graduated 
we consulted as to the regiments we should apply for. The Florida 
war was then going on, and we all concluded that we would apply 
for some regiment then in Florida, for we all wanted to see some 
actual fighting, and if we did not go to Florida we should never see 
any ; so we all joined the Third Artillery. History shows how 
near we came to the facts in our reasoning. 

" Who the Democrat was I can not imagine. Job Lancaster 
was a noble fellow — six feet tall and large in proportion. He 
was killed by lightning while on a scout. He was standing up in 
his boat. Hebert was Governor of Louisiana. He stood at the 
head of our class. All whom you mention were splendid men. 
In Cullum's History of the Graduates of West Point you will find 
the history of all. Fifty-three years — over half a century— have 
passed since we separated at West Point, and, of course, one for- 
gets many things in that time. . . . 
" Yours very truly, 

" Stewart Van Vliet, U. S. A. 
22 



324 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



to promise something, we see that he at least took 
the matter seriously. Prominent among the insignia 
of the Army of the Cumberland was the acorn, and 
the story is told that General Thomas, who had 
given strict orders against foraging, caught an Irish- 
man on the river bank with a pig which he had just 
killed. Bursting out with anger against this violation 
of his orders, he was about to consign him to the 
guard, when the Irishman turned to him, saying : 
'* You see, general dear, he was eating our corps 
badge, and it was for that I killed him." The gen- 
eral pardoned him out of jealousy for the corps badge 
rather than from a sense of pity or the ludicrous. 

No, the humorous side of Thomas's character 
was undeveloped, or at least no appearance of it is 
made to his biographer, however careful his search 
has been. 



INDEX 



Allatoona Pass, 206, 208, 210. 

Anderson, Colonel Archer, ex- 
tract from address of, 304. 

Anderson, General Robert, 37 ; 
health fails, 42. 

Appomattox Court House, sur- 
render at, 291. 

Army, Confederate, of Tennes- 
see, 95 ; under Bragg, 131 ; at 
Richmond, 276; disintegrated, 
290. 

Army, United States, increase 
of regiments, 11, 12 ; tabu- 
lated statement, 126. 

Atlanta campaign, troops ready 
to move, 201 ; system of turn- 
ings, 203. 

Atlanta captured, 224. 

Baird, General A., 177. 
Banks, General N. P., 201. 
Beauregard, General P. G. T., 

32, 76, 284. 
Blair, General Frank P., 210, 
Bragg, General Braxton, 15, 17, 

78, 97, 102, 107, 127, 128, 136, 

145, 157, 164, 171, 174, 181. 
Brannan, General J. M., 147. 
Breckinridge, General Robert 

J., loi, 144, 174. 
Brown, Fort, 14, 15. 



Brown, Major Jacob, 14 ; killed, 

15. 
Brown's Ferry, 165. 
Brownlow, William G., 45. 
Buckner, General S. B., with the 

Home Guard, 41, 44. 
Buell, General Don Carlos, made 

brigadier, 38 ; character, 53, 

74, 79, 82. 
Bull Run, 32, 34, 42. 
Butler, Matthew C, eulogy of 

Thomas, 303. 
Burnside, General Ambrose E., 

179. 

Camp Dick Robinson, 44. 

Canby, General E. R. S., 285, 
287, 288. 

Casino, Fort, 256. 

Chalmers, General Patrick R., 
271, 272. 

Chattanooga, forward to, 119 ; 
description of, 124 ; coinci- 
dence, 126 ; occupied, 160 ; 
' * I will hold the town till we 
starve," 164 ; plan of battle, 
170 ; battle, 172 ; retreat of 
the enemy, 178. 

Cheatham, General Benjamin 
F/, 245, 246, 252, 256, 270, 
285. 



326 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



Chickamauga, topography of, 
138 ; battle of, 140. 

Cleburne, General, 142, 209 ; 
killed at Franklin, 250. 

Cobb, General Howell, 2go. 

Columbia, Tenn., 245, 246, 247, 
252. 

Columbus, Ga., great destruc- 
tion, including ram Jackson, 
270. 

Corinth, 76 ; occupied, 77, 78. 

Couch, General D. N., 268. 

Crittenden, General George B., 
54. 55. 58, loi, 129, 136. 

Cumberland, Army of the, 46. 

Dalton, turning of, 204. 
Davis, General Jefferson C, 148. 
Davis, Jefferson, 24, 38, 110,230; 

captured, 291. 
Decatur, 229. 
Donelson, Fort, 256. 

Farragut, Admiral D. G., 201. 
Fitch, Lieutenant - Commander 

Leroy, 265. 
Florida War, cause of, 6 ; Indian 

warfare, 22. 
Floyd, General John B., 74. 
Forrest, General Nathan B., 

243, 251, 274, 289. 
Franklin, Schofield in peril at, 

245 ; situation of, 247 ; the 

battle, 249. 
Fry, General S. S., at Mill 

Springs, 57. 

Garfield, General James A. , 1 54 ; 
delivers memorial address on 
Thomas, 305, 314. 



Garrard, General Kenner, 51, 

222, 242. 
Gillem, Fort, 256. 
Granger, General Gordon, 149, 

245- 
Grant, General U. S., 60 ; at 
Pittsburg Landing, 75 ; at 
Vicksburg, 121 ; on his way 
to Chattanooga, 162 ; at Chat- 
tanooga, 169 ; Missionary 
Ridge, 177, 178 ; gives per- 
mission for movement through 
Georgia, 237 ; order from City 
Point, 245 ; impatient with 
Thomas, 259 ; order to Gen- 
eral John A. Logan, 260 ; en 
route to Nashville to take tem- 
porary command, 261 ; opin- 
ions of Thomas, 274, 284, 303. 

Halleck, General Henry W., 76 ; 
made general in chief, 78 ; 
letter to Thomas, 87 ; con- 
troversy with Rosecrans, 109. 

Hammond (Cavalry), 265. 

Hancock, General W. S., 295. 

Hatch, General Edward, 246. 

Hardee, Major W. J., 24, 174, 
214, 220. 

Hazen, General William B., 
141, 166. 

Hebert, Paul O., a classmate, 6. 

Henderson, General, 15, 

Hill, General David H., 304. 

Hooker, General Joseph, 161, 
162, 176, 221. 

Hood, General John B., 206, 
209, 210, 213, 214, 217, 218, 
219; evacuated Atlanta, 220, 

223, 228, 229, 230, 233, 236 ; 



INDEX. 



327 



brought to a last hope, 239 ; 
lack of numbers in his army, 
240 ; opinions of Sherman 
and Grant, 240 ; delayed, 
waiting for supplies, 243 ; ar- 
rangement of army under, 
243 ; in pursuit of Thomas, 

245 ; loses an opportunity, 

246 ; defiant parade in front 
of Nashville, 251 ; determines 
to move upon Nashville, 254 ; 
orders an attack upon Mur- 
freesboro, 257 ; line pierced 
at Nashville, 268 ; pursued 
across Harpeth River, 272 ; at 
Tuscumbia and Tupelo, 274 ; 
retires from command, 274 ; 
extract from Advance and 
Retreat, 275. 

Houston, Fort, 256. 

Jackson, General James S., 32 ; 
killed at Perryville, 83. 

Johnson, President, 45 ; im- 
broglio, 294. 

Johnston, General A. S., 24, 52, 
75 ; killed, 76. 

Johnston, General J. E., 32, 
182, 203, 205, 206, 208, 210, 
211, 212 ; relieved, 213, 275. 

Jonesboro, 219, 223. 

Kellogg, Frances L., Mrs. 

Thomas, 23 ; influence of, 27. 

Kentucky, political condition of, 

39. 
Kingsbury, Lieutenant C. P., 

letter, 7, 9, 
Kiowa expedition, 25. 
Knipe (Cavalry), 265. 



Lauderdale, Fort, Florida, 7. 

Lee, Admiral Samuel P., 265. 

Lee, General, 243, 256, 285. 

Lee, Lieutenant Colonel R. E., 
24 ; resigns and takes service 
for Virginia, 28 ; at Rich- 
mond, 285. 

Lincoln, Abraham, 38, 40 ; pre- 
liminary proclamation con- 
cerning slavery, 88 ; views 
concerning Thomas at Nash- 
ville, 261 ; compliments 
Thomas, 283. 

Logan, General John A., 260. 

Long, General Armistead L., 
289. 

Lookout Mountain, 175, 176. 

Lowell, James Russell, " Biglow 
Papers," 12. 

Mackall, General William W., 

290. 
Macon, captured, 290. 
Magoffin, Governor Beriah, 40. 
Mahan, Professor Dennis H., 

announces death of Thomas, 

315- 
Marietta, 211. 
Martin, Fort, 256. 
Mason, John T., 5. 
Matamoros, 14 ; evacuated, 15. 
Maury, General Dabney H., 

eulogy, 304. 
Meade, General George H., 

295 ; given Eastern Military 

Division, 298. 
Meridian Raid, 200. 
Mexican War, cause of, 12 ; 

first encounter, 14 ; the war 

ended, 19. 



32^ 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



Military Division of the Missis- 
sippi, i6i, i8i. 

Mill Springs, battle of, 55 ; re- 
sults of battle, 60 ; extracts 
from the report of Thomas, 
63 ; extracts from report of 
General Crittenden, 68. 

Missionary Ridge, plan of at- 
tack, 171, 

Mitchell, O. M., made brigadier, 
38 ; ordered to supersede 
Thomas, 49 ; order revoked, 
49. 

Mitchell, Robert B., 95. 

Monterey, Mexico, 15 ; battle 
of, 16. 

Montgomery, Ala., moved upon 
by Wilson, 289 ; surrendered, 
2S9. 

Moore, Colonel J. B., 242. 

Morgan, General John H., no. 

Murfreesboro, description of, 
96 ; delay at, 109. 

McArthur, General John, 242, 
267 ; efficient charge at Nash- 
ville, 267. 

McClellan, General George B., 
42. 

McCook, General A. G., 304. 

McCook, General A. McD., 52, 
83, 130. 

McDowell, General Irwin, 32. 

McPherson, General J. B., 181, 
203, 208, 210, 214 ; killed, 
221. 

Nashville, campaign of, 232 ; 
plan on grand chessboard of 
the war, 234 ; strategy of the 
campaign, 243 ; preliminary 



movements, 244 ; Hood's ac- 
count of Confederate move- 
ments, 252 ; description of, 
255 ; delays before the battle, 
257; impatience at Washing- 
ton, 258 ; Union line, 265 ; 
battle, 266 ; enemy attempts 
riposte^ 268 ; panic flight of 
enemy's left, 271 ; symmetry 
of battle, 272 ; enemy's losses, 
273 ; results of the battle, 
275, 283 ; remarks, 282 ; 
Union army very compact, 
270 ; second day of battle, 270. 

Negley, General James S., 99, 
no. 

Nelson, Lieutenant William, 
appointed brigadier general, 
44. 

New Hope Church, battle of, 
209. 

Ohio, Army of the, 82. 
Opdycke, Colonel Emerson, gal- 
lant charge at Franklin, 249. 
Orchard Knob, 173, 176. 

Palmer, General J. B., at Stone's 
River, in. 

Patterson, General Robert, 31 ; 
skirmish, 34 ; supported by 
Thomas, 37. 

Peach Tree Creek, battle of, 
214 ; description of, 216. 

Perryville, battle of, 80 : criti- 
cisms after, 83. 

Philadelphia City Troop, 31. 

Pillow, General G. J., 74. 

Pittsburg Landing, or Shiloh, 
75- 



INDEX. 



329 



Polk, General Leonidas, 95, 

137, 206, 209 ; killed, 211. 
Post, Colonel P. S., 271. 

Resaca, occupied by Thomas, 
208. 

Reynolds, General J. J,, at 
Chickamauga, 152. 

Rochelle, Elizabeth, mother of 
General Thomas, 2, 3. 

Rochelle, James, uncle, 4. 

Rosecrans, General William S., 
42 ; succeeds Buell over the 
head of Thomas, 86 ; assumes 
command of the Army of the 
Cumberland, 90; sketch of, 
91 ; at Tullahoma, 106 ; or- 
der from Washington, 121 ; 
letter to Halleck, 122 ; occu- 
pied Chattanooga, 129 ; gen- 
eral pursuit, 130 ; relieved of 
command of the Army of the 
Cumberland, 162. 

Schoepf, General, 48, 51, 53- 

Schofield, General John M., 212, 
214, 217, 231, 241, 245, 246; 
escapes peril at Spring Hill, 
247, 259, 265, 266, 268, 271, 
285, 298. 

Scott, Robert N., 262, 

Selma, description of, 288 ; de- 
stroyed, 289. 

Shepherd, Lieutenant -Colonel 
O. L., 114. 

Sheridan, General P. H., 99, 
148, 154. 177. 287, 295, 303. 

Sherman, General W. T., an- 
nouncement of Thomas's 
death, i ; classmate, 17 ; 



made brigadier, 38 ; succeeds 
Anderson, 42 ; in command 
of Army of the Cumberland, 
47 ; upholds Thomas, 49 ; 
succeeded by General Buell, 
52 ; on the way to Chattanoo- 
ga, 161 ; at Fort Wood, 169 ; 
at Missionary Ridge, 172 ; 
promoted to command of Mili- 
tary Division of the Mississip- 
pi, 181 ; advanced to relief of 
Burnside, 183 ; moves from 
Vicksburg and Memphis, 
200 ; composition of army, 
202 ; strategy, 212 ; taken at 
a disadvantage, 218 ; ordered 
an attack upon Hardee, 220 ; 
raised the siege of Atlanta, 
222 ; enters Atlanta and de- 
cides to destroy it, 224; to 
start on his famous march, 
229 ; order issued, October, 
1864, 237 ; opinion concern- 
ing Thomas, 262 ; moving 
through Atlantic States, 285 ; 
armistice, 288 ; return march 
from Savannah, 291. 

Shiloh, battle of, 75. 

Smith, General A. J., 231, 242, 
245, 251, 254, 256, 265, 266, 
267, 271, 274, 282, 285. 

Smith, General E. Kirby, 95. 

Smith, General G. W., Confed- 
erate, 290. 

Smith, General William F., at 
Brown's Ferry, 167. 

Smith, General William Sooy, 
201. 

Smyth, Professor, comments on 
Washington, 26. 



330 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



Spring Hill, purpose of Hood, 
246. 

Stanley, General David S., 231, 
241, 246, 249, 250. 

Stanton, Secretary E. M., 258, 
260, 263. 

Steedman, General James B., 
150, 245, 256, 265, 266, 270. 

Stewart, General A. P., 243. 

Stoneman, General George, 222 ; 
brilliant expedition, 287. 

Stone's River, battle of, 96 ; 
crossing of, 104 ; speech of 
Major William Lambert, 105 ; 
extracts from Thomas's re- 
port, 109. 

Taylor, General Richard, as- 
sumes command of Hood's 
army, 274 ; at Meridian, 286. 

Taylor, General Zachary, en- 
camped at Corpus Christi, 12, 
14, 16, 17 ; battles of Palo 
Alto and Resaca, 14 ; Buena 
Vista, 16. 

Tennessee, East, 43 ; Army of 
the, 75. 

Thomas, Benjamin, brother of 
General Thomas, 3. 

Thomas, General George H., 
eulogy, I ; family history, 4 ; 
deputy to the clerk of the 
court of Southampton Coun- 
ty, 4 ; entered West Point 
and graduation, 5, 6 ; joined 
his regiment at Governor's 
Island, 6 ; Florida War, 6-10 ; 
letter to Kingsbuiy, 7-9 ; 
joins Wade's command, 10 ; 
brevet first lieutenant, 10 : 



at Charleston, 11 ; detailed to 
New York city, 1845, n ; 
with General Taylor, 15 ; bre- 
vetted captain, 15 ; brevetted 
major, 18 ; appearance, 20 ; 
captaincy, 22 ; to Forts Inde- 
pendence and Adams, 22 ; de- 
tailed to Military Academy, 
22 ; marriage, 23 ; to Benicia 
Barracks, 23 ; to Fort Yuma 
and Jefferson Barracks, 24 ; at 
Forts Mason, Texas, San An- 
tonio and Belknap, 25 ; leave 
of absence, 25 ; decides to re- 
main with the North, 28 ; ac- 
cident, 28 ; to Carlisle Bar- 
racks, 30 ; promoted colonel, 
30 ; ordered to Valley of Vir- 
ginia, 31 ; letter to Patterson, 
35 ; " Rock of Chickamauga," 
35, 158 ; scruples overcome, 
and assigned to command of 
Army of the Cumberland, 39 ; 
assigned to Camp Dick Rob- 
inson, 45 ; letter from O. M. 
Mitchell, 48 ; at Rock Castle 
Hill, 51 ; at Crab Orchard, 52 ; 
ordered to join Schoepf, 55 ; at 
Mill Springs, 56 ; promoted 
to major general, 78; ordered 
to join Buell, 79 ; refuses com- 
mand of the Army of the Ohio, 
79 ; at Perry ville, 81 ; relieved 
by Rosecrans, 87 ; anecdote, 
100 ; at Stone's River, 106 ; 
eulogy, 118 ; Bragg's strategy, 
128 ; at Lookout Mountain, 
133 ; at Chickamauga, 137 ; 
placed in command of Army 
of the Cumberland, 161 ; or- 



INDEX. 



331 



der to Colonel Mackay, 168 ; 
at Missionary Ridge, 173 ; 
victory, 179 ; pursuit of the 
enemy, 180 ; contrast between 
Sherman and, 182 ; " Old 
Slow Trot," 183 ; extracts 
from report of Chickamauga, 
184-198 ; preparing for At- 
lanta campaign, 199 ; pursuit 
of Johnston's army, 205; mov- 
ing upon Resaca and King- 
ston, 208 ; suggests attack 
upon Marietta, 211 ; Peach 
Tree Creek, 212, 214 ; order 
of July 25, 1864, 215 ; compli- 
cation of untoward circum- 
stances, 218 ; Jonesboro, 219; 
order of September 9, 1864, 
225 ; directed to occupy Chat- 
tanooga, 228 ; to fall back to- 
ward Nashville, 229 ; position 
and composition of forces un- 
der, 231 ; a glimpse of his 
personality, 232 ; the tempo- 
rary command of Military 
Division of the Mississippi, 
234 ; compared with Hood, 
238 ; in supreme control of 
his army, 241 ; remarks on 
victory at Franklin, 253 ; es- 
tablishes two lines of intrench- 
ments about Nashville, 256 ; 
complaints against, 258; order 
from Grant to attack at once, 
259 ; telegram after Franklin, 
259 ; telegram to Halleck, 261 ; 
firmness against adverse criti- 
cism, 262 ; eulogy, 263 ; vin- 
dicated, 273 ; intends putting 
his army into winter quarters. 



273; loyalty, 275 ; " the begin- 
ning of the end," 276 ; order 
issued after battle of Nash- 
ville, 277 ; extracts from re- 
port of battle, 279 ; lecture 
on battle of Nashville, 281 ; 
meets Stanton at Washington, 

284 ; telegram from Halleck, 

285 ; a model chieftain, 286 ; 
vote of thanks from Congress, 

286 ; assigned to command of 
departments of the Ohio and 
Cumberland, 291 ; assigned to 
Military Division of the Ten- 
nessee, 292 ; part taken in re- 
construction, 292 ; wise policy, 

293 ; resolutions adopted by 
General Assembly of Tennes- 
see, 294 ; nominated by Presi- 
dent Johnson for brevets lieu- 
tenant general and general, 

294 ; declines brevets, 295 ; 
proposed a candidate for presi- 
dency of United States, 295 ; 
declines all civil honors, 295 ; 
letter declining command in 
New Orleans, 296 ; accepts 
command of Military Division 
of the Pacific, 298 ; apoplexy, 
299 ; paper to New York Trib- 
une, 300 ; death, 300 ; burial, 
301 ; monument, 301 ; honors 
to his memory, 302 ; statue at 
Washington, 303 ; presenta- 
tion address by Hon. Stanley 
Matthews, 305 ; summary of 
character, 306, 307 ; declines 
gifts, 308 ; unparalleled rec- 
ord, 309 ; views on subject of 
slavery, 309 ; compared with 



332 



GENERAL THOMAS. 



Grant and Sherman, 310 ; 
disappointment in being over- 
looked, 312 ; story, 313 ; moral 
characteristics, 314 ; resem- 
blance to Washington and 
Scott, 314 ; concluding re- 
marks, 315. 

Thomas, John, father of General 
Thomas, 2, 3. 

Tullahoma, campaign of, 107. 

Twiggs, General D. E., division 
commander, 15. 

United States annexed Texas, 
12. 

Van Home, B., biographer, 129, 

178, 227, 232, 247. 
Van Vliet, General Stewart, 

classmate, 6 ; letter to author, 

322. 



Wade, Major Richard D. A., 
commander of campaign 
against Seminoles, 10. 

Walker, General, no. 

Washburne, General C. C., 241. 

West Point, 5. 

Wheeler,General Joseph, 95,223. 

Wilson, General James H., 
231, 242, 248, 251, 257, 262, 
265, 268, 272, 274, 287, 288, 
290. 

Withers, Robert E., 303. 

Wood, Fort, 169. 

Wood, General Thomas J., 147, 
209, 241, 250, 265, 267, 270, 
271. 

Worth, Colonel William J., 
scouting in Florida, 8. 

Zollicoffer, General, 45, 47, 52, 
54, 56. 



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dents, of Congresses, of embassies, of treaties, 
of the ambition of poHtical leaders, and of the 
rise of great parties in the nation. Yet the his- 
tory of the people is the chief theme. At every 
stage of the splendid progress which separates the 
America of Washington and Adams from the 
America in which we live, it has been the au- 
thor's purpose to describe the dress, the occupa- 
tions, the amusements, the hterary canons of the times ; to note the changes 
of manners and morals ; to trace the growth of that humane spirit which 
aboHshed punishment for debt, and reformed the disciphne of prisons and 
of jails ; to recount the manifold improvements which, in a thousand ways, 
have multiplied the conveniences of Hfe and ministered to the happiness of 
our race ; to describe the rise and progress of that long series of mechanical 
inventions and discoveries v/hich is now the admiration of the world, and our 
just pride and boast ; to tell how, under the benign influence of liberty and 
peace, there sprang up, in the course of a single century, a prosperity unpar- 
alleled in the annals of human affairs. 

" The pledge given by Mr. McMaster, that ' the history of the people shall be the 
chief theme,' is punctiliously and satisfactorily fulfiUeti. He carries out his promise in 
a complete, vivid, and delightful v/ay. We should add t'lat the literary execution of 
the work is worthy of the indefatigable industry and unceasing vigilance with which 
the stores of historical material have been accumulated, weighed, and sifted. The 
cardinal qualities of style, lucidity, animation, and energy, are everywhere present. 
Seldom indeed has a book in which matter of substantial value has been so happily 
united to attractiveness of form been offered by an American author to his fellow- 
citizens." — Netv York Sun. 

"To recount the marvelous progress of the American people, to describe their life, 
their literature, their occupations, their amusements, is Mr. McMaster's object. His 
theme is an important 0)ie, and we congratulate him on his success. It has rarely been 
our province to notice a book with so many excellences and so few defects." — New York 
Herald. 

" Mr. McMaster at once shows his grasp of the various themes and his special 
capacity as a historian of the people. His aim is high, but he hits the mark." — 
New York Journal of Commerce. 

"... The author's pages abound, too, with illustrations of the best kind of histori- 
cal work, that of unearthing hidden sources of inform.ation and employing them, not 
after the modern style of historical writing, in a mere report, but with the true artistic 
method, in a well-digested narrative. ... If Mr. McMaster finishes his work in the 
spirit and with the thoroughness and skill with which it has begun, it will take its place 
among the classics of American literature." — Christian Union. 



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D. APPLETON & CO.'S PUBLICATIONS. 



HE HISTORICAL REFERENCE-BOOK, com- 
prising a Chronological Table of Universal History, a Chrono- 
logical Dictionary of Universal History, a Biographical Dic- 
tionary. With Geographical Notes. For the use of Students, 
Teachers, and Readers. By Louis Heilprin. Fourth edition, 
revised and brought down to 1893. Crown 8vo. 569 pages. 
Half leather, $3.00. 

" One of the most complete, compact, and valuable works of reference yet pro- 
ducftd." — Troy Daily Times. 

" Uneqiialed in its field." — Boston Courier. 

" A small library in itself." — Chicago Dial. 

" An invaluable book of reference, useful alike to the student and the general reader. 
The arrangement could scarcely be better or more convenient." — A'ew York Herald. ' 

"The conspectus of the world's history is as full as the wisest terseness could put 
within the space." — Philadelphia Afnerican. 

" We miss hardly anything that we should consider desirable, and we have not been 
able to detect a single mistake or misprint." — JVew York Nation. 

" So far as we have tested the accuracy of the present work we have found it with- 
out flaw." — Christian Union. 

" The conspicuous merits of the work are condensation and accuracy. These points 
alone should suffice to give the 'Historical Reference-Book ' a place in every public 
and private library." — Boston Beacon. 

"The method of the tabulation is admirable for ready reference." — New York 
Home Journal. 

"This cyclopaedia of condensed knowledge is a work that will speedily become a 
necessity to the general reader as well as to the student." — Detroit Free Tress. 

"■ For clearness, correctness, and the readiness with which the reader can find the 
information of which he is in search, the volume is far in advance of any work of its 
kind with which we are acquainted." — Boston Saturday Evening Gazette. 

" The geographical notes tvhieh accompany the historical incidetits are a novel 
addition, and exceedingly helpful. The size also commends it, making it convenient 
for constant reference, while the three divisions and careful elimination of minor and 
uninteresting incidents make it much easier to find dates and events about which ac- 
curacy is necessary. Sir William Hamilton avers that too retentive a memory tends 
to hinder the development of the judgment by presenting too much for decision. A 
work like this is thus better than memory. It is a ' mental larder ' which needs no care, 
and whose contents are ever available." — New York University Quarterly. 

A CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF UNIVERSAL 

-^ HISTORY. Extending from the Earliest Times to the Year 

1892. P'or the use of Students, Teachers, and Readers. By 

Louis Heilprin. i2mo. 200 pages. Cloth, $1.25. 

This is one of the three sections comprised in Heilprin 's "Historical 

Reference-Book, " bound separately for convenience of those who may not 

require the entire volume. Specimen pages sent on request. 

New York : D. APPLETON & CO., i, 3, & 5 Bond Street. 



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D. APPLETON & CO.'S PUBLICATIONS. 



'HE GILDED MAN {EL DORADO), and other 
Pictures of the Spanish Occupancy of America. By A. F. 
Bandelier. i2mo. Cloth, $1.50. 

The author here describes the adventures and romantic episodes attendant 
upon the early Spanish explorations of our Southwest. The scene of the 
story which gives its title to the volume is laid in Venezuela, and the legend 
of El Dorado is for the first time told accurately in popular form. With this 
exception the tales relate to our own country. They include the stories of 
the mysterious " Seven Cities of Cibola," " El Quivira," and others of equal 
dramatic interest and historical value. 

TJZARRIORS OF THE CRESCENT. By W. 

^^ H. Davenport Adams, author of " Battle Stories from Eng- 
lish History," etc. i2mo. Cloth, $1.50. 

" A. work without a rival in Its particular field. . . . All the gorgeousness of the 
barbaric East invests this glowing pageant of kings and conquerors. . . . This is a re- 
markably able book in thought and in manner of presentation." — Philadelphia Ledger. 

"A lively, carefully prepared chronicle of the careers of quite a number of the Mo- 
hammedan rulers in Asian regions who made their marks, one way or another, in the 
development of the peculiar civilization of the East. . . . This author has selected from 
the long chronicle the salients likely to be most interesting, and has obviously taken 
much pains to sift the fact carefully out of the rather confused mass of fact and fable in 
the Moslem chronicles." — New York Covtyfiercial Advey-tiser. 

" Nowhere in history are there to be found such records of conquest, such frightful 
tales of blood, such overwhelming defeats or victories, as in the lives of the Asiatic 
sovereigns. . . . The author is a historian who tells his story and stops. He has done 
his work faithfully and well." — Citicinnati Comviercial Gazette. 



P 



ICTURES FROM ROMAN LIFE AND STOR V. 
By Professor A. J. Church, author of " Stories from Homer," 
" Stories from Virgil," etc. Illustrated. i2mo. Cloth, $1.50. 

"Prof. Church is a tried and approved master of the art of interesting young people 
in historical themes. The present work, while too thoughtful to be called strictly juve- 
nile, treats of the great emperors and families of Rome in a simple narrative style cer- 
tain to captivate youth and older people fond of historic lore." — The Chautatiquatt. 

" In the thirty-six chapters comprised in the book there are as many stories, each 
begun and ended with the chapter. There are no long and tedious accounts. The 
reader gets the salient points of history. . . . Books of this kind have a special value 
by inducting young people into a love of historical reading and study." — Sau Fran- 
cisco Bulletin. 

"The material for these sketches is drawn partly from the inexhaustible riches of 
Plutarch, partly from contemporaneous history, and partly from letters, edicts, etc. ; 
and, well chosen and briefly related, are interesting, whetting the appetite of the stu- 
diously inclined. . . . Various illustrations add to the interest of the work." — Spring- 
Jield Republican. 

" Each of the chapters presents some striking scene or personality in the period from 
Augustus to Marcus Aurelius. . . . Several of the chapters are tlirown into the form 
of contemporary letters. The plan of the book is well conceived, and the subjects are 
fll^neral himiaiiLiiiterest." — New York Critic. 



YT 



New York : D. APPLETON & CO., i, 3, & 5 Bond Street. 



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